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Abstract 
This thesis attempts to explain Aristotle's conception of the self-mover (introduced in 
Physics VIII. 4-6) by analysing, in particular, the relationship between the locomotive 
faculty of the soul and the sumphuton pneuma. 
Aristotle's theory of self-motion calls for resolutions to three major problems: (a) how 
is self-motion to be explained without denying the existence of the first mover, i.e. the 
ultimate cause of the motions of all sublunary beings? (b) how is the self-motion of the 
living being different from the natural motion of the non-living being? and (c) what is the 
relationship between the unmoved moving part and the moved part of the self-mover 
(identified as the soul and the body)? 
Chapter I discusses (i) some potential problems that Aristotle faces in maintaining the 
theory of self-motion as a part of his overall theory of natural change, (ii) the characteristics 
and the relationships of the internal parts of the self-mover, and (iii) the reason for 
identifying the parts with the soul and the body. Chapter II turns to examine modem views 
on Aristotle's conception of the soul-body relationship, focusing on the functionalist 
interpretation of it as entailing compositional plasticity, viz. the view that the same 
psychological state may be realised by several different material states. 
Chapter III examines what psychological capacities are necessary for the arousal of 
animal locomotion and what their interrelationships are, whereas Chapter IV argues against 
Nussbaum's claim that Aristotle maintains that phantasia is an absolutely necessary 
capacity for an animal to arouse locomotion. Chapter V analyses the locomotive faculty 
and its relationship with the sumphuton pneuma. 
On the basis of this examination, this thesis ascribes to Aristotle the following claims: 
(al) that all natural beings have natures for initiating their own motions, which cannot be 
merely brought about by the external mover, (b l ) that self-motion is differentiated from 
natural motion in that, although both depend on external conditions, the former, unlike the 
latter, also depends on the internal condition of the mover, and (CI) that psychological 
capacities can be realised only in the pneuma and in nothing else. 
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This thesis aims to provide new perspectives on the conception of the self-mover in 
Aristotle's theory of change. The problem of self-motion in Aristotle has not gone 
unnoticed. 1 However, it has not received due attention and there are still many problems to 
be resolved. Moreover, attention has unfairly focused more extensively on, or given 
priority to, the psychological aspect of the self-mover and, as a result, the significance of its 
physiological aspect has been neglected. 
As we shall presently see, enquiring into Aristotle's conception of the self-mover is 
eventually enquiring into how to understand its capacity for self-motion which he explains in 
terms of the two inner parts of the self-mover (i.e. 'the unmoved moving part and the 
moved part' or 'the soul and the body'). In doing this, I shall focus on the question of 
whether Aristotle conceives the relationship between soul and body as contingent or as 
essential or, in other words, whether he maintains that the psychological capacity can be 
realised in different materials or only in one particular material. This is a significant 
question for, if their relationship is contingent and if priority is given to the psychological 
capacity of the self-mover, then we can presumably explain the self-mover in terms only of 
its psychological capacity. In contrast, if it is essential, then a full account of the self-mover 
must specify both its psychological capacities and its specific physiological constituent(s). 
On the basis of a detailed analysis of Aristotle's account of animal locomotion, I shall 
conclude that his conception of the self-mover implies this latter view. 
1 E.g. Furley (1978, pp. 55-67); Nussbaum (1978), esp. Essays I, 3, and 5; Nussbaum and Putnam (1992), 
pp. 27-56; Gill (1991), pp. 15-34. For a collection of articles on the matter, see Gill and Lennox (eds.) 
(1994). 
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Let us first consider some possible questions arising with respect to the conception of 
the self-mover. There is no doubt that Aristotle discusses the problem of self-motion mainly 
in Physics VIII. 4-6, but nothing else is immediately certain. As a result, the following 
problems remain puzzling: 
(1) Firstly, there arises a question about Aristotle's descriptions of the self-mover in Ph. 
VIII. 4 in relation to the reading of the conception of nature in II. 1. In II. 1, Aristotle tells 
us that not only living or ensouled beings (i. e. plants and animals) and their parts, but also 
non-living beings (i.e. the simple bodies-earth, air, fire, water) exist by nature. Since he 
defines natures as sources of motion and rest that they have within themselves, he seems to 
be saying that all natural beings are capable of their own motions without necessarily 
requiring any external mover (192b 9 ff).2 
However, in VIII. 4 Aristotle says that there is a difference between the motion of the 
living being and that of the non-living being (255a 6 ff.). And he appears to regard only 
living beings as self-movers. He describes the self-mover in various ways: that which moves 
itself without being moved by anything from without (252b 19 ff.), that which derives its 
motion from itself (254b 14-15), and that which contains the source of its motion within 
itself (241b 36-37). However, these descriptions do not at all help us distinguish the living 
being from the non-living being. For since, as mentioned, all natural beings are said to have 
within themselves natures that are the sources of their own motion, the non-living beings 
(i.e. the simple bodies), also appear to meet the conditions for self-movers. If so, what is 
the difference between natural motion, i.e. motion in virtue of nature, and self-motion, i.e. 
motion in virtue of soul, Aristotle has in mind? 
2 I place three and more than three references to Aristotle's texts in footnotes for a smoother reading. 
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Since natures are said to belong to all natural beings and the capacity for self-motion to 
the living being only, is it the case that Aristotle denies natures to the simple bodies or that 
he ascribes some additional sources of motion to living beings without denying natures to 
the simple bodies? More specifically, we might raise the following questions depending on 
whether natures are characterised as active or passive sources: if they are active sources, 
(1 a) does Aristotle deny natures in the simple bodies for the sake of ascribing the capacity 
for self-motion (in virtue of natures as active sources) to the living being? or (1 b) does he 
still allow natures to the simple bodies, whereas he ascribes an extended role of natures to 
the living being? And, if the answer to (1 b) is positive, we also need to ask (1 C) what sort of 
extended role Aristotle postulates in the case of the living being. On the other hand, if 
natures are passive sources, there would arise a modified version of question (1 b) which still 
requires the sort of question (1 C): does Aristotle think that the natures of non-living beings 
are passive, whereas the natures of living beings are active? and what are these active 
sources that are peculiar only to the living being? 
(2) In effect, it is not even clear whether Aristotle ever acknowledges the living being as a 
self-mover. This is mainly due to his statement at Ph. VIII. 6, 259b 6-17 where he appears 
to say that there is no self-motion because the most plausible example of self-motion, i.e. 
animal locomotion, is also 'in a strict sense' affected by the environment, i.e. an external 
mover. 
(3) There is also a question about whether he thinks that all living beings are capable of 
self-motion. In discussing self-motion, he uses the locomotion of the animal as an example 
and does not provide any discussion of the motion of the plant. Moreover, the reading of 
the passages at 253a 11-20 and 259b 6-17 seems to suggest that, if there is any self-motion, 
it would be locomotion. However, Aristotle elsewhere ascribes the capacity for self-motion 
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not only to animals, but to all en souled beings which include plants (255a 6-7). Thus we 
should ask whether he accepts not only animals, but also plants, as self-movers. 
(4) Aristotle explains self-motion in terms of internal parts of living beings (see esp. 257b 2 
if). However, it is unclear (4a) what the internal parts characterised as the unmoved 
moving part and the moved part are, (4 b) what their characteristics are, and (4 C) what their 
relationships are. 
There are other questions specifically concerning animal locomotion. 
(5) Aristotle in general explains each capacity of the living being in terms of a faculty of the 
soul (DA 413a 21 if). For instance, the living being is capable of nutrition in virtue of the 
nutritive faculty and the animal is capable of sense-perception in virtue of the sensitive 
faculty. Aristotle also appears to explain the capacity for locomotion in terms of the 
locomotive faculty (DA 414a 30 if). However, inDA III. 9-10 he introduces the appetitive 
faculty as the source of locomotion and seems to identify it with the locomotive faculty. 
There is, however, a difficulty in accepting the seeming identification of the two faculties. 
For Aristotle tells us that all animals have the appetitive faculty, whereas only some of them 
are capable of locomotion. 3 Thus the question of what exactly he thinks of the locomotive 
faculty (or the source of locomotion) remains obscure. 
(6) Another relevant question is what capacities animals reqUlre for locomotion. 
Aristotle's ascription of the capacity for locomotion only to some animals suggests that the 
conditions for being an animal are not sufficient for being a locomotive animal. What other 
capacities are necessary? Since the answer to this question is obscure, what kinds of 
animals he thinks of as locomotive is also obscure. 
3 Read 413b 22-24 and 414b 1-6 in conjunction with 413b 1-4 and 415a 6-7. 
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(7) Nobody will deny that locomotion is a clear example of a motion that the animal brings 
about by involving its body. However, if other psychological capacities are involved in the 
arousal of it, do they also involve a body and its change? The present thesis deals with all 
the above questions. 4 Once they are resolved, Aristotle's conception of the self-mover will 
appear consistent and sound. 
Why does the conception emerge as an issue at all in the Physics? This question is 
closely related to Aristotle's overall project in the treatise. In I. 1, he sets out to determine 
the primary causes or first principles of the existent through observations of particulars and 
theoretical reflections on them (184a 10 if). In VIII, he has established a number of 
principles based on his earlier examination of beings in motion. Among them is the principle 
that everything in motion must be moved by something else (e.g. 241b 34 if) until the chain 
of causes reaches the first unmoved mover which imparts motion to others without being 
moved (258b 32 ff.; Met. 1072a 21 if). Aristotle attempts to verify the principle by 
applying it again to beings in nature. At this stage, he notices that natural beings appear to 
initiate their motion without requiring any external mover or cause (Ph. 252b 13-28). 
However, Aristotle is unwilling to accept this observation as true. For if there are such 
beings, it may not be true that everything must be moved by something else, nor that there 
must be a first mover that is ultimately responsible for the motions of all beings. However, 
Aristotle acknowledges that the motion of living beings is more problematic than that of 
non-living beings and so they must be distinguished. Therefore his discussion of self-motion 
is initially an effort to distinguish the status of living beings from that of non-living beings, 
4 Since my main concern is animal locomotion, (3) concerning the self-motion of the plant, will receive 
only cursory attention. 
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both of which must not violate the principles he tries to establish. 5 Argued in this way, we 
shall see that for Aristotle there is no self-motion simpliciter. 
Chapter I begins by examining this matter in detail. Then I shall, in Sec. 1 (b) and (c), 
discuss whether the natures in the simple bodies must be regarded as passive sources. 6 We 
shall see that Aristotle maintains self-motion as a peculiar aspect of living beings 
'presupposing the existence of the first mover' as the simple bodies do. Thus the motion of 
the simple bodies (e.g. fire moving upwards or earth moving downwards) in relation to the 
first mover need not be understood as purely passive; it is active in a more qualified sense 
than that of living beings. I shall argue that Aristotle acknowledges natures as active 
sources to all natural beings, whilst he ascribes an extended role of natures to living beings. 
The rest of Chapter I primarily concerns the two internal parts of the self-mover (see 
questions (4a) and (4b) above). As mentioned, Aristotle explains the self-motion of living 
beings in the Ph. in terms of its internal parts, i.e. the unmoved moving part and the moved 
part. Aristotelian commentators usually identify the parts with the soul and the body 
without explaining why. I shall thus examine why they should be identified with each other 
by comparing the characteristics of the parts expounded in the Ph. with those of the soul 
and the body in the DA. 
Once they are identified, Chapter II embarks on the question how we should understand 
their relationships to each other, i.e. (4C). In effect, it is difficult, on the basis of the account 
given in the Ph., to understand what and how the internal parts of the living being 
contribute to the arousal of living activities. At this stage, the identification of the parts 
with the soul and the body provides us with more fruitful sources concerning their roles in 
5 So Furley (1978, p. 59) terms this 'a clash of motives'. Cf. Nussbaum (1978), p. 117. 
6 See question (1) above. Cf. e.g. Beavers (1988, pp. 357-374) who suggests that it is misleading to read 
natures in the simple bodies as the active sources for the reason that they presuppose the existence of the 
first mover. 
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living activities, a subject dealt with by Aristotle elsewhere. In this Chapter, by focusing 
mainly on the DA contexts, I shall examine some of the contemporary interpretations of 
Aristotle's hylomorphism and what kinds of problems they entail. 
Although Aristotle's hylomorphism has long been of philosophical interest in its own 
right, it is undeniable that the contemporary enthusiasm in the philosophy of mind has 
accelerated interest in it. In accordance with the development of modern philosophy of 
mind, Aristotle's theory of the soul-body distinction has been viewed from many different 
perspectives such as dualism and various forms of materialism. 7 
One of the powerful materialist interpretations is functionalism. In contrast to Fudey 
who explains animal locomotion in terms only of the animal's psychological capacity 
without considering its physiological aspect,8 Nussbaum, for instance, does consider its 
physiological aspect as well. 9 However, she claims that Aristotle regards as contingent both 
the form-matter relationship in an artefact and the soul-body relationship in a living being. 
For instance, as the shape of a star can be realised in many different kinds of matter, souls 
can be realised not only in flesh and bones, but also in many other materials, so all the forms 
are compositionally plastic (or multiply realisable). 
It is important to note that the functionalist does not deny that there is a physiological 
change occurring in accordance with a psychological activity. Nor does she claim that a 
psychological capacity can be realised in any and every sort of matter. What she claims is 
that it is not necessary for it to be realised in one and only one sort of matter, but in many 
different sorts of matter in so far as their physical properties allow. In this way, she 
maintains the compositional plasticity of form over matter within certain limits.lO Thus this 
7 For detailed references, see Ch. II. 
8 Furley (1978), esp. pp. 64-65. 
9 See note I above. 
10 E.g. Nussbaum and Putnam (1992), p. 45 & p. 48. 
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view embraces the identification of form with matter at a token level, but denies it at a type 
level. That is, it denies that in the case of animals it is not essential that souls must be 
realised in flesh and bones and in nothing else. The functionalist effort to deny the type-
type identification of the soul with the body may well be understood as an attempt to 
account for Aristotle's teleological account of living beings and their activities. 11 It is 
undeniable that Aristotle objects to Empedocles's account of the teleological activities of 
natural beings as the chance events of 'material bodies' .12 Noting this point, the 
functionalist claims that Aristotle explains 'the eye or the heart not in terms of what it is 
made of but in terms of its function-what it does, what it is for' . 13 Thus she goes on to 
claim that, since for Aristotle 'form' signifies 'function', he would acknowledge that 
something is a heart, for instance, in so far as it pumps blood without reference to what it is 
made of Indeed, this line of interpretation is strong since it accounts for Aristotle's 
frequent analogy between the hylomorphic constituents of the living being and those of the 
artefact (e.g. DA 412b 10 ff.) and, also, his emphasis on the necessity of some particular 
sort of matter of an individual being or substance. 14 
However attractive the functionalist view may appear, there are those who still remain 
unconvinced by it. 15 F or instance, Code and Moravcsik argue that the compositional 
plasticity of form is a modern conception which Aristotle did not think of 16 These anti-
functionalists (or essentialists) argue, on the basis of an analysis of Aristotle's conception of 
11 See Code and Moravcsik (1992), p. 135. 
12 Ph. 198b 34-199a 8; cf. 187a 20 fI. See also Aristotle's objection to his predecessors' materialist 
account of the soul at DA 404a 29 fI. 
13 Cohen (1992), pp. 58-59. Cf. Nussbaum and Putnam (1992), p. 74 fI. 
14 See e.g. Met. 1036a 26 fI. ('snub' is the concavity in the 'nose' or the animal is the soul embodied in 
'flesh and bones'). 
15 The functionalist interpretation has been criticised by those who claim (i) that the psychological activity 
does not accompany any physiological change (e.g. Burnyeat, 1992, pp. 15-26), (ii) that their relationship is 
essential (Lloyd, 1992, pp. 38-66; M. Frede, 1992, pp. 93-107; Code and Moravcsik, 1992, pp. 129-145), 
and (iii) that their relationship is dualistic (e.g. Robinson 1983, pp. 123-144; Heinaman, 1990, pp. 83-102). 
16 Code and Moravcsik (1992), pp. 133-134. 
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essences or natures, that, in the case of living beings, the soul can be actualised in only one 
sort of matter. I7 That is, the relationships between the soul and the sort of matter in which 
it is actualised are essential. However, there is a difficulty in refuting the functionalist 
interpretation on the basis of such conceptual analyses since it is hard to show that there 
must be an essential connection between soul and body. For the functionalist does not have 
to deny the nature of a living being; that is, she would still argue for the compositional 
plasticity of form, as accepting the essence or nature of the being at a token level. Since 
conceptual analyses are controversial in evaluating Aristotle's own position on the soul-
body relationship, we need to focus on what Aristotle says in the case of a specific example 
of living activities. 
It is a commonplace that Aristotle's theory of the soul covers a much wider area than 
the contemporary philosophy of mind does. The latter has attempted to understand human 
minds and their relationships to bodies by analysing such mental activities as perception, 
intention, and thinking. However, for Aristotle the conception of the soul is not a peculiar 
characteristic that belongs only to human beings; it belongs to all living beings including 
irrational animals and even plants. Thus his theory of the soul concerns not only mental 
activities, but also such activities as growth, digestion, reproduction, locomotion, etc. 
Thus, when we are talking about Aristotle's psychology, we are indeed talking about his 
discussion of the activities of the living being in general. It then seems that, in trying to 
understand Aristotle's conception of the relationship of the soul and the body, the analysis 
of other activities of the living being is as important as that of mental activities that belong 
only to a limited class of living beings. In effect, this suggests that, if one is to pick up a 
particular activity as an example to be analysed, one needs to justify oneself for doing so. 
17 See M. Frede (1992), p. 96 iI.; Code and Moravcsik (1992), pp. 130-131. 
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Nussbaum (1978), in her commentary on De Motu A nimalium , makes an unusual 
attempt in that she sets out to understand the soul-body relationship from the analysis of 
animal locomotion. However, she pays insufficient attention to the specifics of the soul-
body relationship in locomotion and instead tries to deduce this relationship from the 
controversial ideas about some individual cognitive activities involved in arousing 
locomotion. She thereby misses the opportunity to understand the relationship in those 
living activities from the analysis of this specific example, i.e. locomotion. However, it is 
indeed necessary for us to try to understand the soul-body relationship from the analysis of 
animal locomotion itself 
Locomotion appears important for several reasons. Firstly, Aristotle's discussion of 
locomotion in expounding self-motion in the Ph. suggests that he takes it to be a 
phenomenon which is particularly obvious to the senses (e.g. 252b 18 ff.). Secondly, 
among the various living activities, Aristotle takes locomotion to be prior to other types of 
motion for at least three reasons: (a) it is the one that belongs to more advanced living 
beings, (b) it is manifested at the last stage of their perfection, and (c) it brings about lesser 
changes in the animal body than any other types of motion do (261a 13-26). Finally, 
locomotion has a significant feature of locomotion which Aristotle does not explicitly tell us 
about. When such activities as nutrition, sense-perception, thought, and so on, are dealt 
with, it appears that they are defined in separation from one another by their proper objects 
and activities. Yet, on some occasions we find that each of those activities are not in 
separation from one another, but involve others. For instance, an animal utilises its capacity 
not only for nutrition, but also for sense-perception in order to maintain its life (cf DA 414b 
21-415a 12). Since living beings are capable of their activities in virtue of their soul-
faculties, the question we are asking is about the relationship of those faculties. We shall 
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see that locomotion is one interesting example which clearly shows such a connection 
between soul-faculties. 
In Chapter III, Section 1, I shall discuss this thesis in detail. At DA 414b 19 if, 
Aristotle makes an analogy between soul-faculties and geometrical figures. The point of the 
analogy is that, as a quadrilateral, for instance, subsumes a triangle, the higher faculties 
subsume the lower faculties. However, what does this imply? I shall propose that Aristotle 
wants to make two points with it. (i) In the animal that is capable of more than nutrition, a 
lower capacity is not for its own sake, but for the sake of higher capacities. For instance, 
the animal requires the capacity for seeing, for instance, not merely to enjoy seeing an 
external object as such, but as a necessary condition for locomotion which is, eventually, for 
the sake of survival (e.g. DA 415b 12-14; Sens. 436b 18 if). 
(ii) Another point which has not earned appropriate attention is that the lower faculties 
are teleologically determined by the higher ones by virtue of being subsumed under them. 
Aristotle thinks that the animal requires the capacities for recognising an object at a distance 
(i.e. the distance senses), for recognising it as pleasant or painful, and for pursuing or 
avoiding it (i.e. orexis) in the arousal of locomotion. Furley seems to think that an animal is 
a self-mover because it is capable of sense-perception, orexis, phantasia, etc. I8 However, 
this account is over-generalised and cannot explain the difference Aristotle makes between 
locomotive animals and non-locomotive animals. 
Aristotle maintains that all animals have the appetitive faculty that subsumes the 
sensitive faculty, but that some of them are incapable of locomotion (e.g. 413b 22-24). He 
thinks that the capacity for locomotion is related to the capacity for the distance senses (i.e. 
seeing, hearing, and smelling) that some animals have in addition to the contact senses (i.e. 
18 Furley (1978), p. 64. 
11 
touch and taste) (e.g. Sens. 436b 18 ff.). However, Aristotle hardly appears to think that 
the two types of senses are due to two different faculties. If so, he has to explain why some 
animals have the distance senses in virtue of the sensitive faculty, whereas others do not. At 
this stage, I shall argue that locomotive animals have the additional senses because the 
sensitive faculty is teleologically determined by the fact that it is subsumed under the 
locomotive faculty. Having argued this way, we shall see more clearly why Aristotle's 
introduction of the appetitive faculty as the source of motion in DA III. 9-10 should not be 
understood as it appears (see question (5) above). 
Chapter IV turns to examine the involvement of phantasia in animal locomotion. 
Nussbaum characterises the role of phantasia as recognising an object as an object of some 
sort and claims that phantasia is always necessary in the arousal of locomotion. 19 In this 
way, she argues that the necessary capacities for animal locomotion are sense-perception 
(or thought), phantasia, and orexis. However, I shall argue that phantasia is not an 
absolutely necessary capacity for animal locomotion. In doing this, I shall show (i) that 
Aristotle ascribes to phantasia the role of recognising an object not simply as a thing of 
some sort, but as a thing of pleasure or pain, and (ii) that an analysis of Aristotle's account 
of smell suggests that he also ascribes that role to sense-perception and, possibly, to 
thought both of which do not involve phantasia in the arousal of orexis which is the 
proximate reason for locomotion. 
Having examined the psychological side of animal locomotion, in Chapter V, I shall 
consider its physiological side with reference to the conception of the sumphuton pneuma. 
This conception is difficult to be dogmatic about because Aristotle does not discuss it 
thoroughly for its own sake. Nonetheless, there appears to be no doubt that Aristotle thinks 
19 Nussbaum (1978), Essay 5. 
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that it is a material or physiological substance that exists only in the living being. I shall 
attend to three facts: firstly, in the MA, he introduces the conception of pneuma in 
distinguishing animal locomotion from the locomotion of an artefact, i.e. the puppet (701b 
10 if). And, secondly, he tries to establish its special status in relation to orexis (703a 4-6). 
Finally, in his biological works (esp. the GA and the PA) he employs the conception of 
pneuma in explaining not only living activities such as reproduction, digestion, sense-
perception, locomotion, etc., but also the composition of different bodily parts, different 
animals, etc. On close examination of these points, I shall argue that Aristotle's use of 
pneuma demonstrates an essential connection between soul and body; that is, the animal's 
capacity for various kinds of psychological or living activities necessitates this particular 
physiological substance, pneuma. 20 
In this way, I take Aristotle to maintain that the actualisation of a particular type of a 
psychological capacity always involves a change of a particular type of a physiological 
substance. For instance, he believes, as I shall argue, that the feeling of pleasure or pain 
always involves the heating or chilling of pneuma in the heart. Thus it might well be 
suggested that Aristotle commits himself to the type-type identity theory. If so, he also 
appears to commit himself to material reductionism, viz. the view that the occurrence of 
psychological phenomena can be explained in terms of the occurrence of the relevant 
material changes, namely, the former are reducible to the latter. In contrast to this 
suggestion, I shall conclude Chapter V by showing that Aristotle's account of animal 
locomotion clearly shows that he is commited neither to the type-type identity theory nor to 
material reductionism. 
20 This need be claimed with qualification since, as we shall see in Ch. V, Aristotle appears to acknowledge 
that dead animals appear to have this substance, though insufficient for them to be alive and to be capable of 
their supposed activities. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF-MOVER 
If we are asked what a self-mover is, we might define it as an agent that is responsible 
for motion that is initiated by the subject itself without necessarily requiring any external 
mover. If so, Aristotle's characterisation does not appear to be different from ours since he 
also regards a self-mover as a mover that moves by itself by means of having the source of 
motion in itself and that is not moved by anything external (e.g. Ph. 241b 24 if). And yet 
his discussion of self-motion in Ph. VIII soon emerges as a problem for us in several 
respects. The problem begins with the question whether he ever acknowledges the 
existence of the self-mover. Fudey summarises it as follows: 
Aristotle sometimes calls animals self-movers. We must try to determine what exactly he means by this. In 
particular, we must look at this thesis in the light of certain passages in the Physics which appear to deny 
that there can be self-movers. Is this apparent anomaly to be explained genetically? Are we to believe that 
Aristotle criticized and rejected his earlier thesis that animals are self-movers? Or is his position as a whole 
consistent? How then are we to explain away the apparent anomaly?21 
Fudey has in mind the two passages at Ph. VIII. 2, 253a 11-20 and 6, 259b 6-17 where 
Aristotle appears to deny the possibility of self-motion.22 However, there is a difficulty in 
saying with confidence in the light only of these two passages that "he denies self-motion". 
The difficulty is not only that he, on many other occasions, appears to assert the existence 
of the self-mover or its capacity for self-motion, but also that even in the two passages his 
position is not very clear. In the former passage, Aristotle asserts locomotion as the only 
type of self-motion living beings are capable of, whereas in the latter he makes the same sort 
21 Furley (1978), p. 55. 
22 These two passages are cited and discussed in detail in Ch. II. Sec. 2 (c) below. 
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of claim, but adds a qualification by saying that even locomotion 'is not strictly (Kup1ws) 
originated' by living beings. These remarks are indeed ambiguous enough to lead one to 
doubt that Aristotle ever really acknowledges the possibility of self-motion. On the other 
hand, if 'locomotion is not strictly self-motion,' what does he mean that it is self-motion in a 
non-strict sense? What is then the criterion of being strict and non-strict? Aristotle appears 
to think that he has given satisfactory answers to those questions. Thus we should try to 
determine what his answers are and see whether they are sound or not. 
The primary question is whether Aristotle maintains a consistent theory of the self-
mover. I argue below that he does. In what follows, I shall be chiefly concerned with three 
questions. In Section 1, I shall ask (i) why Aristotle feels it necessary to introduce the 
question of the existence of the self-mover and (ii) whether he can maintain the existence of 
the self-mover without rejecting the definition of nature, i.e. the principle of change and 
rest, ascribed not only to living beings (plants and animals), but to all natural beings 
including non-living beings, i.e. the simple bodies (earth, fire, air, water). Section 2 deals in 
detail with the question (iii) in what way he accounts for self-motion. The last question 
involves an overall enquiry into Aristotle's characterisation of the living being as divisible 
into two inner parts, i.e. the unmoved moving part and the moved part. I shall focus on 
examining their relation to each other and, also, to the external world. Having done so, we 
shall also see that Aristotle ascribes the capacity for self-motion not only to animals, but to 
all living beings,23 which entails that he acknowledges not only locomotion, but also other 
types of change, e.g. qualitative motion, quantitative motion, etc. as self-motion. 
23 Furley's statement cited above gives the misleading impression that Aristotle's self-motion is concerned 
only with animals. 
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I. 1 Natural Motion and Self-Motion 
A proper way of approaching the problem of the self-mover is to ask why Aristotle is 
concerned with the conception in the first instance. Why does he not simply accept it as a 
fact that there are such beings that move by themselves? In what follows, I shall begin by 
explaining Aristotle's position concerning the observation of such beings. Sub-section (b) 
concerns the motion of the simple bodies. In Ph. II. 1, Aristotle says that all natural beings 
(i.e. animals and their parts, plants, and the four simple bodies) have within themselves 
natures defined as internal sources of motion and rest (192b 9_16).24 If so, it seems that all 
of them are capable of their own motion and that they can be legitimately called self-
movers.25 However, this is explicitly denied at 255a 3 ff Aristotle differentiates the motion 
of the simple bodies from that of living beings and calls the latter type of motion self-
motion. Does it follow that he is now denying the presence of natures in the simple bodies? 
I shall argue that he is not. 
(a) The Emergence of the Problem of Self-Motion 
In order to understand why self-motion emerges as a problem for Aristotle, we have to 
understand the three interrelated principles that Aristotle tries to establish in Ph. VIII, (PI) 
that motion must be eternal (250b 10 ff.), (P2) that everything that moves must be moved by 
something else or that there cannot be any motion ex nihilo,26 and (P3) that there must be a 
first unmoved mover in the universe (258b 10 ff; cf 242a 50 ff.). 
Aristotle begins the Physics by stating that it is an enquiry into the primary reasons 
(at na) and the principles (apxat) of the things that are subject to change (184a 10-16; 
24 Aristotle in DC III. 1, 298a 26-31 adds the parts of plants, the heaven and its parts to the class of natural 
beings. 
25 Furley (1978), p. 55. 
26 I.e. Motion that starts 'out of nothing' or, rather, 'without being moved by anything'. See 259b 1-16; cf. 
19la 23-31; GC 317b 11-18. References are due to Gill (1991, p. 244). 
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184b 27-185a 4).27 His theory of change, thus embarked on, reaches its culmination in 
Book VIII where he endeavours to prove the eternity of motion and the existence of the 
first unmoved mover which was the primary reason for the eternal motion. 28 In ch. 1 of the 
Book, Aristotle argues for principle (PI) in the respects of becoming, ceasing, and time. 
F or instance, he argues that there cannot be a beginning of the first motion because, if there 
were, then there would be something that is responsible for the beginning of the first motion 
(251a 10-b 10). And this 'something' also requires 'something else' for its motion. Thus, 
since the first being cannot be first but requires other beings prior to it in order to initiate its 
motion, there cannot be a beginning of motion. The cessation of motion is denied on similar 
grounds (251 b 29-252a 6). It is to be noted that the denial of the possibility of the 
beginning and the cessation of motion is based on principle (P2) that everything that moves 
must be moved by something else. That denial is thus derived from theoretical reflections 
rather than sensory observations. 
However, the problem of the motion of natural beings is derived from sensory 
observations. Aristotle observes the upward motion of fire, the locomotion of the animal, 
etc. that do not appear to require any external movers. At this stage, if their motions are 
really as they appear to be, then (P2) does not stand and, also, (PI) which claims the eternity 
of motion loses its ground. Thus for Aristotle, those principles appear incompatible with 
the observation of the motion of natural beings. If he wants to maintain that the principles 
must be applicable to the structure of the universe as a whole, he has to find a way to 
explain the motions of natural beings without violating them. Aristotle cannot leave the 
observation of such motions as an exceptional case, since he accepts 'the small world 
27 As is generally noted, Aristotle distinguishes lClV'lcrl<; that includes non-substantial change (i.e. 
qualitative motion, quantitative motion, and locomotion) from J1E'ta[3oA" that includes non-substantial 
change as well as substantial change (i.e. generation and destruction) (see esp. Ph. 200b 26-201a 9). See 
Ross (1936), pp. 7-8,45-7; Waterlow (1982), pp. 93-158. 
28 Ross (1936), p. 85. 
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hypothesis' or 'the micro-macro analogy' (as one might call it), viz. the hypothesis that 
what is true of a small world, i. e. a living being, could also be true of the universe as a 
whole (252b 25-29; cf 252a 29_30).29 That is, he is convinced that if there were beings, as 
it appears, that are capable of starting their change without being moved by anything 
external, then it would be also possible that all the beings in the physical world as a whole 
including the heavenly bodies move themselves spontaneously without requiring any 
external movers. If this is so, then there might be a time when there is no change and so the 
eternity of change is not guaranteed. Thus the problem of self-motion in Aristotle initially 
derives from his attempt to reconcile the conflict between the need for the establishment of 
principles (PI) and (P2) with the observation of beings that appear to initiate their motion 
without requiring any external mover. The conflict is thus between theoretical reflections 
and sensory observations. 
Aristotle's effort to reconcile that conflict can be first found in VIII. 2 where he 
considers three possible objections to principle (PI), two of which are based on sensory 
observations. 30 He states that among them the observation of the motion of living beings 
presents the most difficult problem (JlO:Atcrta. 8' <lnopiav) (253a 8-9). The imaginary 
opponent argues that there are some beings that appear to start their motion from a state of 
absolute rest without being moved by anything from without (252b 18-28; 253a 8-11). In 
reply to this objection, Aristotle does concede that some beings appear to move themselves 
but goes on to claim that such an observation is mistaken since some part of their organism 
is always in motion, the aition of which might be the environment (253a 11-13). In 
29 Aristotle in Ph. VIII. 1 acknowledges that the idea of the application of this hypothesis is due to 
Empedocles (252a 28-30). However, he warns us that it is a mistake to think that this kind of application is 
'always' right (252a 32-b 5). And yet he does not provide us with the criteria to distinguish the right 
application from the wrong one. His acceptance of the hypothesis is also prevalent, in particular, in the MA 
(cf. 698a 8-14; b 8-15; 699a 22-27). 
30 In postulating the first objection (252b 10-12), Aristotle assumes that his earlier claim made in V. I that 
change is from something to something (225a 1 ff.) is accepted by his opponents. 
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claiming this, Aristotle denies the existence of self-motion by appealing to sensory 
observations. It is unclear what part he is referring to. But he hardly seems to have any 
doubt that the motion of the part is observable (6PIDjlEV) and that its motion is related to the 
environment. This argument appears to be on a par with principle (P2) that everything that 
moves is moved 'by something (uno nvoc;)' (241b 34-242a 49), which denies the existence 
of beings that start their motion ex nihilo. However, if there is such a bodily part that is 
always in motion in relation to the environment, then it seems that the existence of the self-
mover is completely denied. And if the existence of such a bodily part can be proved, it 
appears that Aristotle no longer needs to be concerned with the conception of the self-
mover. 
However, Aristotle turns to analyse the internal parts of the beings which seem to be 
different from the observable part discussed above. Aristotle explains the motion of living 
beings in terms of two internal parts, one moving and the other being moved, as is the case 
in a man's pushing a chair. Thus 'by something' in principle (P2) that 'everything that is in 
motion must be moved by something' now entails either 'by something external' or 'by 
something internal' (241b 34-242a 49; 259a 30-31).31 At this stage, we need to note 
Aristotle's method of natural science suggested in I. 1 of the Physics. He there says that 
the enquiry into natural beings should start from what is more knowable to us and progress 
to what is more knowable by nature (184a 17 ff).32 And yet, he maintains that although 
sensory observation is no doubt a starting point when establishing a principle, it is not a 
31 Aristotle makes this point more explicitly at VIII. 4, 255b 32-256a 3 and, thereby, claims the principle to 
be true. Cf Waterlow (1982), p. 205. On the other hand, Aristotle also leaves room for this way of 
interpretation in the aversion of VII, but not in the pversion. The aversion (242a 47) says that everything 
that is in motion must be moved 'by something,' whereas the p version (242a 13) explicitly says 'by 
something other than itself. Thus the p version excludes the possibility of interpreting it as entailing 'by a 
moving part of itself'. Cf Olshewsky (1995), pp. 391-392; Wardy (1990), p. 94. 
32 Cf 184a 14 if.; 185a 12-14; 253a 32-b 6. For a detailed discussion of Aristotle's dialectical method, see 
e.g. Hussey (1993), ix f; Wardy (1990), p. 83 f 
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sufficient ground for establishing a principle (arche) without also involving theoretical 
reflection. In this vein, he, in Ph. VIII, often emphasises the significance of sensory 
observation as a starting point of the enquiry into self-motion. 33 However, when Aristotle 
analyses the internal parts of the living organism as one moving and the other being moved, 
his starting point is not based on the direct observation of such parts, but on the observation 
of some beings that appear to move without an external mover. Based on the observation 
of such beings, he begins to make an enquiry into how their motion can be explained within 
the structure of the universe as a whole. Again, the inner divisibility of such beings at 257a 
32 if is, as we shall see more closely at a later stage, not the divisibility of bodily parts that 
are immediately observable to our senses; but it is rather a conceptual divisibility. 
We have seen two ways in which Aristotle deals with the observation of self-motion. 
(1) He denied the imaginary opponents' claim of self-motion as based on mistaken sensory 
observations. In doing this, his ground was also the sensory observation of a bodily part 
that is always in motion. On the other hand, (2) he also denied the claim by analysing the 
internal parts of the living organism. However, this analysis was conceptual in the sense 
that it did not derive from observation, but from the application of principle (P2), which 
entails the agent-patient relationship, to the living organism itself. We can perhaps make an 
analogy of (1) with a puppet whose inner mechanism is transparent. In such a puppet, when 
the first central string is pulled by the external operator, we can observe the inner 
components and connections that produce the eventual motion and explain how the motion 
is produced. In contrast, in the case of (2) its inner mechanism is opaque and we cannot 
33 Aristotle claims that any attempt to prove the existence of change which is apparent to us would be due 
to human intellectual weakness (253a 32-b 6; cf. 184b 27-185a 3; 185a 12-14; 200b 12-14; 256b 12-13). 
However, Ross (1936, p. 85) points out, making a reference to VIII. 3, 254a 24-30, that Aristotle is 
nonetheless not accepting the existence of motion as a hypothesis without any attempt to prove its truth, but 
that he attempts to prove it by appealing to sense-perception "coupled with the important addition that if it 
be urged that sense-perception is fallacious, it may be answered that even the occurrence from time to time 
of these illusions itself implies change in our mental condition". 
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really explain how the motion of such an organism is produced. There is thus a significant 
difference between the two. 
However, why does Aristotle need this sort of analysis of the internal agent-patient 
relationship of the parts, if he believes that the existence of the self-mover can be denied by 
means of the observation of some bodily part that is always in motion? Why does he 
envisage such different mechanisms in accounting for the same phenomenon, i.e. the motion 
of living beings? Are we wrong to think that he envisages two different accounts? Does he 
think (1) or (2), but not both? In order to answer these questions, we need to ask whether 
the modification of 'by something' as entailing 'by the internal mover' is also reconcilable 
with the 'small world' hypothesis. In other words, if some beings move themselves by their 
internal movers, would it not also be true that others may move themselves in that way, 
namely, that all the beings in the universe may move themselves without necessarily 
requiring any external mover? This is also an unacceptable consequence for Aristotle. For, 
if there were any being in motion that does not require an external mover, his argument for 
the existence of the first mover which he characterises as the ultimate origin of all changes 
in the universe (259a 3-7) would fail. That is, Aristotle's modification of 'by something' as 
entailing 'by something internal' is a necessary move for him to locate living beings within 
the structure of the universe without violating the establishment of his principles. He is 
compelled to postulate the internal parts of a living organism in order to uphold principles 
(PI) concerning the eternity of motion and (P2) concerning the agent-patient relationship of 
beings in motion. 
However, the internal mover is not a moved mover, but an unmoved mover (258a 7-9). 
Thus a living being has an internal unmoved moving part and a moved part, and so there is 
no necessary connection between such a being and the unmoved mover of the universe that 
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is ultimately responsible for every change (259a 3-7). Aristotle, however, does not wish to 
acknowledge the existence of such a self-sufficient mover. If the unmoved mover of the 
self-mover were fully responsible for its own motion, then the existence of the first 
unmoved mover of the universe he tries to establish, i.e. principle (P3), would not be an 
absolutely necessary principle. In consequence, although self-motion is explained in terms 
of the internal parts, it is still necessary for Aristotle to try to find some connection between 
the living being and the external mover. He is thus put in the position of having to show 
that living beings can start their motion without an impulse from without, and, at the same 
time, that they, nonetheless, have some link with the outer world. 
To recapitulate, Aristotle's characterisation of the internal mover in a living being as an 
unmoved mover dismisses a necessary connection with the outer world. In other words, the 
living being can be said to be the self-mover since it is responsible for its own motion in 
virtue of having the unmoved mover as a part. Nonetheless, he is still required to explain its 
motion within the whole structure of the universe, which implies that the living being is 
somehow affected by an external mover. In consequence, it appears that Aristotle's 
conception of self-motion and of the self-mover is not about a self-mover in an unqualified 
sense, i.e. something that moves solely in virtue of itself or its own sources without any 
stimulus from without. His analysis of the internal parts primarily suggests that he does not 
regard the motion of living beings as the same as that of others that do not appear to move 
themselves. Thus, even after the denial of the self-mover on the basis of the sensory 
observation of a bodily part that is always in motion, Aristotle still describes living beings as 
those 'that derive their motion from themselves' (e.g. 255a 6 if.) or 'that move themselves' 
(e.g. 258a 23). Although I shall frequently emphasise this point wherever necessary, 
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bearing it in mind will help us understand many problems arising in Aristotle's theory of 
self-motion. 
(b) Is the Motion a/the Simple Bodies not Per Se? 
At Ph. VII. 1, 241b 35-39, Aristotle makes a contrast between self-movers that move , 
themselves by means of having their intrinsic source of motion, and moved movers, that are 
moved by something other than themselves. 34 Reading that passage in relation to 
Aristotle's introduction of nature defined in Ph. II. 1 as the source of motion and rest "in 
respect of place, or of growth and decrease, or by way of alteration" (192b 12-16), it gives 
the impression that Aristotle acknowledges all natural beings as self-movers. However, he 
explicitly denies this in VIII. 4. He there divides natural beings into two types and regards 
the simple bodies (earth, fire, etc.) as moved movers (254b 20-23) and living beings as self-
movers (254b14-17). Aristotle tells us that his division is based on his observation that 
living beings do not appear to require any external source for their motion from without, 
whereas the simple bodies appear to do so (252b 13-28). It thus appears that the division 
between self-movers and moved movers is not that between natural beings and artefacts, 
but between living beings and non-living beings both of which are classified as natural 
beings in II. 1. The extension of self-movers is thus narrower than that of natural beings 
since living beings alone are now said to be self-movers. 
If so, we have to ask again whether this division should be taken to suggest that 
Aristotle denies to the simple bodies motion per se in virtue of their natures. In dealing 
with this question, we have to note that there are two separate issues here: it might mean 
whether he denies any sort of natures to the simple bodies, i. e. any sort of motion per se to 
34 Aristotle's implication of the conception of the self-mover can be also found in VII. 2, 243a12-15, VIII. 
2, and VIII. 4-6. Cf. Waterlow (1982), p. 205. 
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them, or whether he denies to them natures specifically defined as the sources of motion and 
rest in an active sense. In Ph. VIII. 4, Aristotle appears to ascribe motion per se to all 
natural beings including non-living beings (i.e. the simple bodies) (254b 12_32).35 He 
explains that the motion of the living being is per se when it moves as a whole and its 
motion is derived from itself It might suffer motion per accidens, depending on 'the kind 
of motion that it may chance to be suffering and the kind of element of which it is 
composed' (254b 18-20). On the other hand, Aristotle maintains that the motion of the 
simple bodies is also either per se or per accidens (b 21-23; 255a 1 if). He offers the light 
thing ( e.g. fire) moving upwards and the heavy thing (e.g. earth) moving downwards as the 
examples of the motion per se of the simple bodies. For him, that something is capable of 
motion per accidens presupposes that it is also capable of motion per se (DC 300a 24-26). 
Thus, since the simple bodies are capable of motion per accidens, e.g. earth moving 
upwards and fire moving downwards, they are also capable of motion per se. 
What is then the motion per se and how is it different from a forced motion? Aristotle 
explains the motion per se of the simple bodies as follows: 
So, too, what is of a certain quantity extends itself over a certain space unless something prevents it. The 
thing in a sense is and in a sense is not moved by one who moves what is obstructing and preventing its 
motion-e.g. one who pulls away a pillar or one who removes the stone from a wineskin in the water is the 
accidental cause of motion; and in the same way the rebounding ball is moved not by the wall but by the 
thrower. So it is clear that in all these cases the thing does not move itself, but it contains within itself the 
source of motion-not of moving something or of causing motion, but of suffering it. (255b 22-31) 
Aristotle here characterises nature as a principle of 'suffering ('tou 1tuO'XEt v)' . If we take 
the passage to be his standard characterisation of nature in spite of his account of it in II. 
35 For Aristotle, not only motion but also rest can be per se as well as per accidens (DC 300a 27-29). For 
more on this particular topic, see esp. DC II. 13, 294b 31 ff.; III. 2. 
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1 36 d· . f 
, our IScusslon 0 the concept of the self-mover will be readily understandable in that the 
self-mover is that which moves itself, whereas the simple bodies are moved movers that 
always require an external mover for their motions. If that was what Aristotle meant then 
, 
he would be retreating from what he said earlier in II. 1. If we understand the above 
passage in this way, then we are forced to regard Aristotle as claiming that there is no 
difference between the motion per se of the simple bodies and their motion per accidens 
since both types of motions are initiated by something external. Is this true? I think not. If 
it is true, it then seems to follow that his ascription of natures to the simple bodies must be 
denied. As we shall see below, Aristotle obviously distinguishes motion per se in virtue of 
nature from motion per accidens without it and identifies a forced motion with the latter, 
but not with the former. 
Waterlow points out that the distinction between natural motion37 and self-motion in 
Aristotle is subject to the problem "of showing how even in their natural motions the simple 
bodies can be properly described as moved by something". 38 This is a problem for Aristotle 
because, as noted, he has to explain their motion without threatening principle (P2) that no 
motion starts ex nihilo. Thus Waterlow dismisses the active motion of the simple bodies 
and says that their motion per se "is 'moved by' those external substances responsible for 
the motion either through having produced the body in the first place or through removing 
hindrances" .39 Aristotle thinks that since the simple bodies are naturally unified and 
36 Commentators differ in translating Kt VEtcreat in the passage "00<; O-ocrl1<; 't11<; q)'UcrECO<; apXl1<; 'tt vo<; Kat 
ai'tio<; 'to-U KtVEtcreat Kat itPE~EtV tv q, imapxEl. 1tponco<; Kae' ai)'to Kat wit Ka't<l cr,\)~~E~l1K6<;" (192b 
21-23). For example, Charlton (1970, p. 23) and Waterlow (1982, p. 2) translate it as middle (with an 
active sense), whereas Apostle (1969), Wicksteed and Cornford (1957), and Hardie and Gaye (Oxford 
Translation) as passive. For a discussion of the potential influence of different translations on the Ph. 
arguments, see Beavers (1988), pp. 357-374. 
37 Here I use 'natural motion' to refer to the motion per se of the simple bodies in contrast to self-motion 
which is the motion per se of living beings. 
38 Waterlow (1982), pp. 206-207. 
39 Waterlow (1982), p. 207; cf. pp. 166-168. 
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continuous, their motion cannot be explained in terms of internal parts (255a 12-18 cited 
below). Thus if a simple body were to start its motion ex nihi!o, it would do so as a whole 
spontaneously. However, if this is the case, principle (P2) which entails the presence of a 
mover in every motion will collapse. 
Let us return to the Ph. passage (255b 22-31) cited earlier. Aristotle there introduces 
the obstacle-remover (hereafter, 'the remover') as a cause of motion. However, as may 
well be noted, it is not an agent that directly causes a motion. F or instance, when a cue 
strikes a snooker ball, the cue brings about the motion of the ball and it is a direct cause of 
the motion. However, when a man removes a block which prevents the ball from rolling, he 
is a cause in a different sense. On the other hand, when the ball is struck by the cue, it is 
moved without reference to the nature of the ball. The point here is that when the ball is 
left alone on a table, it does not move itself In effect, Aristotle would say that the ball does 
not have a nature qua itself except for the natures of its components qua the simple 
bodies. 40 
However, the simple bodies are different. For instance, when fire is left alone without 
any interference, it tends to move upwards. Thus, even if the remover removes an obstacle, 
this does not explain why fire moves in a certain direction as it does. Moreover, such a 
remover is not always necessary for the upward motion of fire since its motion is not 
obstructed 'always or for the most part'. 41 The remover is thus accidentally (KU'tU 
crUJ..l~E~l1K6c;) responsible for the motion of fire. The role of the remover is strictly limited 
to removing the obstacle that interrupts the motion per se of the simple bodies; it does not 
40 Aristotle says in Ph. II. 1: "... a bed and a coat and anything else of that sort, qua receiving these 
designations-i.e. in so far as they are products of art-have no innate impulse to change. But in so far as 
they happen to be composed of stone or of earth or of a mixture of the two, they do have such an impulse ... " 
(l92b 16-23). 
41 For Aristotle's discussion of 'always or for the most part' as a condition for being an aition, see 197a 19 
if. 
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directly bring about their motion. It then appears that the simple bodies do have some 
active source of their motion within themselves. In effect, Aristotle repeatedly remarks in 
VIII. 4 that when there is no obstacle, they will actualise their motion.42 In other words, 
were they not capable of a certain motion by themselves, they would remain still even when 
an obstacle has been removed. In brief, the obstacle remover does explain the motion of the 
simple bodies under certain circumstances when there are obstacles. For if there is no such 
remover of the obstacles, the simple bodies are not able to move. However, it does not 
explain their motion per se after obstacles are removed or when there are no obstacles at all. 
Aristotle is thus hesitant about calling the remover a mover of the simple bodies. He thus 
says that "The thing in a sense is and in a sense is not moved by one who moves what is 
obstructing and preventing its motion" (255b 23_24).43 If so, Aristotle's statement in the 
passage cited earlier that "in all these cases the thing does not move itself, but it contains 
within itself the source of motion '" of suffering it" must not be understood simply as 
referring to the passive source. The motion of the simple bodies is certainly different from 
that of a ball. The simple bodies do seem to have a source of active motion, not merely 
passive motion. 
The following analysis of the cases where there are no obstacles shows how Aristotle 
explains the existence of the external mover without denying the motion per se of the simple 
bodies. In the De Cae/o, he writes, 
For if the various elements are constrained by one another to move as they do, each must still have a natural 
movement which the constrained contravenes, and the prime mover must cause motion not by constraint but 
naturally. If there is no ultimate natural cause of movement and each preceding term in the series is always 
moved by constraint, we shall have an infinite process. ... Their movement must have been due either to 
constraint or to their nature. And if their movement was natural, careful consideration shows that there was 
42 Ph. 255b 5-6; b 10-11; b 21-25; 255b 36-256a 3. 
43 6 aE 'to ucptO''taJl.EVOV Kat K(oA UOV Kt VltO'a<; EO''tt Jl.Ev 00<; Kt VEl EO''tt a' 00<; ou ... 
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already a world. For the prime mover must cause motion in virtue of its own natural movement, and the 
other bodies, moving without constraint, as they carne to rest in their proper places, would fall into the order 
in which they now stand, the heavy bodies moving towards the centre and the light bodies away from it. 
But that is the order of their distribution in our world. (300b 11-25) 
Aristotle here takes it for granted that, for instance, fire moving away from the centre and 
earth moving towards it are moving in virtue of their own natures. And yet he is saying that 
such motions are in harmony with the motion that the prime, or first, mover imparts. That 
is, the prime mover does not impart any sort of foreign motion to the simple bodies, but 
only the motion which is per se to them. Aristotle is then saying that nature is not merely 
passive, but active to some extent, that is to say, when an appropriate motion is imparted by 
the first mover, the simple bodies actualise their motion according to the natures they 
possess. 44 The simple bodies as a whole move in virtue of their natures in accordance with 
'the order of their distribution in our world'. This phrase is obscure on its own. However, 
it is clear that by motion per se Aristotle does not mean motion that is completely exempt 
from any relation to the external mover. As mentioned, it is plain that, were they not to 
have any active source of motion within themselves, they would not move even when an 
obstacle is removed. Similarly, if they had no natures as active sources, the motion 
imparted to them by the first mover would be motion per accidens. However, there is no 
doubt that Aristotle acknowledges motion per se of the simple bodies (e.g. DC 227b 1-2). 
But since a source of movement within the thing itself is its nature, while a force is a source of movement in 
something other than it or in itself qua other, and since movement is always due either to nature or to 
constraint, (I) movement which is natural, as downward movement is to a stone, will be merely accelerated 
44 Cohen claims that "An intrinsic principle, according to Aristotle, need not be a principle of motion or 
change; it can be a principle of rest or stasis" (1996, p. 42. See pp. 37-54). His claim soon confronts an 
objection since Aristotle maintains that what is true of motion is also applicable to the state of rest; that is, 
since the motion of the simple bodies is either per se or per accidens, their state of rest can also be per se or 
per accidens (DC 300a 27-29). 
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by an external force, while (2) an unnatural movement will be due to the force alone. (30lb 17-25. 
Numbers and underlines are mine.) 
In this passage, Aristotle clearly states that motion per se of the simple bodies is not without 
any relation to the external mover. In effect, in (1) he is saying that the motion per se of 
earth, for instance, is due to its source of downward motion in itself and an external mover 
is that which aids its motion. That is, Aristotle does not think that the inner nature and the 
external mover are exclusive, but complementary to each other (301b 28-29). In contrast, 
he says in (2) that if the external mover brings about a motion by its force without reference 
to what is moved, then it is motion per accidens. 
As indicated, Aristotle's account of the motion of the simple bodies in terms of their 
natures is not to say that they are capable of their own motion without reference to any 
external mover: he allows that there is some external mover which affects their motion in 
accordance with the natures inherent in them. However, for Aristotle the external mover is 
not some violent force that moves the simple bodies which are purely static, but some sort 
of aid that accelerates the actualisation of their natures. As noted, he needs to explain 
natural motion within the structure of the universe as a whole (300b 25). That is, natural 
motion must also be explained without violating the principles that are applicable to all the 
constituents of the whole universe. For this reason, Aristotle tries to relate the motion per 
se of the simple bodies to the first mover. At Ph. VIII. 4, 255a 3-6, he states that, when the 
simple bodies suffer motion per accidens, it is evident whence the motion is derived, but, he 
goes on to say, it is not so in the case of their motion per se. The obstacle-remover might 
well be taken to be included in that category where the involvement of a mover is evident. 
However, motion per se of the simple bodies is the case where the cause of the motion is 
obscure. In other words, it is obscure in what way the first mover would 'aid' or 
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'accelerate' natural motion. Nonetheless, it is, as Aristotle would say, absurd to dismiss the 
involvement of a mover on the ground that it is not evident what exactly it is and how it is 
involved in motion (cf 241b 40-43). 
AtMet. V. 12, 1019a 20-23 and 1019b 35-1020a 6, Aristotle introduces the dunamis as 
a source of motion (i.e. the active dunamis) and the dunamis for suffering (i.e. the passive 
dunamis) (cf 1046a 19 ff).45 Thus for him the agent-patient relationship is explained in 
terms of the active dunamis-passive dunamis relationship. As mentioned in relation to the 
principle of 'no motion ex nihilo', Aristotle wants to establish that the agent-patient 
relationship is applicable to every motion without exception. If so, A is moved by B, B by 
C, C by D, and so on continually. Aristotle, however, rejects such an infinite series of 
motions and brings in the conception of the first mover (e.g. Ph. 242a 50 ff). In effect, 
when the first mover is defined as the unmoved mover, it emerges as an exceptional or 
special case of an agent or an active dunamis in it since the unmoved mover is by definition 
not moved by anything else. Moreover, when such an agent is related to a patient, their 
relationship is different from that in other cases. That is, although it is a mover, it does not 
literally move the patient by moving itself, but moves it by being unmoved. When we talk 
about the role of the unmoved mover in this way, the patient has to have a certain source 
(dunamis) of active motion. As Gill says, "an active ouvcq..l1<; determines the proper 
ordering of motions but cannot, as an unmoved mover, introduce new forces into a causal 
chain, whether by initiating a causal sequence or by imposing physical constraints."46 For, if 
it introduced a new force, then there would be a prior force to it and so on ad infinitum (see 
251a 10-21). 
45 Gill (1991), esp. pp. 246-254. 
46 Gill (1991), pp. 251-252~ cf. Solmsen (1960), p. 234. 
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In talking about the relation between the first mover and the simple bodies in this way, 
we are indeed forced to define natures as the sources of motion in a passive sense, for the 
first mover is, according to Aristotle, that which is responsible for all motions in the 
universe. There must be an external agent that provides certain conditions or removes 
obstacles for the patient to be able to exercise its own dunamis. However, as mentioned, 
although the dunamis in the simple bodies is not powerful enough to trigger its own motion 
by removing all the obstacles it confronts, Aristotle clearly and repeatedly says that when all 
the conditions are provided and when there is no obstacle, the natures of the simple bodies 
tend to actualise themselves. Thus the motion per se of the simple bodies is different from 
forced motion as in the case of a chair being moved by a man, in which there is no room for 
taking account of the active source of motion, if any, in the chair other than the source in 
the man. 
Aristotle envisages a clear difference between forced motion and motion per se. As 
seen in the DC passage cited above (301 b 17-25), he thinks that motion per accidens is the 
motion initiated by the external mover alone, whereas motion per se is the result of the 
relation between the source of the patient and the external mover. The motion per se of the 
simple bodies belongs to the latter category. If they had no natures, they would not be able 
to move in the way they do. If they were moved by the first mover without any 
involvement of their inner natures, then their motions would be forced motions. The point 
is that in the case of forced motion the external mover is a sufficient condition for bringing 
about the motion, whereas, in the case of the motion of the simple bodies, the external 
mover and the nature of the simple bodies are jointly sufficient, but separately insufficient. 
We might now conclude that Aristotle's characterisation of the simple bodies as moved 
movers differentiated from self-movers is not meant to deny that they are capable of motion 
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per se by means of having natures within themselves. As we shall presently see, the 
distinction is rather based on whether they have internal parts or not. The simple bodies do 
not have such an inner structure and so they are distinguished from self-movers. What is to 
be noted here is that Aristotle does not deny that motion per se of the simple bodies is 
observable (cf DC 304b 25-28) nor that they have natures as principles of their motion. He 
is now retreating from describing their natures as the sources of spontaneous motion having 
no relation to the first mover. The motion per se of the simple bodies is not quite 'active' if 
the term entails the capacity for self-initiated motion. Nonetheless, it is clearly different 
from a purely passive or forced motion (which now turns out to be motion per accidens). 
However, for Aristotle all natural beings are constituents of the universe. Thus both 
natural motion and self-motion must be explained in relation to the first ultimate mover of 
the universe. Granting that the involvement of the first mover in the two types of motion is 
not directly observable, they would appear to be self-initiated motions which are clearly 
different from forced motions, i.e. motions per accidens.47 If so, why does Aristotle need 
to ascribe internal parts to living beings? Why does he not simply say that all seeming self-
motion is, as a matter of fact, forced motion in relation to the first mover? The motive is 
clear: he wants to distinguish the motion of the simple bodies from the motion of living 
beings. Aristotle seems to note the fact that, even if earth has the nature to move 
downwards, when it lies on the surface, it is not capable of actualising its nature, whereas 
the animal is (cf Ph. 253b 33-36). If this line of interpretation is right, then Aristotle would 
need to try to distinguish the natural mover from the self-mover, not on the basis that one 
47 However, in accounting for the motion per se of the simple bodies, Aristotle cannot exclude its relation 
to the first mover. For, if he did, then he would have to deny principle (ii) about the necessity of the agent-
patient relationship in every motion. However, at MA 700b 11 iI. he says that "if we exclude the motion of 
the universe, living creatures are responsible for the motion of everything else". The reason for his 
treatment of living creatures as the cause of motion without reference to the first mover of the universe is 
related to their possession of the internal unmoved mover, which we shall examine in Sec. 2 (b). 
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appears to move itself and the other not (which denies nature to one mover), but that one 
has a limited capacity to move, whereas the other has a wider range of capacities to move 
(which allows natures to both movers). Indeed, he embarks on the matter in Ph. VIII. 4 by 
ascribing the capacity for motion per se in one direction to the natural mover and the 
capacity for motion per se in two directions to the self-mover. 
(c) The Distinction between Natural Movers and Self-Movers 
Let us now turn to ask what criteria Aristotle has in mind in distinguishing the natural 
mover from the self-mover. In Ph. VIII. 4, he says, 
It is impossible to say that their motion is derived from themselves: this is a characteristic of life and 
peculiar to living things. Further, if it were, it would have been in their power to stop themselves (I mean 
that if e.g. a thing can cause itself to walk it can also cause itself not to walk), and so, if fire itself possesses 
the power of upward locomotion, it is clear that it should also possess the power of downward locomotion. 
Moreover if things move themselves, it would be unreasonable to suppose that in only one kind of motion is 
their motion derived from themselves. Again, how can anything continuous and naturally unified move 
itself? In so far as a thing is one and continuous not merely in virtue of contact, it is impassive: it is only in 
so far as a thing is divided that one part of it is by nature active and another passive. Therefore none of 
these things move themselves (for they are naturally unified), nor does anything else that is continuous: in 
each case the mover must be separate from the moved, as we see to be the case with inanimate things when 
an animate thing moves them. (255a 6-18) 
Aristotle here characterises self-movers (those that derive their motion from themselves) as 
those (i) that are alive, (ii) that are capable of, say, two-way motion, and (iii) that are not 
continuous, but divisible into the moving part and the moved part. In explaining two-way 
motion, Aristotle makes two contrasts (1) between the power to initiate motion and the 
power to arrest it48 and (2) between the powers to move in opposite directions. 49 In this 
48 Since, as noted, Aristotle in Ph. II. 1 says that all natural beings have natures as the sources of 'motion 
and rest', it might appear that (1) is not a peculiar characteristic of living beings. He does not seem to be 
interested in making an explicit distinction between the source of rest in the living being and that of the 
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way, the natures of the simple bodies are said to be the capacities to produce one-way 
motion,50 whereas the capacity for two-way motion is described as the characteristic of 
living beings. Since life belongs only to those beings that have souls (DA 402a 5-7), 
Aristotle is saying that only living beings are capable of two-way motion (cf 412b 16-17). 
What is it about the soul that makes its possessors so special? Is soul different from 
nature? According to Aristotle, nature is neither a subject nor a substance, but always 
requires a subject in which it inheres (Ph. 192b 32-34). And it is not an accidental attribute 
such as a shape or a quality (192b 35-193a 2; cf 194a 34-b 8).51 Thus nature cannot be 
explained in terms of contraries such as privation and form (cf 190b 24 ff.) for it is not 
something that mayor may not belong to a subject. Aristotle, however, does call it 'form' 
in so far as it is an object of definition. He says, "What is potentially flesh or bone has not 
yet its own nature, and does not exist by nature, until it receives the form specified in the 
definition, which we name in defining what flesh or bone is" (193a 36-b 2). Thus nature is 
the form in the sense of essence by which we determine what a thing is (cf Met. 1029b 11-
16; 1030a 18-27). In starting the study of the soul in the DA, Aristotle clearly states that it 
is an extension of the work on nature (402a 5-7; cf 412a 12-16). The soul is that in virtue 
of which a living being is capable of living and, also, of exercising various living activities in 
order to maintain its life (413a 21 ff). The soul of a living being is thus its nature in the 
sense of form or essence (412a 6 ff.). Therefore Aristotle's distinction between the simple 
simple bodies. However, he is presumably thinking that the living being has a power to stop its motion 
prematurely before it fulfils its end, e.g. an animal's stopping eating before it satisfies its hunger, whereas 
the motion of the simple bodies comes to an end only when it reaches a natural place (cf. DC 295b 19 fl.). I 
shall not discuss this matter in detail. Cf. Gill (1991), pp. 243-257. 
49 It is to be noted that Aristotle is here concerned chiefly with locomotion. However, considering that he 
ascribes to living beings other types of motion of which they are capable in virtue of the soul (406a 12-14; 
415b 22-27), it is unreasonable to assume at the outset that he considers locomotion as the only self-motion 
(cf. Met. 1046a 36 fl.). We shall return to this issue at a later stage. 
50 Aristotle, however, maintains that motion per accidens of the simple bodies is manifold (300a 24-27). 
51 On Aristotle's distinction between per se and per accidens attributes, see Met. esp. VII. ..\. and Witt 
(1989, pp. 104 fl.). 
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bodies and the self-mover does not rely on one having nature and the other not, but on their 
having different natures. 
We saw earlier that Aristotle's introduction to the internal divisibility into two parts of 
living beings appears necessary in order for him to reconcile their motions (that appear to be 
initiated without any external mover) with the principle of 'no motion ex nihilo'. However, 
this introduction of the internal parts is, in effect, an attempt to distinguish the motion of 
living beings from that of the simple bodies. That is, the internal divisibility is a necessary 
condition for one to be called a self-mover and not just a natural mover. Is this also a 
sufficient condition for the capacity for two-way motion? According to the passage cited 
above (Ph. 255a 6-18), Aristotle seems to think so. As has been shown, one of the reasons 
he offers for the limited capacity of the simple bodies for one-way motion is that they are 
naturally unified and continuous and thus they are not divisible into internal parts (Ph. 255a 
15-18). However, we must ask what this unity is about. Is it a unity of material 
components? This question arises since we have not yet determined the nature of the 
internal parts. We shall return to answer this question in Sec. 2 (a) below. 
I. 2 The Analysis of the Self-Mover 
It has often been mentioned that Aristotle believes that there is no motion ex nihilo. 
And yet he describes the motion of living beings in terms of their internal parts in order to 
distinguish it from forced motion and, also, from the motion per se of the simple bodies. In 
this section, we shall see what he means by self-motion and the self-mover by examining in 
detail the nature of the internal parts of the self-mover and their relation to the external 
mover. 
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(a) The Division of the Internal Parts 
Aristotle characterises the self-mover in various ways: it is that which moves itself 
without being moved by anything else (e.g. Ph. 252b 19 if), that which derives its motion 
from itself (e.g. 254b 14-15), or that which contains the source of its motion (e.g. 241b 36-
37; GC 324a 27). And the opposites are true of the moved, or forced, mover. What makes 
the difference between the two types of mover is, of course, that the self-mover has the 
source of its own motion. But, for Aristotle, the self-mover does not spontaneously begin 
to move just because it has the source of motion within itself, but moves as a result of the 
agent-patient relationship between its internal parts. He says, "In so far as a thing is one 
and continuous not merely in virtue of contact, it is impassive; it is only in so far as a thing 
is divided that one part of it is by nature active and another passive" (Ph. 255a 13-15 cited 
earlier). At one stage, Aristotle claims that every mover moves something 'with itself or 
'with something else', e.g. either a man moves a thing himself or with a stick (256a 22-23). 
By regarding both the man and the stick as examples of instruments with which the man 
imparts motion, he characterises the self-mover as a mover that uses itself as an instrument 
(256b 16-21). In this way, Aristotle concludes that in every motion there are three 
elements, i.e. the mover, the moved, and the instrument of motion (256b 13-14). 
As mentioned earlier, Aristotle accepts the hypothesis that what is true of a living being 
might be also true of the universe. However, he appears to accept the reverse as well, i.e. 
what is true of the universe might well be true of a living being (e.g. MA 700a 6 ff.; b 13-
14). He once states in the MA that "if we exclude the motion of the universe, living 
creatures are responsible for the motion of everything else" (700b 11 ff.). In saying this, he 
primarily envisages the relation between the first mover, that is responsible for all motion, 
and all the beings in the sublunary world, that are subject to motion, and, secondly, between 
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the self-mover and other beings. One might then suppose that Aristotle thinks of the self-
mover as a first mover in the sense of an unmoved mover. However, this is not so. 
Aristotle infers the existence of the unmoved mover by arguing for its necessary 
involvement in self-motion (Ph. 256b 21-25). That is, the self-mover is not the unmoved 
mover itself, but a mover that contains the unmoved mover in it. According to our 
discussion so far, it appears that Aristotle has four types of mover in mind, i. e. the unmoved 
mover, the self-mover, the natural mover, and the moved mover. In effect, both the self-
mover and the natural mover are called moved movers in so far as they experience motion 
per accidens. However, unlike the unmoved mover that moves without being moved and 
the moved mover that moves by being moved (e.g. 256b 15-16), it is not immediately clear 
how we are to understand the motion per se of the self-mover explained in terms of its 
parts. In Ph. VIII. 5, Aristotle writes, 
Therefore when a thing moves itself it is one part of it that is the mover and another part that is moved. But 
it is not self-moving in the sense that each of the two parts is moved by the other part; the following 
considerations make this evident. If each of the two parts is to move the other, there will be no first mover; 
for that which is earlier in the series is more the cause of its being moved than that which comes next, and 
will be more truly the mover; for we found that there are two kinds of mover, that which is itself moved by 
something else and that which derives its motion from itself; and that which is further from the thing that is 
moved is nearer to the principle of motion than that which is intermediate. Again, there is no necessity for 
the mover to be moved by anything but itself; so it can only be accidentally that the other part moves it in 
return. I take then the possible case of its not moving it: then there will be a part that is moved and a part 
that is an unmoved mover. (257b 13-23) 
With reference to the nature of the parts of the self-mover, we first need to note that the 
moved part in the self-mover must be distinguished from the moved mover, i.e. the part that 
moves something else by being moved. If the moved part were to move something else, 
then what is moved would be the moving part or something external. However, Aristotle 
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holds that the moving part is not to be moved by the other part per se, but leaves room for 
its being moved by it per accidens. That is, the moved part does not move the moving part 
in return per se. In the above passage, Aristotle explicitly rejects this idea of the internal 
parts moving each other, for, if that were the case, there would be no first mover. 52 
Aristotle thus arrives at the conclusion that the self-mover is composed of the moving part 
and the moved part which mayor may not move the moving part (257b 23; cf 258a 25-26). 
On the other hand, he also seems to maintain that neither of the two parts can have any 
direct contact with the external object without involving each other. It is undeniable that if 
either of them is absent in a living being, the living being cannot derive its own motion from 
itself (258a 27 if) and it is no longer a self-mover. In other words, if, in the self-mover 
composed of AB, either of them were separated from the other, A would not move 
anything else nor would B be moved by anything else. Thus, in so far as AB' s motion is 
self-motion, the roles of A's moving and B' s being moved are strictly between themselves; 
that is, A's potentiality to move has an internal relation to B' s potentiality to be moved. 
Thus construed, we are entitled to conclude that neither can A in any way move an external 
object without involving B nor can B be moved by anything external without involving A. 
It is thus AB as a whole that acts as a mover in relation to other external objects. 
Supposing that in a single organism AB divided at C, CB is a moving part and AC a 
moved mover the latter will be at rest when the former is not in motion. However, , 
Aristotle's own expression in VII. 1 is that "if CB is not in motion, then AB will not be in 
motion" (242a 41-42). Ross argues that Aristotle is here making "the mistake of supposing 
that this implies the causal dependence of the movement of AB on the movement of a part 
52 For a discussion of the necessity of the first mover, see VIII. 5, 256a 4 fI. 
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of itself CB". 53 That is, if AB is at rest when CB is not in motion, it will also be at rest 
when AC is not in motion. It is, of course, true that if either of the parts were absent or at 
rest, the whole AB would not be in motion. However, this does not imply that the moving 
part CB as well as the moved part AC are individual causes of a self-motion. For, for 
Aristotle, what is first in the series of self-motion is the first mover, whereas what is last in it 
is a moved mover which mayor may not move the mover in return. In other words, 
Aristotle thinks that CB is the first mover which imparts motion to AB through AC, but he 
does not think of the agent-patient relationship in a reversed order. Thus all the 
responsibility for AB's motion and rest should be ascribed to CB, but not to AC. 
In dismissing the possibility of AC as a mover responsible for AB' s motion, it is 
important to note Aristotle's suggestion that what is further away from the thing that is 
moved is nearer to the principle of motion (257b 16-20). That is, what is earlier in the 
series of motions is nearer to the principle. In a self-mover AB, CB moves AC and puts the 
whole AB in motion. And CB is, as Aristotle says, more truly a mover than AC because it 
is earlier in the series. In the same way, CB's ceasing motion is responsible for AC's rest 
and also for AB' s rest. Again, for Aristotle CB rather than AC is responsible for AB' s rest 
because CB is further away from AB than AC in the series of motions. Moreover, for him 
the relation between the parts is one-way, i.e. when CB moves AC, there is no necessity 
that AC moves CB in return. 54 A single organism's parts moving each other does not fit 
53 Ross (1936), note on 242a 38-49. On the other hand, Wardy (1990, p. 97 ff.) thinks that this is not a 
problem for Aristotle if we "understand the thesis as modestly claiming that, in anything moved, one can 
always conceptually differentiate between active and passive factors". By the factors being 'conceptual', he 
means that they are not "as actual, causally related parts within the moving whole, such as limbs and torso". 
However, Wardy's claim is not wrong, but that is not the way in which Aristotle settles the problem, as we 
shall see below. On the other hand, Wardy seems to be confused with the division of the two parts being 
conceptual and their role being conceptual. For Aristotle, as I shall argue, their division is conceptual, but 
their role is not. The point is that if their role is also conceptual, then there cannot be a dead body which 
loses the unmoved mover (i.e. the soul) of the living being. However, Aristotle explicitly acknowledges that 
there is a dead body that results from a loss of the unmoved mover, i.e. the soul (e.g. DA 412b 25 ff.) 
although he would not call it a body. Cf. The discussion of homonymy principle in Ch. II. Sec. 2 (a). 
54 Ph. 258a 5-9; cf. 260a 4-5; 267b 2 ff. 
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into his conception of the self-mover (257b 14-15). In this way, Aristotle is eventually led 
to the conclusion that the mover in the self-mover is an unmoved mover (257b 23-26). His 
characterisation of the moving part as unmoved enables him to claim that the mover CB is 
not moved by AC in return. In consequence, Ross's criticism that in Aristotle's theory of 
the self-mover the moved part, AC, appears to be also responsible for AB' s motion is 
wrong. 
Although Aristotle, in general, speaks as if the division of the internal parts of the self-
mover were readily recognisable, he later admits that it is indeed otherwise . 
... for here the uncertainty is not as to whether the motion is derived from something but as to how we ought 
to distinguish in the thing between the mover and the moved. It would seem that in animals, just as in ships 
and things not naturally constituted, that which causes motion is separate from that which suffers motion, 
and that in this way the animal as a whole causes its own motion. (254b 27-32) 
All the information we can gather from this passage is that the self-mover is composed of 
two parts which bring about its motion by playing different roles, i.e. one moving and the 
other being moved. Aristotle here does not tell us what the parts are, only that they are. 
They are not as distinctive as hands and arms conjoined by the wristSS and so their 
relationship is obscure. In effect, in Ph. VIII. 5 Aristotle explicitly rejects such an actual 
division of the parts of the self-mover. 
Perhaps there is nothing to prevent each of the two parts, or at any rate one of them, that which is moved, 
being potentially divided though actually undivided, so that if it is divided it will not continue in the 
possession of the same nature; and so there is nothing to prevent self-motion residing primarily in things 
that are potentially divisible. (258b 1-4. Italics are mine.) 
55 Wardy (1990), p. 97. 
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Aristotle's objection to the actual division of the internal parts is based on the thought that, 
if they were, they would "not continue in the possession of the same nature" (258b 3).56 
That is, since the nature of the self-mover is to have a part moving and a part being moved 
and, also, the capacity for two-way motion, it is plain that if the self-mover is actually 
divided, either of the parts will not have the same nature as the self-mover as a whole does. 
Thus it is clear that in talking of the parts of the self-mover, Aristotle does not mean to refer 
to actually separable parts. Indeed, he thinks that whatever has a magnitude can be divided 
into parts and so even the simple bodies are divisible (cf GC 327a 10 if). Thus, it appears 
that the divisibility Aristotle has in mind as a criterion distinguishing between the self-mover 
and the simple bodies is not a material divisibility, but a conceptual, or functional, 
divisibility. He says that the simple bodies are not capable of two-way motion because they 
are 'naturally unified' and 'continuous' not merely in virtue of contact (Ph. 255a 12_18).57 
The phrase 'not merely in virtue of contact' is to distinguish the simple bodies from 
artefacts produced by art (Met. 1015b 35-1016a 17; cf 1052a 22-32). Fire, for instance, is 
'one' not merely in the sense of contact, but also in the sense of natural unity in virtue of its 
own nature. 
One might ask whether Aristotle envisages that it is difficult to recognise any specific 
division of the internal parts of the self-mover because their relation is such as a bodily part 
56 The relevant passage is fully quoted below. 
57 However, it is not immediately clear why Aristotle, at 255a 12-19, talks of the material unity of the 
simple bodies as one of the conditions that distinguishes them from living beings. It might be because at 
this stage he envisages the sort of a material complexity of the living organism which he discusses in P A II. 
1-2 (see also, Meleo. IV. 10). He thinks that animals are composed of the homogeneous parts, e.g. blood, 
flesh, semen etc., as well as the heterogeneous parts, e.g. the eye, the hand, the face etc. that are composed 
of the homogeneous parts. Thus they are composed of not one, but various simple bodies (P A 646a 13 if.; 
cf. GC 334b 31-335a 22; Meleo. 389a 29 if.). This complexity of the living being in terms of material 
elements is, however, not directly relevant to the conceptual division of its internal parts since the division 
is not an actual material division. In the Ph. passage (255a 12-19), Aristotle speaks as though the material 
complexity were what makes the living being different from the simple bodies. However, he elsewhere 
maintains that the living being has such an complexity because it is different from them. That is, since it 
has the soul, its material organism is so complex as to perform the activities it is capable of (Mete. 389b 23 
if.; PA 687a 6 if.). Cf. Ch. III. Sec. 2 (c) and note 202. 
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being 'distributed' all over the other part. It is undeniable that in such a case it is not 
possible to discern one from another. Moreover, if the fact that the simple bodies are 
naturally unified or organised is a reason for their incapacity for self-motion, then living 
beings, too, must be incapable of self-motion because they are also naturally organised 
unities. These objections indeed presuppose that the division between parts of the self-
mover is material. However, Aristotle's characterisation of the moving part as unmoved 
excludes the possibility of the part being material because for him everything that has a 
magnitude is subject to motion. Thus it is once again clear that the division is not a division 
of material parts. 
In Met. IX in a discussion of the conception of potentiality, Aristotle says that one and 
the same thing can have the potentiality to move and the potentiality to be moved (1 046a 9-
15). However, he distinguishes it from saying that an organic unity can be acted on by itself 
for the reason that in such a case "it is one not two different things" (1046a 28-29). Since it 
is not possible for one thing to act and to be acted on at the same time, he goes on to claim 
that the self-mover must have internal parts (Ph. 255a 13-19). For "only in this way is it 
possible for a thing to be self-moved" (258a 1-3; cf 254b 27-32 cited above). On the other 
hand, in Met. IX. 2, Aristotle says that some produce a single effect and some produce 
contrary effects according to their natures, i. e. according to whether they have souls or not 
(1046a 36-b 28). That is, only some beings that have souls can have both the potentiality to 
move qua other and the potentiality to be moved qua other (1046b 15-19). If so, Aristotle 
is eventually saying that one and the same thing can be described as having both active and 
passive capacities when it is considered from two different aspects, as a man who cures 
himself can be said to be a doctor or a patient depending on how we see him. In this case, it 
seems that, although the division of the doctor and the patient is not actual, one and the 
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same man appears to play active and passive roles. Does Aristotle explain the relation 
between the unmoved moving part and the moving part in the same way as he explains a 
man described as a doctor, on the one hand, and a patient, on the other? If so, what he 
needs is to grant that they are not really parts that compose a being, but two different 
descriptions of one and the same thing. In order to answer the above question, we need 
further to examine the characteristics of, and the relationships between, the internal parts of 
the living being. 58 
(b) The First Unmoved Mover of the Self-Mover (SF) 
As noted, the self-mover is said to have an unmoved mover (Kl vouv CtKt Vll'tOV) as a 
part. 59 At this stage, it is important to note that Aristotle envisages two types of unmoved 
mover. However, he often switches from one to another without any clear indication of 
which one he refers to. Thus it is necessary for us to clarify what they are and how they 
differ. Without this effort, those who are familiar with Aristotle's conception of the eternal 
unmoved mover, which is the 1tpro'tov K1VOUV K1VEl OU KlVOUJ..lEVOV of the universe, might 
be puzzled by his introduction of an unmoved mover as perishable in Ph. VIII. 6. Such an 
effort is also necessary for us to grasp the role of the unmoved mover in the self-mover. 
Firstly, Aristotle thinks of a first unmoved mover (hereafter, let us call it UF) which is 
either directly or indirectly responsible for all motions in the universe (259a 3-7). He 
derives its existence from the assumption that, although everything that is in motion must be 
moved by something else, the series of motions cannot go on to infinity (242a 50 ff.). The 
UF is eternal since time and motion are eternal (251a 8 if). On the other hand, there is 
another kind of first unmoved mover which is responsible for the motion of the living being 
58 See also Ch. II and Ch. V. Sec. 2. 
59 Ph. 243a 13-15; cf. 257b 13-16; 258a 1-3. 
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(hereafter, SF). The relevant passage In which Aristotle distinguishes them reads as 
follows: 
For, since nothing that has no parts can be in motion, everything which moves itself must have magnitude, 
though nothing that we have said makes this necessarily true of every mover. So the fact that some things 
become and others perish, and that this is so continuously, cannot be caused by anyone of those things that, 
though they are unmoved, do not always exist; nor again some be caused by some and others by others. The 
eternity and continuity of the process cannot be caused either by anyone of them singly or by the sum of 
them, because this causal relation must be eternal and necessary, whereas the sum of these movers is 
infinite and they do not all exist together. (258b 24-32) 
The UF is one in number (259a 7-13) and brings about a continuous motion. In contrast, 
the SFs are many in number and cannot bring about a continuous motion because they do 
not exist eternally, but come to be and pass away. Being perishable, its motion cannot be 
continuous but ceases to be at some time (258b 26 if), although the motion can presumably 
be continuous until the SF perishes. Thus when dealing with the SF, we are concerned with 
a perishable unmoved mover. 
Suppose that a self-mover composed of AB somehow moves a non-living being, C, 
which again moves another non-living being, D, etc. For Aristotle, each of the relations 
between A and B, between AB and C, between C and D, etc. might be a continuous motion, 
but the relations as a whole are not continuous since they are not one and the same motion, 
but many individual, and successive, motions (259a 16-19). On the contrary, the UF can 
bring about a continuous motion for it is what always exists. This continuous motion of the 
UF is, according to Aristotle, circular locomotion which is the only motion that can be 
eternal (260b 29-30). Being circular, there is neither a beginning nor an end for it. 
However, all other sublunary motions have both a beginning and an end. 
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First, it may be said that no change is eternal; for the nature of all change is such that it proceeds from 
something to something, so that every change must be bounded by the contraries that mark its course, and 
no motion can go on to infinity. (252b 10-12) 
Aristotle believes that since every change is from something to something, i. e. between 
contraries (see also, esp. 224b 27 ff.), no change can be infinite or continuous in a strict 
sense (241a 26-b 13). Nonetheless, he does not deny the continuous and eternal motion of 
the universe (252b 34-253a 2). In effect, he later claims that the UF is an exceptional case 
in that it continuously imparts motion to the first moved mover which is also eternal (259b 
32-260a 5). In contrast, as mentioned, the motion of living beings is continuous only in a 
limited sense since they are perishable. The motion occurring between the components AB 
of a self-mover and, also, that between the self-mover and the outer environment are thus 
continuous in a limited sense because the self-mover is not eternal. The motion of the self-
mover is continuous only as long as the self-mover is alive. 
However, it is to be noted that Aristotle uses the term 'the unmoved mover' not only 
for the SF and the UF, but also for others such as the environment. 60 It is plain that the 
environment is not to be identified with the ultimate unmoved mover, i.e. the UF. The point 
Aristotle tries to make here might be illustrated from an analogy with the ranks of the army 
officers. Suppose that there is one general who gives an order to a colonel, the colonel to a 
major, the major to a captain, and so forth. The difficulty here is that Aristotle sometimes 
regards the general, the colonel, the major, and so on as first movers. Supposing again that 
the general is the first mover of the universe, in the absence of the general the colonel is said 
to be the first mover, in the absence of the general and the colonel the major is the first 
mover, and so on. In this way, Aristotle calls the UF, the environment, or the moving part 
60 E.g. DA 433b 12 if.; Ph. 253a 11-13; 259b 11-13. 
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of the man with the same name, i.e. the first mover. Strictly speaking, none of them are 
either first or unmoved except for the UF. In other words, neither the environment nor the 
moving part is an unmoved mover Simpliciter, but only in a qualified sense. Indeed, this 
line of argument enables Aristotle to claim that, although living beings are moved by the 
environment and eventually by the UF, they are still self-movers in virtue of having SFs 
within themselves. That is, when we consider only the relation of the inner parts of self-
movers, there is the SF as the principle of their motion which imparts motion without being 
moved by anything. However, this cannot be strictly true when we consider the universe as 
a whole. Living beings are somehow affected by the environment and, eventually, by the 
UF. 
However, does Aristotle think that we can take any mover out of the movers involved in 
a series of motions at random and call it the first mover? Let us take Aristotle's example in 
Ph. VIII. 5: a man holding a stick in his hand moves a stone with it (256a 6-7). Can we 
simply exclude the man and say that his hand is the first mover? Can we also exclude his 
hand and call the stick the first mover? Would Aristotle accept this kind of random 
exclusion of the previous movers? If not, what are the criteria Aristotle has in mind? He 
gives a concise and simple answer to the question. The first mover is by definition that 
which is not moved by anything else and that which does not need another mover (256a 16-
21). And so the series of motions must "be preceded by something else which imparts 
motion with itself' (256a 29-34). Returning to the above example of army officers, if the 
colonel, the major, etc. are not capable of giving orders to the troops on their own without 
having orders from the higher officers, then they cannot play the role of first movers. On 
the other hand, in the stick example, the man is said to be the first mover since the man 
moves himself without being moved by anything else. 
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However, why does Aristotle think that the man rather than the SF of the man is the 
first mover in a series of motions? It is because, although he objects to the idea that the 
man moves, and is moved by, himself as a whole without internal parts, he does not thereby 
reject the thesis that it is the man as such that moves the stick. The man as a whole is a self-
mover in virtue of the SF. That is, it is not the SF of the man, but the man as a whole, that 
is the first mover in the series of motions 'in relation to external objects'. As we saw 
earlier, the two inner parts of the self-mover cannot have any relationship to the external 
object without involving each other. That is, neither the moved part nor the moved part 
alone moves, or is moved by, the external mover. Thus, when the SF moves the moved 
part, the two parts as a whole act on the external object. 61 
(c) An Analysis of Ph. VIII. 2, 253a 11-20 and 6, 259b 6-17 
Given the preliminary analysis of Aristotle's account of the parts of the self-mover, let 
us now turn to examine two important passages which are sometimes considered as his 
rejection of the existence of the self-mover. By analysing them in detail, I shall argue that 
Aristotle does not deny self-motion, but acknowledges as self-motion all sorts of motion 
including locomotion, quantitative motion, and qualitative motion. 
As briefly mentioned earlier, Aristotle in Ph. VIII. 2 examines some possible objections 
to the thesis of the eternity of motion which he is endeavouring to establish. The imaginary 
opponent's claim is based on the observation of animal motion-that the living being 
appears to start its motion without requiring any external mover. She would go on to 
argue: "if this can occur in an animal, why should not the same be true also of the universe 
as a whole? (252b 25 fT.)" If, as she argues, this is also true of the universe, then there is a 
61 This line of analysis of the parts in the self-mover is consistent with with his hylomorphic distinction 
between soul and body which we shall see in Ch. II. 
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possibility that the heavenly motion might be spontaneous. There is no doubt that Aristotle 
accepts that argument as valid. However, he does not want to say that the conclusion is 
true. For, if he did, he would also have to accept the unhappy consequence that motion ex 
nihilo is possible. Thus, as we saw earlier, what is necessary for Aristotle at this stage is to 
deny that the animal is a self-mover simpliciter. That is, he needs, on the one hand, to 
ascribe a distinct status to it as a self-mover and, on the other, to allow the contribution of 
the environment to its motion to some extent. Indeed, this seems to be exactly what 
Aristotle is doing in the following two passages. 62 
(A) 
This, however, is false; for we observe that there is always some part of the animal's organism in motion, 
and the cause of the motion of this part is not the animal itself, but, it may be, its environment. Moreover, 
we say that the animal itself originates not all of its motions but its locomotion. So it may well be the 
case-or rather perhaps it must be the case-that many motions are produced in the body by its 
environment, and some of these set in motion the intellect or the appetite, and this again then sets the whole 
animal in motion: this is what happens in sleep: though there is then no perceptive motion in them, there is 
some motion that causes them to wake up again. (253a 11-20) 
Aristotle here rejects the commonly accepted view that living beings start their motion from 
a state of absolute rest and claims that there is "aEi 'tt K1VOUjlEVOV tv 'tQ) ~cPCP 'troy 
O'UjlCPU't(J)V", which is caused by the environment. However, he does not say that all 
motions require the environment as their source. He here appears to allow that locomotion 
is the only motion that has nothing to do with the environment. Aristotle, however, does 
not immediately embark on detailed discussion of this matter, but promises to deal with it 
on a later occasion (253a 20-21). This promise is kept in Ph. VIII. 6. 
62 I acknowledge that I have adopted Furley's method (1978) in referring to the two passages under 
discussion as (A) and (B). 
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(B) 
We must grasp the fact, therefore, that animals move themselves only with one kind of motion, and that this 
is not strictly originated by them. The cause of it is not derived from the animal itself: there are other 
natural motions in animals, which they do not experience through their own instrumentality, e.g. increase, 
decrease, and respiration: these are experienced by every animal while it is at rest and not in motion in 
respect of the motion set up by its own agency; here the motion is caused by the environment and by many 
things that enter into the animal: thus in some cases the cause is nourishment-when it is being digested 
animals sleep, and when it is being distributed they awake and move themselves, the first principle of this 
motion being thus originally derived from outside. Therefore animals are not always in continuous motion 
by their own agency: it is something else that moves them, itself being in motion and changing as it comes 
into relation with each several thing that moves itself. (259b 6-17) 
Aristotle's position in this passage is obscure: at first, he seems to acknowledge that 
locomotion is self-motion, but he soon denies it by saying that it is not 'strictly (KUptroC;)' 
originated by the animal (261a 23-24; DA 410b 20-21). However, why does he not simply 
say that all motions are somehow affected by the environment, but distinguish locomotion 
from other types of motion? What does he mean by the qualification 'strictly'? In order to 
decide whether we are to accept the above remarks as a denial of self-motion, we thus need 
to ask why he feels it necessary to distinguish locomotion from increase, decrease, and 
respiration (cf. 432b 9-14). 
Aristotle in (B) says that increase, decrease, and respiration are not produced or set up 
by the animal itself, but originated 'by the environment and by many things that enter into 
the animal'. In other words, the animal does not experience them through its own 
instrumentality. Aristotle explains at GC I. 5, 321b 17 if (cf. DA 416b 123 ff.) that animal 
growth is related to the nutriment that the animal obtains from the environment. He says 
that, for instance, animal flesh does not grow by itself, but by the food the animal consumes 
(322a 7-8). The food is transformed 'into the same form as that offlesh' (322a 1-3). Thus 
food from the environment is necessary for animal growth. On the other hand, respiration is 
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the inhalation and the exhalation of air in the environment (Resp. 471a 8-9). Animal life is 
dependent on the amount of the air that the animal breathes in and lets out by means of 
respiration. The role of air breathed in is, in effect, to cool down the bodily temperature of 
the animal that is necessary for keeping it alive (473a 3-4). It is thus clear that the animal 
requires a direct relation to the environment in order to undergo such motions as increase, 
decrease, and respiration. However, whether this kind of relation is to be the ground for 
denying that they are some types of self-motion is still subject to further discussion. 
For the moment, let us turn to Aristotle's repeated remarks on waking and sleeping in 
both passages (A) and (B). Passage (A) reads as if the environment somehow causes 
intellect or desire (orexis) to bring about a motion, when animals are at sleep. However, 
this cannot be true because the animal's desire, for instance, cannot be directly affected by 
the environment without involving sense-perception. However, Aristotle tells us that "an 
animal when asleep is unable to exercise, in the simple sense, any sensory faculty whatever" 
(Somn. 455a 9-10). In the Somn., he explains that no animal can sleep or wake without 
sense-perception, because they are 'affections of the primary faculty of sense-perception' 
(454a 20-24; b 28-29). However, this does not mean that the animal is exercising its 
perception in sleep. For sleep is the suspension of actual perception. On the contrary, 
while the animal is awake, the animal's sense-perception is at work. Thus we might take it 
that in passage (A), Aristotle is making an analogy between waking states and sleeping 
states. That is, he is saying that, as in waking states the animal must have some cognitive 
faculties in initiating its locomotion, there must be some motion in order for it to wake up 
from its sleeping state. For when the animal is asleep, it will not be woken up unless there 
is a certain motion other than sense-perception that wakes it up because sense-perception is 
at rest in sleep (cf. 454a 3-7; Ph. 253a 19-20). Moreover, its waking up must not be 
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spontaneous but by means of something since no motion is ex nihilo. F or this reason , 
although the animal might have a dream which is a kind of exercise of sense-perception, it 
cannot be what wakes the animal up because it is not a motion that always goes on (Somn. 
456a 24-26; b 11-14). 
What is it, then, that wakes the animal up from its sleep? Aristotle offers two possible 
accounts. According to one, the animal wakes up because of its nature in virtue of which it 
pursues the goal or what is best. 
Now, since there are several types of cause ... , in the first place, then, as we assert that nature operates for 
the sake of an end, and that this end is a good; and that to every creature which is endowed by nature with 
the power to move, but cannot with pleasure to itself move always and continuously, rest is necessary and 
beneficial ... But the waking state is the goal, since the exercise of sense-perception or of thought is the 
goal for all beings to which either of these appertains; inasmuch as these are best, and the goal is what is 
best. Again sleep belongs of necessity to each animal. I use the term 'necessity' in its conditional sense, 
meaning that if an animal is to exist and have its own nature, it must have certain endowments; and, if 
these are to belong to it, certain others likewise must belong to it. (455b 13-28) 
We here encounter a typical line of Aristotle's teleological account of natural beings and 
their behaviours: that is, natural beings tend to move in virtue of their natures towards an 
end which is intrinsically good or best. Aristotle conceives that sleep is necessary for 
animals for they have the capacity for sense-perception and they will be unable to exercise it 
without rest (454b 7-8). While in sleep, they cannot actualise the capacity. However, the 
exercise of sense-perception as well as of thought is what is best for them and thus they 
wake up. What is it then that is best for animals? Aristotle answers that it is their survival 
(cf DA 415b 12-22). And, in order for them to survive they must have some 'endowments' 
such as the capacity for sense-perception. 
Secondly, Aristotle, on the other hand, explains the reason for sleeping and waking up 
in mechanical or physiological terms, i.e. in terms of the hot and the cold in the process of 
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digestion. According to him, the digestion of consumed food produces the heat in the 
animal and the heat puts the animal to sleep (Somn. 456b 27-28; 457b 7 ff.). At this stage, 
he ascribes the role of cooling down or controlling the heat to the heart (456a 4 ff.). Thus, 
when the digestion is completed, the heart cools down the heat in the animal and the animal 
wakes up (458a 10 £f). For Aristotle, the presence of natural heat is necessary for every 
living being (Juv. 470a 20-21; 473a 9). He introduces the digestion of food and the 
surrounding air as two factors that aid the control of the heat to keep the living being alive 
(470a 21-22; Resp. 476a 21 ff.). The digested food is hot (Cf. Somn. 457a 5; b 10) and 
"sleep comes on when the corporeal element is conveyed upwards by the hot, along the 
veins, to the head" (457b 20-21). The completion of the digestion means the body is cooled 
off and so the animal wakes up. 
Aristotle's account of sleeping and waking up in both (A) and (B) is close to the second 
account in physiological terms. In effect, he does not show any sign of having the 
teleological account in mind at this stage. In the passages, he says that the physiological 
process of digestion is completed while the animal is in sleep. Why does Aristotle try to 
explain this particular example? It is conceivable that he confronts an objection raised by 
those who argue for the existence of the self-mover on the basis of the observation of the 
animal in sleep. That is, they would argue that the animal is not in motion while in sleep, 
but, when it is awake, it appears to start its motion without being moved by anything 
external. Therefore animal motion is spontaneous and there is no necessity that motion 
should be eternal. It seems that Aristotle is thus required to show that the state of sleep is 
not an absolute absence of motion. His account is indeed plausible in that, as we know, 
there is always some motion in the animal's body even in sleep. There is no doubt that the 
animal grows and respires while sleeping. And the animal must have a certain relation to 
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food or air in the environment in producing those motions. However, in passages (A) and 
(B), Aristotle is chiefly concerned with the digestion of the food obtained from the 
environment. 
What about animal locomotion? The reason for his distinction of it from other types of 
motion is not immediately clear. How is the digestion of food related to locomotion? As 
far as locomotion is concerned, we might think of two senses of food being a necessary 
condition for it. Firstly, food is a necessary condition for locomotion in the sense of 
nutriment. That is, were there no food, the animal would not obtain nutriment necessary for 
its survival. Secondly, food is necessary in the sense that it is an object of animal 
locomotion. In passage (A), Aristotle mentions intellect and desire (orexis) as possible 
causes of some motion. However, this motion that is brought about by them is certainly not 
growth or digestion for the obvious reason that the animal does not desire to grow or 
digest. As we shall see in Chapter III, among the three types of motion (qualitative motion, 
quantitative motion, and locomotion) of which the animal is capable in virtue of its soul (DA 
406a 11-14), Aristotle thinks that locomotion is the only motion in which the animal 
employs either intellect or orexis. Since orexis is orexis for something, the possession of 
orexis would be vacuous without that 'something'. 63 It thus appears that locomotion is not 
'strictly' originated by animals on both counts: the existence of food is a pre-condition for 
the maintenance of animal life that enables the animal to execute the motion and it is also 
necessary as an object of orexis. However, in the Ph. Aristotle is not concerned with the 
problem of how locomotion is aroused. And, indeed, it is dealt with at a much later stage in 
the DA and the MA. There is no doubt that animal locomotion is aroused in relation to the 
animal's recognition of an external object. However, in stating that locomotion is not 
63 See Ch. III. Sec. 3 (a). 
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'strictly' self-motion, Aristotle does not appear to be interested in that sort of matter yet. It 
seems that he is saying that, since food is necessary for the survival of the animal which is 
the subject of locomotion, locomotion is not a motion originated by the animal in a strict 
sense. 
In passage (B), Aristotle distinguishes locomotion from other types of motion in terms 
of 'instrumentality'. He takes increase, decrease, and respiration as examples of the 
motions that the animal does not experience through its 'own instrumentality'. The point he 
tries to make here seems to be that in producing locomotion the animal does not directly 
manipulate the external object, as it does in digestion and respiration. The animal requires 
food and air in growing and breathing and, also, in controlling the vital heat that is 
necessary for maintaining its life. In these cases, it makes actual use of external objects. On 
the other hand, in the case of locomotion the animal requires its bodily structures and 
organs that are composed of the elements that are originally obtained from external objects. 
However, it is not the case that the animal directly makes use of the external objects. In 
other words, the animal in locomotion is less dependent on the external object than in 
growth and breathing. Elsewhere Aristotle says that this is a reason for the primacy of 
locomotion in the animal. 
... a thing that is in motion loses its being less in the process of locomotion than in any other kind of 
motion: it is the only motion that does not involve a change of being in the sense in which there is a change 
in quality when a thing is altered and a change in quantity when a thing is increased or decreased (261a 20-
23). 
In discussing the motion of the living being in Ph. VIII, Aristotle appears interested in 
locomotion (e.g. 255a 3 if.). This tendency seems to be related to his discussion of the 
primacy of locomotion in chs. 7-10 where he tries to establish circular motion as the eternal 
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motion of the universe. In effect, Aristotle seems to think that, since locomotion is primary 
in the universe, it must be also primary in the animal (cf 261 a 14-26). However, he thinks 
that locomotion is not prior in time to other types of motion in the animal, whereas it is in 
the universe. He explicitly says that the animal acquires it last in its development (261 a 14-
15; cf 260b 15 ff.; Met. V. 11). Unlike the eternal motion (260b 29-30), the primacy of 
locomotion in the animal is not in respect of time, but in respect of the perfection of being in 
its teleological order (261 a 18-19). 
If locomotion is differentiated from other motions in this way, does Aristotle want to 
say that e.g. digestion, growth, and respiration are to be characterised as motions caused 
'entirely' by the environment? As we have seen, he explains them in physiological or 
mechanical terms. If he thinks that those motions are initiated by the external mover alone, 
then there is no doubt that he is, at least, saying that they are not types of self-motion. 
However, Aristotle often claims that the environment is not that which affects the animal, 
but that which is affected by the animal. In other words, the food is not something that 
feeds the animal, but that with which the animal is fed. In the DA, Aristotle says as follows: 
The process of nutrition involves three factors; what is fed, that wherewith it is fed, and what does the 
feeding; of these what feeds is the first soul, what is fed is the body which has that soul in it, and that with 
which it is fed is the food. ... The expression 'wherewith it is fed' is ambiguous just as is the expression 
'wherewith the ship is steered'; that may mean either the hand or the rudder, i.e. either what is moved and 
sets in movement, or what is merely moved. All food must be capable of being digested, and what produces 
digestion is warmth; that is why everything that has soul in it possesses warmth. (416b 20-29) 
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Aristotle is lingering over the problem of how to understand the role of food in animal 
motion, but he makes it clear that the food is not the mover of the motion. More clearly, in 
DA II. 4, he says that the animal rather than the food is responsible for its nutrition. 64 
... food is acted upon by what is nourished by it, not the other way around, as timber is worked by a 
carpenter and not conversely; there is a change in the carpenter but it is merely a change from not-working 
to working. (416a 34-b 3) 
He does not deny that the food is a necessary condition for nutrition. And yet he does not 
want to say that it is a sufficient condition for, or an efficient aition of, the animal. He thus 
goes on to say, 
Since nothing except what is alive can be fed, what is fed is the be souled body and just because it has soul in 
it. Hence food is essentially related to what has soul in it. Food has a power which is other than the power 
to increase the bulk of what is fed by it; so far forth as what has soul in it is a quantum, food may increase 
its quantity, but it is only so far as what has soul in it is a 'this-somewhat' or substance that food acts as 
food; in that case it maintains the being of what is fed, and that continues to be what it is so long as the 
process of nutrition continues. (416b 10-14. Italics are mine.) 
Above all, what Aristotle clearly tells us here is that the food is not something that forces 
the animal to produce motion against its nature. As he says, food acts as food to increase 
the volume of the ensouled body in so far as the ensouled body has such a nature. We need 
to recall our earlier discussion of the relation between the nature of the simple bodies and 
the prime mover. There we saw that the prime mover does not bring about their motion per 
accidens, but merely accelerates their motion per se. 65 Similarly, in the relation between the 
environment, i. e. food, and the animal, the food does not bring about the animal's motion 
64 See also Resp. 472a 23 where he says that "the origin of breathing and of the respiratory motion must be 
within [the animal]; it is not due to pressure from around". 
65 The SF cannot trigger the motion of the moved part because, if it did, "it would need to alter from a 
previous state to furnish the stimulation, and would thus fail to be unmoved" (Gill, 1991, p. 244). 
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per accidens, i.e. against its nature; it aids the animal to perfect its motion per se, i.e. 
according to its nature. If so, we might now conclude that, as opposed to the superficial 
reading of passages (A) and (B), Aristotle does not deny the existence of any kind of animal 
self-motion, whether it is growth or respiration. 66 In other words, he accepts self-motion in 
other categories of motion (than locomotion) in a qualified sense in which he accepts for the 
simple bodies. However, there is no doubt that he considers them also as types of self-
• 67 
motIon. 
(d) The Identification of the SF and the Soul 
We have so far granted that the SF is identified with the soul without providing any 
textual evidence. Does Aristotle identify the two? Waterlow points out that, although 
Aristotle "never in the Physics mentions soul as the change-element in self-change," it is, 
nonetheless, hard to resist the view that Aristotle appears to identify "the source of self-
change with sour. 68 In effect, there are some passages in Ph. where Aristotle seems to 
acknowledge the involvement of soul in animal motion, but they are too obscure to be used 
as direct evidence for the claim that he identifies the SF with the soul. For instance, in VIII. 
9, he refers to 'those who make soul the aition of motion' and says that they consider the 
soul as the first principle of the living being that moves itself (265b 33-266a 2). However, 
he merely reports their view without making his position clear whether he is for or against 
66 Nowhere in Ph. VIII, does he explicitly raise the question whether plants are also to be regarded as 
capable of producing self-motion. However, as seen earlier, Aristotle thinks that self-motion is the 
characteristic oflife, i.e. in virtue of the soul. And since plants have the nutritive soul (413a 25 ff.) which is 
related to nutrition, growth, etc., it is reasonable to accept that they are also capable of self-motion in 
growth. Their two-way motion would be to extract and not to extract nutriment from the environment. See 
Gill (1991), p. 245. Cf. Ch. III. Sec. 2 (c) for the relation between locomotion and other types of animal 
motion. 
67 Note that, in this section, my chief concern is the relation between the whole animal and the external 
mover or the environment. The relation between the SF and the moved part, or the soul and the body will , 
be dealt with in more detail in the subsequent chapter. 
68 Waterlow (1982), p. 213. 
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it. Another implication of the involvement of the soul in self-motion might be found in 
passage (A) cited above where Aristotle mentions that such soul-capacities as desire 
(OpE~l~) and intellect (ouxvola) are necessary in giving rise to animal locomotion. 
However, they are introduced as moved movers rather than as unmoved movers. We might 
attempt to identify the unmoved mover with the soul from the characterisation of the mover 
in the self-mover as being unmoved ('to K1VOUV <lK1Vl1'tov). However, the Physics does not 
make explicit whether we are to identify it with the soul or with some other entity whatever 
it may be. 
Thus the identification of the SF with the soul must be made in comparison of the 
characterisations of the unmoved mover in the Ph. with those of the soul in the DA. The 
most prominent evidence for such a view is Aristotle's introduction of the soul as the source 
of motion in the DA (esp. 415b 22-27). He also characterises it as unmoved in I. 2. He 
there accepts his predecessors' characterisation of the soul as the source of motion, but 
rejects their characterisation of it as a material element 'which moves itself (esp. 404a 21-
24). In the subsequent chapter, he argues that if the soul moves itself, it must have a place 
(406a 14 fr.). If so, it might be capable of separate existence (403 a 10-11) and 'a 
resurrection of animals from the dead' would be possible (406b 2 fI). In this way, he goes 
on to claim that "it is a mistake to say that the soul is a magnitude" (407a 3 fr.).69 From 
this he concludes that motion cannot be an attribute of it. In DA I. 3 -4, Aristotle strongly , 
rejects the view that the soul can be moved even 'by itself (408b 30-32). 
What about the SF? As seen earlier, Aristotle maintains that the SF is perishable. 
However we need to ask whether he means that the SF is somehow movable. In the GC I. , 
7, Aristotle tells us that the tendency to be moved is a characteristic of matter. 
69 See Hick's note on 407a 3-26. 
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As to matter, it (qua matter) is passive. Now fire contains the hot embodied in matter; but a hot separate 
from matter (if such a thing existed) could not suffer any action. Perhaps, indeed, it is impossible that the 
hot should exist in separation from matter; but if there are any entities thus separable, what we are saying 
would be true of them. (324b 18-21) 
He here implies that no entity in motion can be separable from matter in reality. However, 
he does not thereby deny that there can be a mover that is not itself in motion. The 
existence of the UF is certainly separable from matter. 70 In the Met., Aristotle claims that 
the UF is immaterial since it is an eternal mover (1071b 21-22). Later on, he again says that 
"there is a substance which is eternal and unmovable and separate from sensible things. . .. 
this substance cannot have any magnitude, but is without parts and indivisible. For it 
produces movement through infinite time, but nothing finite has infinite power" (1073 a 4-
9). 
The UF is exempt from all sorts of motion, 'both unqualified and accidental' since it 
does not have matter (Ph. 258b 15; 259b 23-24). However, even if for Aristotle the SF 
should be different in this respect from the UF, he cannot thereby deny its immovability. 
For the SF is by definition that which is not moved by anything. For Aristotle, 'being 
unmoved' primarily implies that it is not embodied in matter since whatever has matter is 
subject to change, namely, the matter qua matter is susceptible to change (GC 324b 4-5; 
335b 30-31). Thus if the SF is involved in motion, it is not a motion qua the unmoved 
mover, but qua matter. If so, the perishability of the SF must be explained in terms of 
'accidental motion'. That is, although the SF is immovable, it is subject to motion since it 
involves some matter as an underlying subject. Thus the perishability of the SF must not be 
ascribed to the SF itself, but to its underlying matter. The main difference between the UF 
and the SF is that the SF is enmattered, whereas the UF is in no way enmattered. If 
70 E.g. Ph. 258b 24-25; 266a 10 if.; Met. 1071b 21 if.; 1073a 4-13. 
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something is composed of matter, it is in principle subject to change. However, the SF is 
not itself matter, but enmattered. Thus Aristotle says that it is subject to change not per se, 
but per accidens or, in other words, it is moved not qua itself, but qua being enmattered. 71 
At DA. 406b 4 ff., Aristotle explains the motion of the soul in the same way. Considering 
all the characteristics of the unmoved moving part and the soul we have seen so far it 
, 
appears that we are now entitled to identify them with each other. 
Let us now turn to see more about what Aristotle means by accidental motion of the SF 
or the soul. He says in Ph. VIII. 6, 
(Moreover in all these things the first mover and cause of their self-motion is itself moved by itself, though 
in an accidental sense: that is to say, the body changes its place, so that that which is in the body changes its 
place also and moves itself by leverage.) Hence we may be sure that if a thing belongs to the class of 
unmoved things which move themselves accidentally, it is impossible that it should cause continuous 
motion. So the necessity that there should be motion continuously requires that there should be a first 
mover that is unmoved even accidentally ... (259b 17 ff.)72 
How do we understand the statement that the SF 'moves itself by leverage'? Ross takes 
Aristotle to mean that "If a lever is to continue to lift a weight, it must keep in contact with 
the weight as the latter moves. Aristotle's thought is that similarly the soul as it moves the 
body must keep in contact with the body, and thus by moving the body incidentally moves 
71 Aristotle thus says that if there is any motion natural to the soul, "it must have a place" (DA 406a 14-22). 
72 Aristotle in Ph. V. 1 distinguishes three types of change: change K:u8' uino, i.e. the type of change that 
"a thing is in motion ... in virtue of being itself directly in motion (224a 27-31)," K:u'teX. (J"'\}~~£~l1K:OC;, i.e. 
the type of change that a thing is said to change because its concomitant changes, and change K:u'teX. ~tpoc; 
(a 21-23), i.e. the type of change that "a thing is said without qualification to change because something 
belonging to it changes (a 23-27)". However, the change of the SF does not seem to belong to any of this 
type. It is certainly not the type of change K:u8' uu'to for the SF is by definition not to be in motion. Nor is 
it change K:u'teX. (J"'\}~~£~11K:6C; for the same reason, although Aristotle calls 'change of the SF' 'change K:u'teX. 
(J"'\}~~£~l1K:OC;'. The change under discussion rather seems to be the opposite of change K:u'teX. ~tpo<; because 
the SF changes in virtue of the change of the whole to which it belongs. On the other hand, according to 
An. Post. I. 4, 73b 10 ff., "If one event occurs because of another, then the connection between the two 
events is per se and not per accidens, or coincidental" (Witt, 1989, p. 105, n. 3). Then, the relation 
between the motion of the SF and the motion of the body in which it resides seems per se in the sense that 
whenever the ensouled body moves it is also moved. However, Aristotle wants to say that the motion of the 
SF in virtue of being enmattered is per accidens since there is no change that is per se to the SF itself. 
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itself' . 73 His comment gives the impression that the soul has a bodily contact with the body. 
However, this cannot be true since the soul is an unmoved mover that is not itself material. 
Thus the contact the soul has with the body cannot be the same as that which the lever has 
with the weight. In an exposition of the problem of how the UF moves in Met. XII. 7, 
Aristotle says that it produces motion in beings 'by being loved' (1072b 3). At an earlier 
stage, he also states that "the object of desire and the object of thought move in this way; 
they move without being moved" (1072a 26-27). Aristotle elsewhere explains this sort of 
one-way motion as follows: 
As a rule, no doubt, if A touches B, B touches A. ... Hence if anything imparts motion without itself being 
moved, it may touch the moved and yet itself be touched by nothing-for we say sometimes that the man 
who grieves us touches us, but not that we touch him. (GC 323a 25-33) 
The example of a man's grief suggests that by touch Aristotle here does not necessarily 
mean any bodily contact. He elsewhere says that the condition for one-way motion is the 
agent having different matter from the patient (32Sa 22-23). However, this is not generally 
applied to all the cases of one-way relationship since it is not the case that the UF and the 
SF have a different sort of matter from what they move, but, rather, that they are not 
composed of any matter at all. 
A plausible account of the problem of how the SF 'moves itself by leverage' might be 
given by Ackrill's reading of DA 40Sb 1 ff.74 
The soul does not use the body as a craftsman uses tools, but rather as a craft (such as skill at carpentry) 
may be said to use tools, in that it is necessarily exercised and displayed through the movement of tools. 
The powers distinctive of living things are exercised and displayed in the movement of their bodies. ... The 
other phrase, 'a man does things with his soul', is also not analogous to 'a craftsman does things with this 
tool', but rather to 'a craftsman does things with his skill'. It is in virtue of his being alive, having faculties 
73 Ross (1936), note on 259b 19. 
74 Ackrill (1981), p. 62. 
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of nutrition and desire, that an animal feeds and desires; in other words, the animal feeds and desires 'with 
his soul' 
A significant difference between the UF and the SF is that the former moves other beings 
without being embodied in any matter, whereas the latter is necessarily embodied. In other 
words, the SF is not capable of doing anything without involving the body. That is to say, 
since the SF is not that which moves, or is moved by, itself qua itself, it loses its status of 
the SF, i.e. the unmoved mover of the self-mover, when it is not enmattered or when it is 
separated from the body. That is, as seen earlier, the relation between the SF and the 
moved part is an internal relation. The SF does not move external things without involving 
the moved part and, also, the moved part is not moved by them without involving the SF. 
When the two parts are together, they move, or are moved by, external things. Ackrill's 
account indeed tells us of such a close relationship of the soul with the body. The soul does 
not move the body as a craftsman uses a tool to make, say, a chair. The agent is not the 
man separated from the tool, but the tool which displays the art of making a chair, where 
the tool and the art are not separable. When the tool is broken, it is not the case that the art 
itself is also destroyed. But the art is destroyed qua being enmattered in the tool. All the 
same, when an animal is pushed by an external object, it is not the case that the soul of the 
animal itself is pushed, but that the body which has the soul in it is pushed and the soul is 
thereby accidentally pushed. However, there is a significant difference in this analogy in 
that one can replace a tool with another when it is broken and go on to work, whereas in 
the case of the soul-body relationship the soul is not replaceable, as I shall argue in the 
subsequent chapters. In effect, the problem of the relationship between the soul and the 
body is a chief concern throughout the present thesis. F or the moment, let this account 
suffice as a preliminary work concerning their relationship. In the following chapter, we 
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shall tum to examine some current interpretations of their relationship and attempt to set 
out the most plausible way of understanding it. 
Summary 
Aristotle's analysis of self-motion distinguishes four types of motion: (i) forced motion 
in which the patient does not have any source of motion within itself, (ii) the motion per se 
of the simple bodies that are capable of one-way motion by virtue of having the source 
within themselves but that still have a relation to the first mover of the universe, (iii) the 
self-motion of the living being that is capable of two-way motion by virtue of having the 
soul and the corresponding bodily part, and (iv) the motion of the unmoved mover that 
moves without being moved. As the simple bodies in (ii) are somehow moved by the first 
mover, the living being in (iii) also has a certain relation to the environment. Nonetheless, 
they are differentiated from each other because the living being in (iii) has two parts that 
have distinct roles, the SF and the moved part. The SF is characterised as moving the body 
without being itself moved by anything else. Although the SF and the UF are both 
unmoved movers, the SF differs from the UF in that it is essentially embodied. Thus, unlike 
the UF which is eternal and exempt from all sorts of change, the SF is perishable and is 
subject to change albeit only accidentally. The change of the SF is not per se, but per 
accidens that it experiences by virtue of being embodied. This characterisation gives 
Aristotle the benefit of reconciling the presence of the unmoved mover in the self-mover 
with the self-mover's passive motion by the environment. 75 
75 As noted, the self-mover's passive motion here must be distinguished from its motion per accidens. 
That is, its motion per accidens is motion imparted by the external mover without any relation to the self-
mover's inner capacity. But the phrase 'the self-mover's passive motion' here presupposes the self-mover's 
inner capacity which cannot be actualised without a relation to the external mover. See below. 
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The main point I have argued is that for Aristotle there is no self-mover and so no self-
motion in an unqualified sense. 76 His view is different from the view that the self-mover has 
nothing to do with the external world in an unqualified sense. In so far as Aristotle confines 
his conception of self-motion as that which has an unmoved mover within it, he does not 
necessarily have to deny the influence of the environment. F or the influence of the 
environment on the self-mover is understood as the affection on the body, but not on the 
soul. Although the soul also suffers a passive motion since it is necessarily embodied in the 
body, Aristotle does not want to call it motion per se of the soul. In maintaining this 
position, he, presumably, has in mind the conceptual characterisation of the UF which must 
be exempt from all sorts of change and wants to ascribe the same sort of characteristics to 
the SF as well. However, since the SF, unlike the UF, is enmattered, he has to find a way 
to explain its motion. Thus he explains that the motion of the SF is not per se, but per 
accidens (Ph. 259b 17 if). I believe that Aristotle's account of the self-mover is very 
plausible once the preconception that the self-mover must be completely isolated from the 
environment is given up. Since the self-motion of the living being is thus granted, we are 
now entitled to turn to discuss its inner mechanism. 
76 Aristotle treats the environment as the proximate reason for animal locomotion without considering the 
relation between the environment and the first mover of the universe. However, it should be taken for 
granted that there is a certain relation between them. At any rate, it does not concern us since the questio.n 
we have been dealing with is how Aristotle is able to maintain the living being as the self-mover that IS 




One might justly point out that Aristotle's analysis, in the Ph., of the conception of the 
self-mover in terms of its internal parts, i.e. the SF and the moved part, is incomplete by 
itself. For, although he establishes, in the treatise, that there must be such parts in the self-
mover, the questions about what they are and how the SF imparts motion to the moved part 
are left for other treatises. For instance, as we saw, the question of what the two internal 
parts are cannot be answered without detailed examination of the characterisations of soul 
and body in the DA. Given the identification, the agent-patient relationship between the SF 
and the moved part turns out to be that between the soul and the body. On the other hand, 
Aristotle regards the problem of how the soul moves the body as a subject matter of the 
second half of the MA on animal locomotion (700b 9-10). Thus, it seems that in dealing 
with his conception of the self-mover, our journey begun with Ph. VIII reaches the MA via 
the DA.77 Since, in the previous chapter, we have focused on the Ph., I shall now turn to 
theDA. 
There is a unanimous agreement that Aristotle's distinction between soul and body is an 
extended application of his general hylomorphism, i.e. his view that natural beings are 
composed of matter (hyle) and form (morphe). However, the question about how to 
understand the soul-body relationship in Aristotle is highly controversial. This question has 
been tackled by a remarkable number of scholars, presumably due to the growing interest in 
modern philosophical theories about the nature of the mind and the thought that his views 
may resemble modern ones. Interpretations of Aristotle's hylomorphism have been 
77 Cf. Nussbaum (1978), pp. 107-108. 
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attempted from various perspectives. Even two such extreme theses as materialism and 
dualism can be worked out for it because Aristotle, on the one hand, talks about the non-
separability of the soul from the body,78 and, on the other hand, he appears to allow the 
independent existence of the soul, i.e. the active nous (intellect) that has no bodily organs 
(DA 429a 23-24; 430a 23 ff).79 Moreover, as we shall presently see, those who interpret 
Aristotle as a materialist also differ in construing his views on the relationship between the 
soul and the body. In the present chapter, I shall discuss this highly controversial matter on 
a theoretical basis. I say 'on a theoretical basis' because I shall not analyse here the soul-
body relationship in the example of a particular living activity, but examine Aristotle's more 
general remarks on the subject. I shall discuss, in particular, the functionalist interpretation 
and some objections to it, and then ask what kind of an alternative interpretation can be 
presented. 80 Let us begin by examining some modern views on Aristotle's hylomorphism. 81 
78 E.g. DA 412b 5-6; 413a 3-5; 414a 14-19; Met. 1045b 16-2l. 
79 In the present thesis, I shall largely ignore the notorious problem of the active nous (intellect) for the 
following reasons: firstly, as noted, this thesis concerns animal locomotion in general and so with the 
relationship between the psychological and the physiological activities in locomotion. Thus the nous that 
belongs only to humans is not of my particular concern. Secondly, according to the discussion of self-
motion in Ch. I, Aristotle never appears to allow for the existence of the unmoved mover (i.e. the soul) that 
does not have any relation to the moved part (i.e. the body). Thus, if the expression 'that which has no 
organ' means that there is no corresponding moved part or that it is not actualised in a body, then it is 
beyond the range of self-motion. Nonetheless, our brief discussion of the soul-body relationship in 
locomotion in Ch. V will suggest that, if the rational faculty is involved in the arousal of locomotion, it will 
involve a physiological part for its actualisation and, also, accompany a bodily change (cf. the discussion of 
the locomotive faculty of the soul in Chs. III and IV. Sec. 2). For a dualist account of Aristotle, see e.g. 
Robinson (1983, pp. 123-144) on the problem of active nous; Heinamman (1990, pp. 83-102) on the 
existence of non-physicsl substances; Shields (1988, pp. 103-138) on supervenient dualism; Irwin (1991, 
pp. 70-73) on quasi-dualism. 
80 Once this is done, the remaining chapters will be devoted to verify whether the alternative interpretation 
is plausible and, if so, how plausible it is, by analysing the psychological aspect (Chapters III & IV) and the 
physiological aspect (Chapter V) of animal locomotion. Having done this, we shall be in a better position to 
say something more substantial about Aristotle's hylomorphism itself and, also, about the validity of the 
suggested interpretation. 
8! Hereafter, I shall use 'hylomorphism' to refer to Aristotle's soul-body distinction rather than his form-
matter distinction which can be also applied to artefacts, unless otherwise stated. 
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II. 1 Some Current Views on Aristotle's Hylomorphism 
As seen in Chapter I, Aristotle explains the motion of the living being in terms of two 
inner parts, a SF and a moved part, which can be identified with soul and body, respectively. 
His conception of the self-mover implies that it is the living being that produces a peculiar 
output, i. e. two-way motion, by means of the unmoved moving part within it, which is 
distinct from the one-way motion of the non-living being. This is not to say that it has no 
link whatsoever with the outer world. The living being does need to obtain food from the 
environment for its survival (e.g. Long. Vito 466b 29_32).82 The foregoing discussion has 
shown that there is a certain relationship between the soul and the body (or the unmoved 
moving part and the moving part) and, also, between the living being and the environment. 
And yet there still remain questions to be considered. 
The relation between the living being and the environment leads us to ask what it is in 
the living body that is moved by the environment or, rather, whether what is moved by the 
environment is the living being as a whole or some part of it. It is, as Aristotle would say 
(Ph. 255a 1-3), not difficult to observe what the moving source is in the case of forced 
animal locomotion. For instance, when a man is pushed away by strong wind, the source is 
no doubt the wind. In this case, Aristotle's account of the motion per accidens of the SF, 
i.e. the soul, in the man is well and clearly exemplified. That is, the man is pushed not by 
virtue of having a soul, but of having a body. On the contrary, it is not so clear in what way 
the environment contributes to the man's voluntary motion in place. Aristotle at times 
appears to say that the soul is moved by the environment (DA 433b 15 ff.;.MA 701b 33 ff.). 
It then seems that he envisages that the soul, moved by the environment, moves the body. 
However, what does it mean to say that the soul is moved and that it is a mover that imparts 
82 See note 76. 
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motion to the body? We must not forget that the soul is not simply a mover, but an 
unmoved mover. If so, it must not be the soul qua itself that is moved by the environment 
since an unmoved mover is by definition that which is not moved by anything. It cannot be 
the body without the soul, either. For the living being is living in virtue of the soul and, 
also, it has the capacity to exercise its activities in virtue of it. We thus concluded in our 
earlier discussion that parts of the living being do not have any direct link with the external 
mover without involving each other. That is, the living being as a whole is moved by the 
environment. 
Now we have to ask what is meant by 'the living being as a whole.' For, if the living 
being is always moved as a whole by the environment, then it is not clear what role the soul 
plays in it. Aristotle has no doubt, as we saw, that animal motion is related to the 
environment whether the animal is awake or asleep. For instance, in bringing about animal 
locomotion, the external object must be presented in actuality or in phantasia or thought 
(DA 433a 9-12) as an object for the animal to pursue (see Chs. III & IV). On the other 
hand, food is what enables the animal to grow while it is sleeping. If so, what is the role of 
the soul as a mover in the animal? What is clear is that the soul and the body in the animal 
are so interrelated as to bring about its motion. As we saw earlier, for Aristotle it is not the 
case that the soul moves the body in the way in which the craftsman uses tools, but that the 
living being moves itself with the soul (DA 408b 1-18; cf. 403a 3 ff.). However, what 
exactly that means is subject to further discussion. 
(a) Cartesian Dualism 
In effect, when such an expression as 'the soul moves the body' is literally understood, 
it gives the impression that Aristotle is talking about the relation between two somehow 
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separate entities in an individual. In characterising his hylomorphism, commentators often 
contrast it with Cartesian dualism. 83 Such a contrast is indeed very important since we are 
philosophically closer descendants of Descartes than Aristotle and, as a result, our 
conception of soul and body is more likely to be influenced by Descartes'. However, 
Aristotle's hylomorphism has some significant features that cannot be understood without 
stepping out of, or setting aside, the Cartesian influence. 
It is well known that "Descartes held that there were two (and only two) kinds of 
( created) substance, namely minds or thinking substances and bodies or corporeal 
substances,,84 that can be conceived without reference to each other. For Descartes, the 
properties of body are modes of extension whose characteristics include occupying space, 
being perceived by touch, sight, hearing, taste, or the like,85 and the properties of mind are 
modes of thought which include willing, sensation, imagination, as well as intellectual states 
or activities. 86 He thus maintains that they are two separate entities that do not have any 
characteristics in common, but he, nonetheless, believes that they causally interact with each 
other. He thinks that, although the soul is united to all the parts of the body, there is 
nevertheless one particular part in the body to which the soul is more closely related. 87 This 
part is the pineal gland in the brain, which is the seat in which the soul immediately exercises 
its functions and brings about bodily change, and which is also the part of the body which 
brings about change in the soul. 88 A general response to this account is to ask, if the soul 
and the body are so different in kind, how their interaction is possible. Does Aristotle have 
83 E.g. Sorabji (1974), p. 45 if.; Wilkes (1978), pp. 127-135; Irwin (1991), pp. 70-73; Code and Moravcsik 
(1992), pp. 139-141. 
84 Baker and Morris (1996), p. 11. 
85 Anscombe and Geach (1954), p. 68. 
86 Anscombe and Geach (1954), pp. 70-71 and pp. 109-124. 
87 The Passions of the Soul I. 30-35. 
88 For more references to Descartes' remarks on the pineal gland, see B. Williams (1978), p. 280; Voss (tr.) 
(1989), p. 36 n. 35. 
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the sort of pineal gland problem? In effect, the thought that he will face the Cartesian 
difficulty is no doubt derived from regarding Aristotle's conception of soul and body as 
Cartesian. What differences are there between the two? 
Firstly, Descartes thinks that animals, other than human beings, do not have souls,89 
whereas Aristotle ascribes souls not only to human beings, but also to irrational animals and 
even to plants.9o Thus Aristotle's conception of soul is related not only to mental activities 
(e.g. sense-perception, desire, thought, etc.) but also to other living activities such as 
nutrition, digestion, respiration, reproduction, etc. This is a primary feature that 
differentiates Aristotle's hylomorphism from contemporary philosophy of mind, which is 
chiefly concerned with mental activities of human beings. On the other hand, "For 
Descartes, unlike ancient thinkers, the difference between living bodies and dead ones is a 
mechanical difference which in itself has nothing to do with the soul. A living body and a 
dead one differ as a going watch differs from a stopped one, and we must not say that the 
body dies because the soul leaves it, but that the soul leaves because the body dies 
(Passions of the Soul i 6, 5)".91 Thus, according to Descartes, the soul may survive in 
theory even after the body ceases to exist. However, Aristotle's conception of the soul 
appears different from Descartes' in this respect. For Aristotle the soul is the form of the 
body, the survival of the soul without the body does not have any meaning (cf DA 412a 6 
ff.; 403a 3-5). Also, the living being initiates its motion only when the soul as the SF within 
it has a relation to the moved part. F or neither of the parts alone can have any relation to 
the external object nor can it act without involving the other part, as we saw in the 
89 For references, see B. Williams (1978), pp. 282-283. 
90 DA II. 2, 413a 21 ff. Thus it is important to bear in mind the fact that Aristotle's philosophy of mind or 
psychology, as we term it, is not merely concerned with mental states and events. 
91 B. Williams (1978), p. 278. 
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preceding chapter. Consequently, we must say that for Aristotle the soul perishes with the 
body. 92 
Despite these apparent differences, one might still take Aristotle's conception of the 
soul to be Cartesian. This can result from the identification of the moved part in the self-
mover as the Cartesian body which does not have any characteristics in common with the 
soul. Aristotle conceives that a living organism is constituted of soul and body which he 
regards as form and matter, respectively (DA 412a 6 if; 413a 2-3). Thus if one of them is 
taken to be a mover in a self-mover, then it seems undeniable that the other must be 
identified as its moved part. In this case, although the SF and the moved part do not 
interact with each other since their motion is one-way,93 they might still appear to have a 
one-way causal relationship in our sense of 'causal'. Thus construed, one might suggest 
that Aristotle also has a version of the pineal gland problem that besets the Cartesian 
philosophy of mind. This impression might be strengthened by one reading of Aristotle's 
passage where he appears to say that the soul is an efficient cause, that which brings about 
change in the body (e.g. DA 415b 22 if). It will be shown in Sec. 2 (b) of this chapter that 
that impression is misleading and that Aristotle does not have the pineal gland problem.94 
(b) Some Materialist Accounts 
In general, if one is not a dualist who postulates soul and body as two distinct 
substances but cannot deny the existence of matter or body as the ontological basis of the 
activities of the mind one is inclined to embrace some form of materialism. For this reason, , 
92 See Ch. I. Sec. 2 (d). 
93 As we saw in a discussion of the relationship between inner parts of the self-mover, the SF moves the 
moved part, but it is not moved by the latter in return (Ch. I. Sec. 2 (a)). Note that the one-way motion here 
must not be confused with the one-way motion of the simple bodies, e.g. fire moving upwards, contrasted 
with the two-way motion of living beings. 
94 See also Ch. V. Sec. 1 (b). 
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a number of commentators characterise Aristotle as holding a version of materialism since 
there is no doubt that he takes the body to be the ontological basis of psychological 
activities without acknowledging the independent existence of the soul without the body. 
However, although they ascribe some form of materialism to him, they are not in agreement 
as to what form of materialism should be ascribed to him. 95 
Although Slakey was not the first Aristotelian scholar who was concerned to interpret 
Aristotle's hylomorphic distinction between soul and body in materialistic terms, it has long 
been a matter of dispute since he presented, as he himself admitted, "a literal interpretation 
of Aristotle's statement that perception is a process in which the perceived object makes the 
sense organ 'such as it itself actually is"'. 96 He argues that, when Aristotle says that "if we 
are to see that which sees, that which sees originally must be coloured" (DA 425b 18-19), 
'that which sees' is the sense organ. Slakey goes on to conclude that for Aristotle 
perception, which 'is an effect on the soul', is also 'an event in the sense organs' .97 This 
view is endorsed by Sorabji. 98 
Barnes is not satisfied with such a strong physicalist account of perception.99 By 
focusing on Aristotle's frequent claim of the non-separability of soul and body (403a 3-b 
19; 413a 3-b 6), he ascribes the title of 'weak physicalism' to Aristotle. lOo "Barnes' view is 
a form of materialism because it commits Aristotle to the position that all psychic states are 
also material states; it is weak because it does not entail that every mental-state type (being-
'II) is identical with some physical-state type (being-cp), and thus allows that mental states 
95 For a reference to a materialist account of Aristotle's hylomorphism, see Shields (1988, n. I). 
96 Slakey (1961), pp. 75-89, see esp. p. 79. 
97 Slakey (1961), p. 87. 
98 Sorabji (1974), esp. p. 53 if. 
99 Barnes (1971-2), pp. 32-4l. . 
100 Barnes (1971-2, p. 34) defines 'physical' as 'definable in terms of the primitive predicates of phYSICS 
(and, if necessary, of chemistry; and, if necessary, of biology)' . 
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can be realized by a variety of distinct physical states.,,101 Barnes's position might well be 
associated with what we call functionalism which argues for the compositional plasticity (or 
multiple realisability) of the soul over the body, i.e. which denies any essential, identical, 
connection between them. Functionalists do not necessarily commit themselves to 
materialism. 102 Nonetheless, in construing Aristotle's hylomorphism, Nussbaum and 
Putnam, for example, ascribe the materialist account to Aristotle by saying that perception 
is always accompanied by 'some material transition'. 103 We shall return to examine the 
functionalist position in more detail. 
On the other hand, against the Nussbaum-Putnam's position Burnyeat argues that for 
Aristotle sense-perception is to become aware of sensible qualities, without involving 'a 
literal physiological change of quality in the organ' .104 IfBurnyeat is right, there is no doubt 
that Aristotle's hylomorphism has no feature resembling the Cartesian interaction between 
the soul and the body. Moreover, he claims not only (i) that the seeing of 'red' is not the 
eye's actually becoming red and (ii) that there is no necessity of any physiological change in 
the eye in seeing, but also (iii) that sense-perception does not require any associated 
physiological change at all even in other parts of the body. 105 Thus his claim indeed 
101 Shields (1993), p. 162. 
102 They argue that in so far as the mental states play the functional roles attributed to them, it does not 
matter whether their physical or ontological bases are copper, cheese, or soul (Putnam, 1975, p. 135). Thus, 
although many functionalists are materialists, "functionalism per se does not entail materialism" because 
there is no logical necessity that mental states should be physical states, i.e. the ontological basis of mental 
realisation may not be material (priest, 1991, pp. 133-134). 
103 Nussbaum and Putnam (1992), esp. p. 37. 
104 Burnyeat (1992, p. 19 ff.) analyses the widely discussed passage at DA II. 12, 424a 17-24 where 
Aristotle says that "receiving the form of something without its matter means becoming like it in form but 
not becoming like it in matter". 
105 However, Bumyeat's discussion is focused on (ii) which does not necessarily entail (iii) .. Thus 
Nussbaum and Putnam (1992, p. 36 ff.; esp. pp. 53-54), who maintain (iii), argue that their position IS safe 
from his criticism. This point is well illustrated by Cohen (1992, pp. 63-64). See also below for more on 
Burnyeat's position. 
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threatens every interpretation that allows for the occurrence of any physiological change in 
the exercise of the capacity for sense-perception. 106 
As we have so far seen, the questions arising for Aristotle's hylomorphism are these: (1) 
whether the soul and the body are two distinct substances and, if not, (2) whether any 
physiological changes are necessarily involved in psychological activities. In order to 
determine our position, let us first take a closer look at the functionalist position. 
(c) Functionalism 
Functionalism is in general understood as the view that being in a mental state is being 
in a functional state which bears causal relations "to (1) environmental effects on the body, 
(2) other types of mental states, and (3) bodily behavior". 107 In other words, functionalists 
understand mental states in terms of their causal relations to inputs, other mental states, and 
outputs. In applying the functionalist account of causal relations 'from (1) the inputs to (3) 
the outputs via (2) other mental states' to Aristotle's theory of self-motion, we might 
understand (1) as sense-perception and (3) as animal locomotion. Moreover, as we shall 
see in close detail in Chapters III and IV, Aristotle thinks that animal locomotion is the 
product of the relation between an animal's perceiving the external object and other 
psychological activities, i.e. (2) above, such as orexis, phantasia, etc. Thus, at first glance, 
it appears that there is a resemblance between functionalism and Aristotle's account of 
locomotion. 
However, we need to examine at least four questions in accepting the functionalist 
interpretation as the right one for Aristotle's hylomorphism: whether Aristotle would accept 
(i) that such a functionalist account, i.e. the process from (1) to (3) via (2), is also applicable 
106 Cohen (1992), p. 57. 
107 Churchland (1984), p. 36. 
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to other types of motion of the living being, (ii) that their relationships are causal, (iii) that 
all the psychological activities are necessarily enmattered or embodied, and (iv) that the 
particular type of embodiment is contingent. The functionalist interpretation of Aristotle 
fails, if there is a negative answer to any of those questions. 108 In the present chapter, I shall 
be chiefly concerned with showing the outcome of a negative answer to the last question. 109 
For the majority of functionalists, mental activities are in fact functional states of some 
sort of matter. They generally accept the claim that there must be some physical or 
physiological basis in which mental states are realised, but refuse to accept that the basis 
must be always the same for a particular type of mental state. The functionalist account is 
thus based on the claim that the relation of mental states to particular types of physical 
states is only contingent and there is no essential connection between them.110 In this way, 
as mentioned earlier, it claims the compositional plasticity (or multiple realisability) of 
mental states over physical states. 
This compositional plasticity leads to the token identity theory, the view that every 
instance of a mental state is identical with an instance of some type of physical state but not 
necessarily a particular type of physical state. In principle, the identity theory in general 
fails if we 'find some property that is true of brain states, but not of mental states (or vice 
versa)'. 111 The compositional plasticity does not entail the type-type identity thesis that a 
particular mental-state type at t1 will be always realised in this particular physical-state type 
108 I mentioned earlier (see note 102) that functionalism is not necessarily committed to materialism. 
However, it ascribes (iii) to Aristotle with respect to his psychology. 
109 Note that (iv) implicitly presupposes that the answer to (iii) is positive. That is, in so far as it is granted 
that the soul is necessarily embodied, we can ask whether the relation between soul and body is contingent 
or essential. (iii) will be briefly dealt with in Chapter V. See Modrak (1987, pp. 28-29) who offers negative 
answers to the questions (i), (ii), and (iii). Since she denies (iii), she does not need to consider question (iv). 
110 Nussbaum (1978), e.g. p. 147 ff.; Nussbaum and Putnam (1992), p. 33 ff.; Cohen (1992), pp. 58-59. 
111 Churchland (1984), pp. 29-30. 
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in which it was realised at tl. Thus, according to the functionalist, a firing of C-fibres in 
Jones's brain at t 1, for instance, is his pain at t I, but such a firing mayor may not be 
identified with his pain at t2 and also the way of their firing may be different at different 
times; i.e. the same mental state can be multiply realisable in different sorts of matter or in 
different ways in the same matter. 112 
If, unlike Burnyeat who maintains that for Aristotle sense-perception is not necessarily 
accompanied by any physiological change, one is to claim that Aristotle maintains that 
psychological activities always involve physiological changes, one has to find a way to 
account for his anti-reductionism. For, as is generally granted, Aristotle was never a strong 
materialist who claims that each type of the psychological states is reducible to some type of 
the physiological states. 113 For this reason, Nussbaum and Putnam devote more than one 
third of their article 'Changing Aristotle's Mind' to justifying their position about the 
compositional plasticity of the soul in Aristotle's hylomorphism. 114 They think that 
Aristotle maintains that "The same activity can be realized in such a variety of specific 
materials that there is not likely to be one thing that is just what perceiving red is, on the 
material level.,,115 In this way, they claim that Aristotle does not commit himself to 
reductionism. 116 However, it is still questionable whether this really represents Aristotle's 
own position. 
112 Cf. Boyd's distinction between compositional plasticity and configurational plasticity (1980, p. 87 ff.). 
113 For instance, his anti-reductive attitude might well be exemplified by his criticism of Empedocles who 
holds that the motion per se of plants or earth can be explained by the analysis of their material components 
(DA 415a 28-416a 18). 
114 Nussbaum and Putnam (1992), pp. 35-46. 
115 Nussbaum and Putnam (1992), p. 32. Note that whether functionalism evades the commitment to the 
ontological reductionism is controversial (see Bumyeat, 1992, p. 22 ff.; Kim, 1989, pp. 242-260). However, 
the point here is that one of the reasons for the functionalist interpretation of Aristotle is to show that he 
was not an ontological reductionist or a type-type identity theorist (see e.g. Nussbaum and Putnam, 1992, 
pp. 32-35; p. 37; pp. 40-41). 
116 Nussbaum and Putnam (1992), p. 45 ff. Cf. Code and Moravcsik (1992), pp. 141-143. 
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II. 2 Bow to Read Aristotle's Bylomorphism? 
At this stage, we need to note that the functionalist claim about the contingent 
relationship between the soul and the body results from the dismissal of Aristotle's frequent 
emphasis on the close unity of the soul and the body in the living being's motion. In the 
DA, Aristotle appears to be more interested in the psychological aspect of the living being 
than its material or physiological aspect. However, this is understandable because the DA is 
the place where he studies the soul or the psychological aspect of the living being. 
However, even in the same treatise Aristotle at times warns us that the physiological aspect 
should not be ignored. 117 
In what follows, I shall examine some of Aristotle's own passages that the functionalist 
reads in her favour and the validity of the functionalist ascription of compositional plasticity 
to Aristotle. And then I shall go on to examine whether there is any alternative reading of 
Aristotle's hylomorphism and, if so, what it is. 
(a) Aristotle's Functionalism? 
Aristotle's hylomorphic distinction between form and matter is first introduced when he 
argues in Ph. I. 9 against the Parmenidean denial of the possibility of change. He thinks that 
the Parmenidean fallacy originally derives from the failure to see that 'one' as well as 
'being' has more than one meaning. 118 As a result, Aristotle argues, Parmenides was unable 
to distinguish a substance from its accidents. 119 Accidents mayor may not belong to a 
particular subject; that is, they are contingent. This account can be illustrated by Aristotle's 
familiar example of a man becoming musical from being unmusical discussed in Ph. I. 7. In 
117 Cf. DA 403a 3 if.; 407b 14 if.; 412b 1O-413a 9. 
118 See Ph. 185a 21 if.; 186a 22 if.; Met. Book X. 
119 Ph. 185a 29 if.; 186a 33 if.; cf. 188a 5 if. 
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such a case, the unmusical man's becoming musical is accidental in the sense that the man 
qua man may never be musical throughout his whole life. Thus the man may become 
musical or remain unmusical. Moreover, the man may decide to learn mathematics instead 
of music and become a mathematician rather than a musician. Consider also an artefact for , 
example, a bronze statue. An artisan may decide to make a chair or a sword, rather than a 
statue, out of a piece of bronze. Bronze has its attributes: it will melt or harden at a certain 
temperature, it will keep its shape when it is solid, and the like. These are the conditions 
that the artisan considers in deciding to make a certain artefact out of it. However, whether 
he decides to make a chair or a sphere is merely a contingent fact, so is whether he uses 
wood or plastic as a material. 120 Does Aristotle think that the soul-body distinction of the 
living being is merely another case of a bronze sphere or a musical man? 
The same sort of question might arise from the reading of the following passage where 
Aristotle explains his conception of the soul in terms of form and actuality: 
We say that substance is one kind of what is, and that in several senses: in the sense of matter or that which 
is in itself is not a this, and in the sense of form or essence, which is that precisely in virtue of which a thing 
is called a this, and thirdly in the sense of that which is compounded of both. Now matter is potentiality, 
form actuality; and actuality is of two kinds, one as e.g. knowledge, the other as e.g. reflecting. (DA 412a 6-
11) 
Aristotle here identifies soul and body, respectively, with form and matter and, also, with 
actuality and potentiality. For him, the soul is 'a substance in the sense of the form of a 
natural body having life potentially within it' (412a 20-21). However, we need to note that 
Aristotle has in mind two distinct types of actuality, knowledge and reflection (or 
contemplation). He later states that the soul is analogous to knowledge rather than to 
contemplation. 
120 Cf. Bumyeat (1992), pp. 17-19. 
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It is obvious that the soul is an actuality like knowledge; for both sleeping and waking presuppose the 
existence of soul, and of these waking corresponds to reflecting, sleeping to knowledge possessed but not 
employed, and knowledge of something is temporally prior. (412a 23-26; cf. Ph. 255a 30 ff.) 
What does he mean by saying that "the soul is an actuality like knowledge"? Hamlyn 
interprets that Aristotle is here making a distinction between 'actuality (=hexis, like 
knowledge, a disposition) and actuality (=energeia, like contemplation or the exercise of 
knowledge, an activity), that 'are both spoken of as actuality' .121 If so, Aristotle's 
description of the soul as the first actuality, i.e. knowledge, seems to be what is to be 
actualised as the second actuality, i.e. contemplation. Then the soul is in a sense a 
potentiality. However, since it is matter that is said to be a potentiality, it must involve 
matter. When the embodied soul exercises its capacity, it is the second actuality like 
contemplation, whereas the embodied soul is a potentiality to exercise, which Aristotle calls 
the first actuality. 
We need not be alarmed by Aristotle's treatment of the embodied soul, i.e. form plus 
matter, as a potentiality to be actualised as the second actuality. As noted, for Aristotle 
change is between contraries, i.e. form and privation, which presuppose the existence of the 
substratum, i.e. matter. A man becomes musical from unmusical, an apple becomes red 
from green, etc. In these cases, 'the man and the apple' are the substrata, 'unmusical and 
green' are privations, and 'musical and red' are forms to be acquired. When Aristotle says 
that matter is a potentiality, he means that the matter tends to actualise a potentiality that it 
already has. In other words, the matter already has a certain form that can be replaced with 
another. 122 All the same, when Aristotle says that the soul is the first actuality (or the 
121 Hamlyn (1993), note on 412a 22. 
122 Bostock (1994, note on 1033a 31-b 2) agrees that in talking about matter (e.g. bronze) as an underlying 
subject that receives the shape of sphere, Aristotle seems to regard it as a compound of form and matter 
rather than matter without any form. See also Ross (1924), note on 1033a 31; Charlton (1970), pp. 71-72. 
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potentiality like knowledge) to be actualised as contemplation, it might well be construed as 
entailing a compound of form and matter rather than the soul alone. The question is then 
whether Aristotle would acknowledge that knowledge is something that can be actualised 
from another potentiality. To put the question differently, would he say that the soul can be 
embodied in some matter for the reason that the matter has the structure, the shape, the 
function, etc. that, for instance, a human being would have? 
According to the functionalist, Aristotle would. Even further, the functionalist claims 
that he would acknowledge that the soul can be embodied even in cheese in so far as it is 
the sort of matter that can display the appropriate functions. However, most of the 
passages, if not all, the functionalist takes to support to her view leave room for another line 
of interpretation. The following passage might be taken to support the functionalist view 
that claims that for Aristotle matter must be in a certain functional state. 
E.g. is earth potentially a man? No-but rather when it has already become seed, and perhaps not even 
then, as not everything can be healed by the medical art or by chance, but there is a certain kind of thing 
which is capable of it, and only this is potentially healthy (Met. 1049a 2-5). 
Elsewhere, Aristotle distinguishes a potentiality from a mere possibility (10 19b 22 ff.; 104 7b 
3-30). When the opposite of some happening is not necessarily true, then the happening is 
said to be possible. In contrast, a potentiality is that which mayor may not be actualised, 
but there is nothing impossible in its actualisation (1047a 21-29; cf 1049a 5 if). In the 
above passage, Aristotle goes on to say that it is not any matter, but the sort of matter that 
has a specific and appropriate potentiality that is actualised by a specific form. However, 
does he thereby conceive that a man can be actualised in some matter other than the sort of 
matter that the man in fact displays? The passage is obscure on its own since, although it 
might be construed as entailing that there must be the sort of matter in which a man can be 
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actualised, it does not clearly say whether the man can only be actualised in that matter. In 
effect, Aristotle hardly seems to be keen on making a distinction between the two 
implications. 
Let us briefly examine Aristotle's discussion of essence (to tt llv Eivat) since the 
question whether the man can be actualised only in a particular sort of matter is tantamount 
to asking whether the man's essence can be acquired. As seen earlier in Ch. I. Sec. 1 (c), 
Aristotle thinks that nature is not an accidental attribute such as a shape or a quality; rather 
it is the form in the sense of essence by which we determine what a thing is. The soul is 
also a different kind of nature which he takes to be the essence of the living being, as we 
saw in the DA passage cited above (412a 6-11). In a discussion of essence in Met. VII, 
Aristotle says, 
It is clear, then, that neither does the form-or whatever one should call the shape of a perceptible thing-
itself come into being or undergo generation, nor does the what-being-is. (Rather this is what comes to be 
in something else, either by nature or by skill or by some capacity.) There being a bronzen sphere is 
something that is produced; it is produced from bronze and sphere, by introducing the form into the bronze 
so that the result is a bronzen sphere. (1033b 5-11. trans. Bostock) 
This passage is, however, difficult to understand. For Aristotle seems to say, on the one 
hand, that the essence cannot be produced and, on the other, that, as the bronze sphere is 
produced by an artisan, essences of beings are also produced 'either by nature or by skill or 
by some capacity'. 
In relation to this view, we have to examine the so-called homonymy principle, viz. the 
principle by which Aristotle claims that a body which is incapable of its supposed function is 
not a body, which implies that for him a body is a living body, i. e. a compound of soul and 
body. He refers to this principle on many occasions,123 one of which reads as follows: 
123 Meteo. 390a 10-17; DA 412b 12-24; 412b 27-413a 2; GA 734b 19 ff.; Met. 1035b 23-25; 1036b 31-33. 
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What a thing is is always determined by its function: a thing really is itself when it can perform its function; 
an eye, for example, when it can see. When a thing cannot do so it is that thing only in name, like a dead 
eye or one made of stone, just as a wooden saw is no more a saw than one in a picture. The same, then, is 
true of flesh, except that its function is less clear than that of the tongue. So, too, with fire, but its function 
is perhaps even harder to specify by physical inquiry than that of flesh. (Meteo. IV. 12, 390a 10-17) 
Aristotle thinks that if a body is not capable of its proper psychological activities, it is a 
body only in name. Thus severed parts of the living being, e.g. arms or legs are no longer 
arms or legs in Aristotle's sense. Since the living being displays its psychological activities 
or functions in virtue of a soul presupposing a body as its ontological basis, we can take the 
above passage to imply that neither can there be a body without a soul nor can there be a 
soul without a body. Moreover, there cannot be parts without a whole body and, also, 
there cannot be a whole body without parts (cf Met. 1034b 20 if). This account of bodily 
parts secures Aristotle's view of the inseparability of the soul from the body and also the 
converse. He thus concludes that it is unnecessary to question "whether the soul and the 
body are one" (DA 412b 5-6; 413a 4-6). 
However, a functionalist such as Shields takes the above passage to entail that 
. I If· °11 b " 124 "whatever-and only whatever-has the functlOna ro e 0 seemg WI e an eye . 
Shields thus understands Aristotle's remark that "if the old man could recover the proper 
kind of eye, he would see just as well as the young man ... " (408b 21 if.), as allowing "in 
principle that one could gradually replace bodily parts the functional role assigned to those 
parts at will with others of the right sort, viz. ones capable of performing the functional role 
assigned to those parts, and still end up with a functioning human being". 125 Aristotle's 
description of 'the proper kind of eye' is indeed obscure and so is the status or 
124 Shields (1990), p. 2l. 
125 Shields (1990), p. 2l. 
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characteristics of its material components. However, these facts do not at once support the 
claim that Aristotle believed in the compositional plasticity of the soul. Shields quotes a 
passage from the Met. and argues for the compositional plasticity of human beings. I quote 
from him below. 
In those cases where things appear realized in [materials] differing in kind, e.g., a circle in bronze or stone 
or wood, it seems to be clear that none of these, the bronze or the stone, belongs to the essence of the circle, 
because it is separated from them; but in those cases which are not seen separated, nothing hinders them 
from being similar to these, [viz. circles]; just as if circles were always seen to be brazen, nonetheless 
bronze would not belong to the form [of circle], but it would be difficult to abstract this in thought. For 
example, the form of man always appears in flesh and bones and these sorts of parts: are these, therefore, 
parts of the form and account [of man]? No, they are but matter, but because [man is not seen] coming to be 
in other [materials], we are not able to separate them. (1036a 31-b 7)126 
Shields thinks that Aristotle is here arguing that "despite the fact that we always see human 
beings realized in flesh and blood, "nothing hinders" their being realized in other ways". 
However, another interpretation is possible for the passage. It would say: Aristotle 
undoubtedly admits that certain forms, e.g. circles, can be actualised in various materials, 
whereas he maintains at the same time that the form of man cannot be actualised in any 
other material than flesh and bones only because he does not see any other case. In this 
vein, Code and Moravcsik argue that "the example [of man] is given in the contexts of 
presenting an aporia, Aristotle is not here speaking in his own voice". 127 
Aristotle maintains that body parts are all subservient to a certain purpose, e.g. nutrition 
(Juv. 468a 18-22; 469a 4-9). Thus severed body parts that do not function at all for the 
living being are no longer considered to be its parts. Moreover, as the body stops being a 
body in Aristotle's sense when the living being is dead, the soul of the living being stops its 
126 Shields (1990), pp. 22-23 
127 Code and Moravcsik (1992), p. 134. 
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function when the body is destroyed, just as getting old restricts a man's capacity (DA 408b 
18 ff). For the living bodies to perform their living activities, they must have souls. And 
.. 
these souls must be embodied in particular bodies. In refuting his predecessors' views on 
the characterisation of the soul, Aristotle writes, 
... they all join the soul to a body, or place it in a body, without adding any specification of the reason of 
their union, or of the bodily conditions required for it. Yet such explanation can scarcely be omitted; for 
some community of nature is presupposed by the fact that the one acts and the other is acted upon, the one 
moves and the other is moved; but it is not the case that any two things are related to one another in these 
ways. All, however, that these thinkers do is to describe the specific characteristics of the soul; they do not 
try to determine anything about the body which is to contain it, as if it were possible, as in the Pythagorean 
myths, that any soul could be clothed in any body-an absurd view, for each body seems to have a form and 
shape of its own. (407b 15-24) 
The functionalist might want to argue that Aristotle's rejection here is not that the form of 
man can be actualised in a specific sort of body which functionally resembles e.g. flesh and 
bones, but that it can be actualised in 'any sort of body' .128 The functionalist qualifies the 
sort of matter or body in which the soul can be actualised; that is, the matter in which the 
animal soul can be actualised should be capable of exercising a necessary function as flesh 
and bones do. However, the anti-functionalist can argue that Aristotle's emphasis on the 
function of such body parts is based on the presupposition that living beings necessarily 
involve their essential matter without which they cannot perform their supposed function. 
In this way, the above passage might well be taken to be the place where Aristotle explicitly 
rejects the Pythagorean claim of the compositional plasticity of the soul. 
What is important to note here is that the functionalist interpretation is possible because 
Aristotle's contexts leave room for such an interpretation, not because it is the only possible 
128 E.g. Nussbaum and Putnam (1992), p. 55. 
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interpretation of them. This means that, as we saw, a counter interpretation is also possible. 
Let us now take a closer look at how the anti-functionalist interpretation can be formulated. 
(b) The Unity of the Soul and the Body 
In Ph. VIII. 5, Aristotle denies that a self-mover moves itself as a whole. He writes, 
If one the other hand the whole is moved by itself as a whole, it must be accidentally that the parts move 
themselves; and therefore their self-motion not being necessary, we may take the case of their not being 
moved by themselves. Therefore in the whole of the thing we may distinguish that which imparts motion 
without itself being moved and that which is moved; for only in this way is it possible for a thing to be self-
moved. Further, if the whole moves itself we may distinguish in it that which imparts the motion and that 
which is moved: so while we say that AB is moved by itself, we may also say that it is moved by A. (257b 
34-258a 5) 
The above passage is based on, at least, two of Aristotle's previous claims; firstly, since for 
Aristotle what is 'continuous and naturally unified', i.e. earth, fire, etc., cannot move itself 
(255a 10 ff.), what moves itself refers to those that have internal parts. Secondly, there 
cannot be anything that has magnitude and moves itself without being moved by something 
else. In effect, this second point is related to the principle we examined earlier that 
everything that moves must be moved by something. However, as we see in the case of 
unmoved movers, the principle is not applicable to those that have no magnitude (267b 18 
tf). Thus self-motion is, of course, the motion of the self-mover as a whole, but the self-
mover must have parts. And it does not start motion ex nihilo since it certainly has 
magnitude; it must be moved by something. In effect, it is undeniable that talking about the 
relation between the unmoved moving part and the moved part that brings about motion 
gives the impression that they are somehow separated from each other. However, since the 
soul itself is not a body, it must be somehow dependent on the material body in order to 
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bring about motion,129 though it is not yet clear in what way it brings it about in the body 
(cf DA 406a 12 ff.). What is clear here is that Aristotle acknowledges that there is a close 
relationship between the soul and the body. 
On many occasions, Aristotle clearly appears to think that a living being is such because 
its soul is embodied or its body is ensouled. That is, his conception of 'body' is not the 
shape of a body, but a living body that functions in a proper way. However, it is important 
to note that in the case of living beings "Aristotle treats psychological activity as requiring 
definable structures, but does not hold that the elements that enter into the specification of 
the form and structure are properties, features, powers, or relations that belong to matter 
that can exist outside of the realization of some enlivening potential". 130 The soul is not 
something that can be obtained, unlike such things as shapes, arrangements, qualities, etc., 
but something that is inherent in or inseparable from the body. 131 The soul already resides 
in the body and the body is already alive. It is not the case that the body mayor may not 
have the soul. If it were, then the body without the capacity for psychological activities 
would be the substratum and having the capacity is a form that can be achieved. However, 
for Aristotle, the soul is the principle of life which primarily means the capacity for self-
nutrition, growth and decay (DA 412a 14). That is, he is concerned with living beings that 
are already alive. Again, for him, the body with the soul, i.e. the living being as a whole, is 
the substratum, and 'exercising' and 'not exercising' are its form and privation, respectively. 
That is, the privation they have is not 'that they are not alive' or 'that they do not possess 
129 DA 414a 19-21; 412a 19 ff.; cf. 414a 19-21; 412a 19 ff. 
130 Code and Moravcsik (1992), p. 133. This view is derived from Aristotle's thought that the man's 
capacity to perform psychological activities in a certain way is the reason for his having the shape, the 
organs etc. See Furley (1996), pp. 59-79. For Aristotle, a body without the necessary psychological 
capacities is not a body at all (see the discussion of the homonymy principle above). 
131 Lloyd (1992) agrees that Aristotle maintains two theories of material elements, one for the living being 
and the other for the artefact (p. 59), but points out the problems raised in relation to his position (esp. pp. 
64-65). 
86 
the capacity or function', but 'that they might not yet exercise their capacity to function in a 
certain way that they already have in virtue of the soul'. If the capacity to be alive is the 
first potentiality for the living being (which Aristotle does not at all think of), the capacity to 
exercise, though not actually exercising at the moment, seems to be the second potentiality 
which he calls the first actuality ofa natural body (412a 27 ff.). 
If we consider the majority of them [affections], there seems to be no case in which the soul can act or be 
acted upon without involving the body; e.g. anger, courage, appetite, and sensation generally .... It seems 
that all the affections of soul involve a body-passion, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving, and 
hating; in all these there is a concurrent affection of the body. In support of this we may point to the fact 
that, while sometimes on the occasion of violent and striking occurrences there is no excitement or fear felt, 
on others faint and feeble stimulations produce their emotions, viz. when the body is already in a state of 
tension resembling its condition when we are angry. Here is a still clearer case: in the absence of any 
external cause of terror we find ourselves experiencing the feelings of a man in terror. From all this it is 
obvious that the affections of soul are enmattered accounts. (403a 5-25; cf. 408b 1 fI. Italics are mine.) 
Aristotle here says that anger, for instance, "should be defined as a certain mode of 
movement of such and such a body (or part or faculty of a body) by this or that cause and 
for this or that end" (403a 26-28). In other words, he is saying that affections should be 
accounted for as soul and body as a whole steering towards the same end (430a 26-26; b 
8); it is not the doing of the soul or the doing of the body alone. Thus the soul and the body 
form an organic body that is essentially alive, and neither of them survives each other. 132 
Whatever the soul does, it does with the body and, all the same, whatever the body does, it 
does with the soul. In this way, they are the soul and the body of a living organism. 
However, he warns us that such an expression as 'the man pities, learns, and the like with 
the soul' (see 408b 13 -18) is to be distinguished from saying that the soul itself is bodily or 
has a magnitude (cf. 407a 10 ff). 
132 Cf. Irwin (1991), pp. 69-70. 
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Burnyeat claims that "To be truly Aristotelian, we would have to stop believing that the 
emergence of life or mind requires explanation". 133 What he is saying here is that Aristotle 
does not separate the doings of the soul from the doings of the body because for him the 
material of which the sense organ is composed is essentially alive and so essentially capable 
of awareness. 134 Burnyeat believes that the functionalist claim about the contingent 
relationship of soul and body is due to the tendency to distinguish them in Cartesian 
sense. 135 It is unnecessary to say that, if the body or the matter that composes the living 
being is, as Aristotle thinks, essentially alive, then we need not talk about the relationship 
between the soul and the body or between the psychological and the physiological. 
However, as we saw,136 Aristotle does talk about the relationship between them in terms 
of the unmoved moving part and the moved part as if they were separate from each other. 
They move as a whole, but this does not entail that the whole does not, or cannot, display 
two distinct activities. As shown earlier, Aristotle certainly acknowledges two 
characteristically distinct activities i.e. one psychological and the other physiological in the 
case of anger, for instance. Moreover, we have to note that it is one thing to say that the 
sense organ does not undergo any change or that there is no change in the sense organ, 
quite another to say that there occurs no physiological change at all in psychological 
activities. 137 For there might still be a physiological change in some other body parts. That 
is to say, even if Bumyeat is right in claiming that sense-perception does not involve any 
physiological change in the sense organ, it does not follow that it does not involve any 
physiological change at all even in other bodily organs.138 I shall not discuss whether there 
133 Burnyeat (1992), p. 26. 
134 Cf. M. Frede (1992), esp. pp. 96-97; Code and Moravcsik (1992), pp. 130-131. 
135 Burnyeat (1992), p. 16; p. 26. 
136 See also Ch. 1. Sec. 2 (a). 
137 Cf. Nussbaum and Putnam (1992), p. 36. 
138 See note 105. 
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is any physiological change in the sense organ in sense-perception as a single psychological 
activity, since I do not believe that the animal's capacity for perception is for the sake of 
perceiving in its own right without reference to such capacities for orexis, locomotion, 
etc.
139 
However, our discussion of the role of pneuma in animal locomotion in Ch. V. Sec. 
2 will show that there is no doubt that some material change is required for the 
psychological activities involved in the arousal of locomotion .. 
Since it is a fact that the shape of the sphere might be impressed on bronze, mud, 
plastic, and so on by an artisan, Aristotle might differentiate the case of artefacts from that 
of living beings. That is, in the case of a bronze sphere the relation between bronze and the 
shape of the sphere is contingent, whereas the relation between soul and body is not. 140 The 
point here is that Aristotle's treatment of the soul-body relationship is essential. Aristotle at 
times says that "different elements compose different things" (Met. 1070b 16-17; 26-27) or 
that "different causes and principles are found in different things" (1070a 31; b 27; Ph. 194b 
9). However, in saying this, he does not mean that there is an indefinite number of elements 
that compose beings. In GC II. 8, Aristotle explicitly tells us that all sublunary beings are 
composed of the four elements (i.e. the simple bodies) (334b 31 ff.), but in different 
proportions. Thus there come to be different beings whose properties might be different 
from those of the elements (328a 6 if). However, Aristotle has no doubt that their 
properties ultimately result from the interrelation of the elements that have their own 
natures within themselves (334b 16-30; cf 333b 17-18). 
In the GC, Aristotle does not appear to have the conception of the sumphuton pneuma 
(i.e. the inborn air) in mind yet, but explains that flesh and bones are also composed of the 
139 See Ch. III. Sec. 2 (c). 
140 Cf. Met. 1036b 22-24: "to bring all things thus to Forms and to eliminate the matter is useless labour; 
for some things surely are a particular form in a particular matter, or particular things in a particular state." 
89 
four elements (334a 20 ff.).141 As we saw in Ch. I. Sec. 1, he distinguishes the living being 
from the non-living being by ascribing to the former a nature (to exercise two-way motion) 
that is different in character from that of the latter (to exercise one-way motion). Although 
he does make an analogy between the artefact and the living being (e.g. DA 412b 12 ff), it 
now seems that the proper analogy should be between 'form and matter of the simple 
bodies' and 'soul and body of the living being'. If so, the reason for Aristotle's use of the 
artefact instead of a simple body might be that the form-matter distinction can be more 
clearly shown in the artefact. We shall return to this topic in Ch. V in the discussion of 
pneuma. 
(c) Aristotle's Conception a/Causes 
Cohen, on one occasion, states that "The success of the functionalist interpretation 
seems to me to depend on whether the apparent role of psuche as efficient cause can be 
satisfactorily explained away. I am not convinced it can be. ...,,142 However, the anti-
functionalist faces the same problem. Indeed, those who deny the dualist position all have 
to deal with it. 
Aristotle clearly and repeatedly says that the soul is that which originates motion in the 
'living body' (e.g. DA 408b 6-7; 415b 9 ff). In particular, inDA II. 4, he considers the soul 
as a cause (aition) in three senses, i.e. the essence of the whole living body, the source of 
movement, and the for-the-sake-of-which (respectively, the formal, the efficient, and the 
final cause) (415b 12 ff.). As indicated, the soul alone is not capable of actualising any 
capacity and so it uses bodily organs by residing in it as the 'instruments for the realisation' 
141 However, as we shall see in Ch. V. Sec. 2, he involves pneuma in explaining their composition. 
142 Cohen (1992), p. 72. 
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of the capacity (415b 18).143 Thus, even if the soul is said to be the capacities of nutrition, 
growth, sense-perception, etc., these are merely static or ineffective capacities (in the sense 
that it will never realise them) without the body by which it realises them. 144 In effect, there 
would not even be a static perception, for instance, without the sense organs. Such a soul 
without involving a body is not even thinkable for Aristotle. 
Let us now turn to Aristotle's own discussion of different senses of the soul being the 
cause of the body in DA II. 4. I quote the relevant passage at length. 
The soul is the cause or source of the living body. The terms cause and source have many senses. But the 
soul is the cause of its body alike in all three senses which we explicitly recognize. It is the source of 
motion, it is the end, it is the essence of the whole living body. (i) That it is the last, is clear; for in 
everything the essence is identical with the cause of its being, and here, in the case of living things, their 
being is to live, and of their being and their living the soul in them is the cause or source. Further, the 
actuality of whatever is potential is identical with its account. (ii) It is manifest that the soul is also the final 
cause. For nature, like thought, always does whatever it does for the sake of something, which something is 
its end. To that something corresponds in the case of animals the soul and in this it follows the order of 
nature; all natural bodies are organs of the soul. This is true of those that enter into the constitution of 
plants as well as of those which enter into that of animals. This shows that that for the sake of which they 
are is soul. That for the sake of which has two senses, viz. the end to achieve which, and the being in 
whose interest, anything is or is done. (iii) The soul is also the cause of the living body as the original 
source of local movement. The power of locomotion is not found, however, in all living things. But change 
of quality and change of quantity are also due to the soul. Sensation is held to be a qualitative alteration, 
and nothing except what has soul in it is capable of sensation. The same holds of growth and decay; 
nothing grows or decays naturally except what feeds itself, and nothing feeds itself except what has a share 
onife in it. (415b 9-27; Numbers and emphases are mine. Cf. Met. lO13a 24-36; Ph. 194b 24-195a 2) 
As the underlined phrases show, Aristotle frequently emphasises that the soul is not the 
cause of a corpse, but of a living body. That is, the relationship of the soul with the body 
primarily signifies a living body (cf. Ph. 195a 11-14). On the other hand, although Aristotle 
does not explicitly offer any account of the material cause in the above passage, it seems 
143 Hicks' note on 415b 18. 
144 Cf. Annas (1982), p. 32l. 
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clear that he wants to explain the activities of living beings in terms of the four types of 
aition including the material cause (cf. DA 415b 18).145 For a living being is not simply to 
be identified with the soul, but also involves a body. 146 
In the above passage, Aristotle says that the soul is the formal cause in the sense that it 
IS that in virtue of which the living being has various capacities necessary for the 
actualisation of its essence, i. e. its being and living. The soul is also the final cause in virtue 
of which the living being acts for 'for-the-sake-of-which', i.e. the good end. Considering 
that the end that the living being pursues is ultimately its survival or living well, the formal 
and the final causes appear to coincide (cf Ph. 198a 25-26). What about the soul as the 
efficient cause? Does it also coincide with others? Presumably, the answer is yes. Living 
beings move around with some purpose. They do have looking for food as their end since 
getting nutrition from food is necessary for their survival. It then seems that the different 
senses of cause are all related to the ultimate end, i.e. survival or life. Furley claims that 
'the material, formal, and final causes' are 'different aspects of the efficient cause, or 
perhaps different kinds of efficient cause' .147 He says, 
The well-adapted beak is a cause (an efficient cause) of the production of the next generation, and it is so 
for no other reason than that it is an effective way of achieving the goal of getting the food necessary for 
survival. If we say that hawks as a class have curved beaks for the sake of catching and tearing up rodents, 
it is in this way that we must explicate the idea. As in the case of intentional action, this is to make the 
final cause into an aspect of the efficient cause.148 
145 Cf. Moravcsik (1974), p. 11; (1975), p. 632; (1991), p. 35. 
146 We cannot explain animal motion without presupposing the involvement of the material body (see GC 
324b 4 ff.). Nor can we explain arms and legs without matter. It is also to be noted that of the different 
senses of aition Aristotle's account of the soul as the source of motion (the efficient cause) shows that the 
soul is the source not only of locomotion, but also of other motions such as quantitative motion and 
qualitative motion. On the other hand, Aristotle's description of 'the source of motion' must not be 
understood as the efficient cause in the modem sense. See e.g. Moravcsik (1974), p. 9; (1991), p. 35. 
147 Furley (1996), p. 62. 
148 Furley (1996), p. 70. 
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However, Aristotle directly rejects this idea of regarding the final cause as a kind of efficient 
cause in GC I. 7. 
The active power is a cause in the sense of that from which the process originates; but the end, for the sake 
of which it takes place, is not active.149 (That is why health is not active, except metaphorically.) For when 
the agent is there, the patient becomes something; but when states are there, the patient no longer becomes 
but already is-and forms (i.e. ends) are a kind of state. (324b 13-18) 
Aristotle is saying that the end cannot be an active cause. He is presumably thinking that 
the end as such does not bring about any motion, if there is no cause in the sense of the 
source of motion. As Aristotle says, the soul is not composed of different causes, but it is 
one and the same cause viewed from different aspects or said in different ways (cf DA 415b 
9-10; Ph. 198a 25 ff).150 Nonetheless, Aristotle does consider the hierarchy or order 
among the different senses of cause in an account of generation in P A I. 1 and claims that 
the final cause is the highest in the order. 
... the causes concerned in natural generation are, as we see, more than one. There is the cause for the sake 
of which, and the cause whence the beginning of motion comes. Now we must decide which of these two 
causes comes first, which second. Plainly, however, that cause is the first which we call that for the sake of 
which. For this is the account of the thing, and the account forms the starting-point, alike in the works of 
art and in works of nature. (639b 11-16) 
Thus, although the causes coincide in the end, there is no reason to think, as opposed to 
Furely, that they are different aspects of one particular sense of cause. That is, we do not 
have to think that the final cause is one aspect of the efficient cause. Animal movement for 
food is not in virtue of the soul as the final cause, but as the source of motion, i.e. the 
efficient cause. Our discussion so far shows that the soul as the efficient cause is distinct 
149 eO"'tt OE 'to 1tOtl1'ttKOV cx.htov Ox; OBEY it apxit 'tfjc; KtvT10"ECOC;. To 0' 0-0 EvEKcx. 0-0 1totl1'tlKOv. 
150 "EO"'tt OE it 'l'1>xit 'to'\) ~&v'tOC; O"roJ1cx.'tOC; cx.hicx. Kcx.t apxft. T<x'\)'t<X. OE 1tOAA<X.X&C; AEYE't<X.l. (DA 415b 
9-10) 
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from the soul as the final cause. However, in what sense the soul is the efficient cause still 
remains obscure. What is clear is that it is not on its own a sufficient condition for the 
activity of the living being since such a living activity presupposes a body. As mentioned, 
the account of the soul as the efficient cause is not a problem only for the functionalist 
interpretation. Thus, in refuting that interpretation, it is not absolutely necessary to deal 
with the problem at this stage. I shall thus leave it for the moment. I shall return to 
examine what account we can offer for the role of the soul as the efficient cause in the case 
of locomotion, when we discuss the psychological and the physiological side of animal 
locomotion in detail. 151 
(d) Aristotle's Anti-Reductionism 
Unlike what Cohen says above, the success of the functionalist interpretation depends 
on the question whether one can really show that Aristotle's conception of the soul-body 
relationship is contingent. As mentioned earlier, the functionalist effort to characterise the 
relationship as contingent is due to the admission that Aristotle was in no way a 
reductionist. However, minimising the relationship between soul and body is not the only 
way to avoid reductionism. Charles presents two possible forms of reading Aristotle as an 
anti-reductionist as follows: 
... Aristotle's ground for resisting the reduction of the psychological to the physical does not rest on his 
belief that no relevant physical sufficient condition can be given. It depends rather on his claim that it is 
not possible to account for the role of psychological teleological causation on the basis of a set of physical 
sufficient conditions. 152 
151 See esp. Ch. V. Sec. 2 (d) (i). 
152 Charles (1988), p. 2. 
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Charles here makes a distinction between ontological reductionism and explanatory 
reductionism and claims that Aristotle rejects the latter, not the former. That is, according 
to him, Aristotle believes that no account of the sufficient physical conditions can be given 
for the essential features of organisms, not that there are no sufficient physical conditions in 
reality. Thus he reads Aristotle as an explanatory anti-reductionist and, at the same time, as 
an ontological reductionist. In this way, Charles takes Aristotle to be a materialist, while 
also ascribing to him the title of anti-reductionist. 
However, Code and Moravcsik are not happy about the consequence which might lead 
to the functionalist interpretation of Aristotle. 153 For saying that 'there are sufficient 
physical states that correspond to psychological states' does not necessarily commit one to 
reductive materialism or the type-type identity theory. One might claim that there might be 
corresponding states without being identical: that is, there might be sufficient physical states 
that correspond to psychological states, but, nonetheless, they are not identical at the type 
level. The functionalist would say that what is important for Aristotle is that there is a 
corresponding physical state for a psychological state. It does not matter what kind of 
matter it may be as long as it is in the required functional state. As noted, this is indeed the 
basis of functionalism which denies the type-type identity theory, but which still admits of 
the token-token identity theory that "maintains that each instance of a given type of mental 
state is numerically identical with some specific physical state in some physical system or 
other". 154 
Code and Moravcsik argue that this is not the right interpretation of Aristotle. 
'" nature, receiving the form without matter, potentiality and actuality, matter and form ... are the concepts 
Aristotle utilizes in his attempts to construct his own view about how perceptual processes are both natural 
153 Code and Moravcsik (1992), pp. 129-131; pp. 141-145. 
154 Churchland (1984), p. 37. 
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and informative, and also about how various forms of living are parts of nature and yet crucially involve 
self-initiating processes. Once Aristotle's basic concerns and problems are formulated in terms of these 
notions, rather than in terms of sufficient physical conditions, we see Aristotle's enterprise as having aims 
and solutions that intersect with, but largely fall outside, the foci of the two views as formulated by Charles. 
Further, we think that for Aristotle the concept of matter is species-relative, and should itself be seen as 
including a teleological aspect-specific potentialities defined in terms of their exercise.155 
Their claim is that the problem of reductionism does not concern Aristotle in the first place 
since for him what appears to be either the doings of the soul or the doings of the body are, 
as a matter of fact, the doings of the living being as a whole. However, even if one accepts, 
as we do, that the living being acts, and is acted upon, as a whole, one does not thereby 
need to deny that Aristotle is concerned with some sort of reductionism or anti-
reductionism. 
As often mentioned, Aristotle does often express his objection to the reductive account 
ofform in terms of matter. Moreover, he also thinks that the living being's motion involves 
two characteristically distinct activities. For instance, in his discussion of animal locomotion 
in the MA, Aristotle attempts to give an account of psychological activities, as he also 
endeavours to find corresponding physiological activities. That is, he explains the arousal 
of locomotion in terms of sense-perception, orexis, phantasia, etc. (esp. 700b 17 £f) and, 
also, tries to show that the physiological account of it is unproblematic (701b 2 £f). For 
instance, he says, 
Of necessity the thought and ph an tasia of these are accompanied by heating and chilling .... For feelings of 
confidence, fears, sexual excitement, and other bodily affections, painful and pleasant, are accompanied by 
heating or chilling, in some cases of a part, in others of the whole body. (701b 34-702a 4) 
155 Code and Moravcsik (1992), p. 143. 
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Whether the physiological change he mentions here is always manifested as 'heating or 
chilling' is subject to further discussion. However, Aristotle, in the above passage, IS 
convinced that there is a physiological activity that accompanies a psychological activity. 
The two activities are different in character and so this is a good reason to raise a question 
whether the psychological is reducible to the physiological. If so, Aristotle might well 
appear to have a problem of reductionism. Thus the remaining question will be whether and 
how he can evade it. 
Summary 
The present chapter has been the place to raise questions rather than to resolve them. 
Although the functionalist interpretation of Aristotle's conception of the soul-body 
relationship has earned many supporters, we saw that there is still room for a counter 
interpretation. 
As noted, the debate between the functionalist and the anti-functionalist is initially 
whether or not Aristotle acknowledges an essential connection between the soul and the 
body. I believe that in explaining living activities Aristotle does think that psychological 
activities involve physiological changes. Also I think that Aristotle holds that psychological 
capacities can be realised in only one sort of matter. Thus my position initially contrasts 
with the functionalist interpretation. Moreover, I also object to the Code-Moravcsik 
dismissal of Aristotle's concern with reductionism. However, the expression that Aristotle 
is concerned with reductionism does not mean that he is committed to reductionism; I think 
that he maintains an anti-reductionist position. 156 
156 For Aristotle's anti-reductionism, see Ch. V. Sec. 2 Cd) Cii). 
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Our discussion in this chapter is based on Aristotle's general remarks on the soul-body 
relationship, but more conclusive evidence should be given from an analysis of a more 
specific example of a living activity. Thus, the questions remaining unresolved here will be 
reviewed in Chapter V with reference to the analysis of animal locomotion. To sum up, the 
questions that will be further discussed are primarily whether Aristotle maintains that the 
soul-body relationship is essential and, if he does, how he evades the reductive commitment. 
Furthermore, the sense of the soul as the efficient cause must be explained away, if one is to 
object to the Cartesian account of Aristotle's conception of soul and body. 
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CHAPTER ill 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PICTURE (1): 
THE LOCOMOTIVE FACULTY OF THE SOUL 
Aristotle has his reason for claiming that locomotion is primary among motions in the 
animal, as it is in the heavenly bodies. The reason he offers for its primacy in the animal is, 
however, neither that it is primary in time nor that it is eternal and continuous, as is said of 
the heavenly bodies, but that it is primary in the course of perfecting the being (1(U"C' 
oucriav) and that it brings about less change in the body (esp. Ph. 261a 13-26). However, 
although he claims that locomotion is related to the perfection of being, he ascribes the 
capacity for locomotion not to all living beings, but only to some animals that have more 
capacities than others. That is, locomotion does not contribute to the perfection of all living 
beings. This claim seems to be derived from his conviction that the more capacities living 
beings have the better they exist. 157 Aristotle is well aware of the fact that what is primarily 
necessary for one to be alive is the capacity for nutrition. However, he notes that to be an 
animal is different from being a plant in the sense that it requires more than that capacity, 
i.e. being an animal is also to have the capacity for sense-perception, i.e. the sense of touch 
(0.<1>11), the capacity for orexis, etc. (e.g. DA 413b 4-24). Such an animal uses all its 
capacities for maintaining life since it is the animal it is (434a 30 ff.) and since living is better 
than non-living (GA 731a 24-732a 11). Aristotle does not question why animals should 
have more capacities than plants, but accepts it as a fact and concludes that animals are 
better than plants (cf. GA ibid.). 
157 Cf. DA 434b 5-7; b 22-27; 435b 20-26; Sens. 436b 18-437a 16. 
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In the DA, he sets out to discuss the characteristics of the soul for the reason that "The 
knowledge of the soul admittedly contributes greatly to the advance of truth in general, and, 
above all, to our understanding of Nature" (402a 5_7).158 He defines the soul as the 
principle of life (apx1) 'trov ~cpc.oV)159 in virtue of which living beings are capable of 'self-
nutrition and growth and decay'. Self-nutrition is a primary condition for beings to be 
alive. 160 And it is a characteristic mark that distinguishes them (including plants) from other 
natural beings, i.e. the simple bodies or the heavenly bodies. However, the capacity for self-
nutrition is not the only one that the living being has in virtue of the soul; it also has the 
capacities for perceiving, desiring, thinking, and the like (413 a 21 ff). 
We saw that Aristotle envisages that each faculty of the soul is that in virtue of which 
one group of living beings differs from another since the soul in the living being plays the 
role of the cause or principle (clt'tta Kat apxil) in different senses (415b 9 ff.).161 It is a 
cause in the senses of the source of motion, the end, and the essence of the whole living 
body, i.e. the efficient, the final, and the formal cause. In general, Aristotle thinks that a 
faculty of the soul is that in virtue of the living being is capable of performing an activity or 
a set of activities. For instance, a living being has the capacity for nutrition in virtue of the 
nutritive faculty, the capacity for sense-perception in virtue of the sensitive faculty, and so 
on. 
158 However, strictly speaking, such knowledge contributes partly to the understanding of nature because 
only some natural beings are said to have souls (Ph. 192b 10-11; cf. 255a 6-7; DA 412a 14-15? " . 
159 Grube (1964, pp. 120-121) notes that this was a common usage of the Greek word If'vXT/ which 
implied the mortality of the soul and 'even in the :fifth century the word 'psyche' was not automatically 
linked with the conception of immortality'. Cf. Hamlyn's note on 402a 1. 
160 DA 412a 13-14; 413a 21 ff.; 416a 19 ff. 
161 Throughout the thesis, I use a 'faculty' to mean a part of the soul (J1~PO~ :ii~ 'I''Oxii~), .in.virtue of which 
living beings have a distinct capacity, rather than a power or a capaCIty (o'OvaJ1t~), as It IS often used to 
refer to. 
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However, it is not immediately clear how many different faculties of the soul Aristotle 
has in mind. He lists different faculties at different times. 162 However, at the beginning of 
DA II. 3, he makes another list of five types of faculties (o'\)va.~Et<;) as if his earlier lists 
were unsatisfactory (414a 30-32) and says that there are no more faculties than those in the 
new list. 163 This new list includes the nutritive (9PE1t'tt1COV), the appetitive (6pEK'ttKOV), the 
sensitive (aicr911'ttKov), the locomotive (KtVll'ttKOV K<X't<l 't01tov), and the rational 
(OtaVOll'ttKoV) faculty. 
There are at least two reasons that lead us to raise a doubt about the number of faculties 
listed in DA II. 3. Firstly, the uncertainty about the number of faculties results from 
Aristotle's classification of living beings in that chapter. If the new list in II. 3 were the 
right one, it would be expected that he will have five different types of living beings in mind 
since each faculty is that in virtue of which the living being has different capacities. 
However, this expectation soon confronts a difficulty because the reading of the chapter 
suggests that Aristotle appears to think of only four types of living being: that is, those that 
are capable of (i) nutrition (plants), of (ii) nutrition and sensation (stationary animals), of 
(iii) nutrition, sensation, and locomotion (irrational locomotive animals), and of (iv) 
nutrition, sensation, locomotion, and thinking (rational locomotive animals).164 Thus there 
is no sign of classifying living beings according to the appetitive faculty. 
Secondly, in DA III. 9-10 Aristotle appears to identify the appetitive faculty with the 
source of locomotion, i.e. the locomotive faculty. If this is what he really means to say, 
why did he list the two faculties as two distinct faculties in II. 3? Thus the unclarity on the 
number of faculties also raises the question whether the locomotive faculty really is a 
162 DA 411a 26 if.; 413a 23; 413b 12; cf. 433b 2-4. 
163 Hamlyn's note on 414a 29. 
164 Read nutrition in this classification as nutrition and reproduction. 
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separate faculty along with other faculties. The soul in the sense of the efficient cause 
suggests its role in growth (and decay), sense-perception, and locomotion (415b 22-27). 
However, if the locomotive faculty is to be identified with the appetitive faculty, there arises 
a difficulty in explaining the locomotion of animals. F or Aristotle ascribes the appetitive 
faculty to all animals (413b 22-24; 414b 1-2) and, at the same time, he acknowledges that 
not all animals are capable of locomotion. Thus, if the two faculties are to be identified and 
if there is no particular locomotive faculty, it is unclear why only some of animals should be 
capable of locomotion despite the fact that all animals have one and the same faculty, i.e. 
the appetitive faculty. I do not believe that Aristotle would hold such an inconsistent 
position. In what follows, I shall thus ask what Aristotle thinks of as the source of 
locomotion and what he really meant in DA III. 9_10. 165 In doing this, I shall argue that 
Aristotle acknowledges the locomotive faculty as a distinct faculty in virtue of which the 
animal is capable of locomotion, from which it will follow that he does not identify it with 
the appetitive faculty and that the number of faculties he had in mind is five. 
In Section 1 (a), I shall first examine the implication of Aristotle's analogy of 
geometrical figures with soul-faculties mentioned at DA II. 3, 414b 19 ff. Then, in Sec. 1 
(b), I shall discuss how Aristotle comes up with five faculties. I have said above that there 
might arise a doubt about the number of faculties since "there is no sign of classifying living 
beings according to the appetitive faculty". This claim is indeed based on a mistaken 
assumption that he distinguishes soul-faculties according to the different sorts of living 
beings. That is, it claims that since the expressions 'animals capable of sense-perception' 
and 'animals capable of orexis' have the same extension, sense-perception and orexis must 
165 In the present and the next chapters, I shall thus attempt to clarify what the locomoti~e. faculty ~s ... In 
doing this, I shall, in the present chapter, focus on the question of what psychological c.apaCltIeS o~ actIVitIes 
are necessary for the arousal of locomotion, whereas, in the following chapter, I questIon what kind of role 
phantasia plays in locomotion and whether it is always involved in its arousal. 
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be the same capacity and the appetitive faculty appears to have no distinct status of its own. 
Thus, I shall show that Aristotle does not distinguish faculties according to their extensions, 
but according to the functions or activities of the animal. 
Section 2 examines what kinds of animals Aristotle regards as non-locomotive (i.e. as 
not having the locomotive faculty), by focusing on his discussion of stationary animals in his 
biological works. In the course of this examination, we shall see that Aristotle is not 
denying them any and every form of locomotion, but a specific form of locomotion for the 
sake of an end, i.e. the capacity to move in space towards a specific end at a distance. This 
specific form of locomotion is related to the capacity for recognising objects at a distance. 
However, Aristotle conceives that some animals have only the contact senses (i.e. touch and 
taste), whereas others have the distance senses (i.e. sight, smelling, and hearing) as well in 
virtue of the sensitive faculty. We should thus ask why this is so. In answer to this 
question, I shall show that Aristotle understands that lower faculties play different 
teleological roles in the animal in virtue of higher faculties under which they are subsumed. 
On the basis of these discussions and the examination of the role of orexis in locomotion in 
Sec. 3 (b), I shall conclude that Aristotle's treatment of the appetitive faculty in DA III. 9-
lOis not to identify it with the locomotive faculty, but to emphasise its major role in 
locomotion. 
III. 1 The Discovery of the Faculties of the Soul 
In the present section, I shall be chiefly concerned with (a) the relationships between the 
five soul-faculties introduced in DA II. 3 and (b) the criterion by which Aristotle 
distinguishes those faculties. 
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(a) The Relationships between the Faculties 
Aristotle in general appears to say that living beings have one additional power or 
capacity in virtue of a higher faculty of the soul. For instance, some beings are capable of 
sense-perception in virtue of the sensitive faculty, whereas others are capable of locomotion 
in virtue of the locomotive faculty. However, Aristotle thinks that living beings are capable 
of two types of activities (i.e. nutrition and reproduction) in virtue of one and the same 
faculty (i.e. the nutritive faculty), which might well be taken to be categorically different 
activities. For instance, growth is change in quantity, while reproduction is change in 
substance. Why does Aristotle relate the two categorically different changes closely to each 
other? It is because he thinks that the growth of a living being, when complete, leads the 
living being to 'generate offspring of the same kind' (cf GA 715a 19 if; DA 415a 23 if). 
He would say that this is a natural development (GA 760a 31 if). However, for Aristotle 
nature does nothing in vain, but works for what is good (DA 415b 15-16; 434a 30-32). 
And, since living is better than non-living, ensouled beings tend to maintain their lives (GA 
731a 28-30). Thus nutrition is for an individual's survival, whereas reproduction is for the 
. I fO ki d 166 survlVa 0 Its n. 
On the other hand, Aristotle's discussion of the faculties of the soul in DA II. 2 raises a 
doubt whether the list in II. 3 is as exhaustive as the classification of the senses discussed in 
III. 1. The classification of the senses (i.e. sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch) is 
exhaustive because they have distinct or exclusive classes of objects from one another, 
namely, each 'sense perceives one class of sensible objects' (425a 19-20). And there are no 
other objects that might escape from being perceived by any of the five senses (cf 424b 22-
23). Aristotle seems to think that his list of the faculties is also exhaustive. He refers to the 
166 King (1996), p. 66. 
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five types of faculties and says that "there is no soul apart from the forms of soul just 
enumerated" (414b 22-23). However, there is a question about the status of the faculty of 
thought and contemplation ('tou YOU Kat 't1le; 9ECOPll'ttK1le;). Aristotle at 413b 25-29 states 
somewhat tentatively that the faculty is separable. 167 Considering that the second half of II. 
2 (413 b 4 ff.) is devoted to the discussion of a separability of a faculty from other faculties, 
what he says about the faculty of thought or the rational faculty should also be construed as 
a discussion of the separability of the faculty from other faculties. 168 However, Aristotle in 
the subsequent chapter introduces the faculty of calculation and thought (AoytOJlOv Kat 
8ulvotav) as including, i.e. inseparable from, the lower faculties (415a 8_10).169 Are they 
two different types of one and the same rational faculty or two different faculties? If they 
turn out to be different faculties, Aristotle's list of the faculties will not be exhaustive. 
(i) The Comprehensibility of the Faculties 
What draws our special attention is the fact that Aristotle maintains that the higher 
faculties subsume the lower ones. 170 In the DA, he often claims that the lower faculties are 
separable from the higher ones on the ground that we observe that there is a class of living 
beings that only have the latter and still exist without the former (cf 413b 1 ff.; 415a 23 ff.), 
whereas the higher ones must subsume the lower ones because they cannot have the former 
without the latter (cf 416b 17-19). The comprehension of the lower faculties means that 
167 Cf. {OIKE at 413b 25. 
168 As may well be noted, the separability of a faculty from other faculties concerned here must be 
distinguished from the separability of the soul from the body discussed in 1. 1, 403 a 3 if. Cf. Hicks's note 
on 414a 25. He reads the statement "'toiho }10VOV EVOEXE'tal Xropi~Ecreal" (413b 24-25) in relation to 
4l2a 16 (Kat crro}1a 'tOl0VOE) and translates it as "it alone is separable 'from the body"'. However, the 
addition of the phrase 'from the body' is not warranted by the discussion of II. 2. Moreover, at 415a 1-12 
Aristotle once again confirms that the discussion here is the separability of a faculty not from the body, but 
from other faculties of the soul. Hamlyn (note on 413b 16) rightly points out that Aristotle's question here 
is not whether a faculty 'can have separate existence'. See also, Barnes (1971-1972), p. 34. 
169 See Hicks's note on 413b 25. 
170 However in our talk of faculties we shall often use them as single ones which do not include the lower , 
ones. Such a use will be clear from the relevant contexts. 
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animals are capable of nutrition and sense-perception, for instance, not because they have 
the nutritive faculty and the sensitive faculty which are separated from each other, but 
because they have the sensitive faculty that subsumes the nutritive faculty. Aristotle 
explicates the point as follows: 
It is now evident that a single definition can be given of soul only in the same sense as one can be given of 
figure. ... It is true that a common definition can be given for figure which will fit all figures without 
expressing the peculiar nature of any figure. So here in the case of soul and its specific forms. Hence it is 
absurd in this and similar cases to look for a common definition which will not express the peculiar nature 
of anything that is and will not apply to the appropriate indivisible species, while at the same time omitting 
to look for an account which will. The cases of figure and soul are exactly parallel; for the particulars 
subsumed under the common name in both cases-figures and living beings---constitute a series, each 
successive term of which potentially contains its predecessor, e.g. the square the triangle, the sensory power 
the self-nutritive. Hence we must ask in the case of each order of living things, What is its soul, i.e. What is 
the soul of plant, man, beast? (4l4b 19-33) 
The last paragraph explicitly indicates that Aristotle here deals with the question he has 
raised at DA I. 1, 403 5 ff. whether we can give a common definition of the soul. It is to be 
noted that Aristotle is concerned with a common definition not of a single species of living 
beings (e.g. the soul of the plant or the soul of the horse or the like), but of the whole genus 
of living beings. In the above passage, Aristotle makes an analogy with a geometrical figure 
of the quadrilateral subsuming the triangle. The analogy primarily suggests that when a 
triangle is subsumed under a quadrilateral, a definition of a quadrilateral will not describe 
the nature of the triangle. However, Aristotle's statement at 414b 23-25 (see above) 
suggests two further reasons for rejecting a common definition. Firstly, the definition of a 
man's soul, for example, might not show all the faculties it subsumes, and, secondly, the 
definition of a plant's soul might not show the faculties which other higher animals have.!7! 
171 It is, however, to be noted that Aristotle has already given a sort of common definition of the soul in DA 
II. 1. For a discussion of this matter, see A. C. Lloyd (1962, pp. 73-74) 
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Aristotle is then saying that since the sensitive faculty, for instance, is defined as the 
capacity for sense-perception, such a definition will not immediately show the capacity for 
nutrition that is subsumed under it. He elsewhere says that a single faculty of the soul is 
that in virtue of which the living being is capable of a single activity (P A 645b 5 ff.). We 
might construe this remark in the same fashion as above; that is, a definition of a single 
faculty will only include a single capacity of the animal without showing the capacities it has 
in virtue of the lower faculties it subsumes. 172 
Now we need to ask what it is for a triangle to be subsumed under a quadrilateral. 
Does Aristotle want to say that we can separate out a triangle as well as a quadrilateral 
from the quadrilateral? Let us examine the following figures: 
. ~ .... ---- - .~ ........... . 




(N) (N) " 
w': ...... _. _ ....... __ . _.: 
(N) " 
" 
Figure (i) Figure (ii) Figure (iii) 
Supposing that the lower figures were actually subsumed under the higher ones, it appears 
that when we remove a triangle from the given quadrilateral, what remains will not be a 
quadrilateral (see Figure (i)), In effect, it seems that the higher the figures we consider, the 
172 We say here that A is 'a higher facility than B' or 'A subsumes B', wh~~ a living b~ing. has additional 
capacities in virtue of A to those in virtue of B. For instance, the senSlove facility .IS ~gh~r than the 
nutritive facility, because a living being is capable of nutrition as well as sense-percepoon III VIrtue of the 
sensitive facility, whereas it is capable only of nutrition in virtue of the nutritive fac~ty. O~ the other hand, 
B is lower than A since a living being is capable of an activity in virtue of B without lllvolnng A. 
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less plane we have left for extracting the lower figures subsumed under them. That is, in 
Figure (i) we do not have enough plane for a quadrilateral after separating out a triangle, 
i.e. (N), from a quadrilateral, whereas in Figure (ii) we have no plane left for a pentagon 
itself after separating out a triangle and a quadrilateral. On the other hand, in Figure (iii) we 
have enough plane for a triangle and a quadrilateral, but not enough for a pentagon and 
nothing for a hexagon itself. It thus appears that, if the higher figures actually subsumed the 
lower ones, they would not show all the lower figures that are subsumed under them. In 
particular, Figure (iii) clearly exemplifies that the examination of the hexagon will not show 
the pentagon that is subsumed under it. That is, a triangle and a quadrilateral and a 
pentagon are not subsumed under the pentagon as such, but they are subsumed potentially. 
How does Aristotle apply this thesis to the case of the faculties of the soul? Supposing 
that (N) is the nutritive faculty, we might have the following formulations: 
Figure (i) = the sensitive faculty = (N) + (Sl) + (S2), 
Figure (ii) = the appetitive faculty = (N) + (Sl) + (S2) + (A), and 
Figure (iii) = the locomotive faculty = (N) + (Sl) + (S2) + (A) + (L). 
We have seen that Aristotle undoubtedly thinks that the animal is not capable of nutrition 
and sense-perception in virtue of the nutritive faculty and the sensitive faculty, but in virtue 
of the sensitive faculty. That is, if both capacities were in virtue of separate faculties, then 
Aristotle would say that the soul of the animal includes two individual faculties which are 
mutually exclusive and he would not talk about the higher faculties subsuming the lower 
ones. That is, for instance, (L) in Figure (iii) alone is not the locomotive faculty, but the 
hexagon as a whole is the locomotive faculty. At this stage, the geometrical analogy 
suggests that higher faculties potentially subsume lower ones so that the animal is capable 
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of various functions or activities in virtue of a single faculty of the soul, but not in virtue of 
its various and separate faculties. 
It is not clear to what extent Aristotle believes that the analogy of the geometrical figure 
can explain the relation of the faculties, although he stresses its significance (414b 28-29). 
Moreover, the DA passage cited above (414b 19-33) does not show that Aristotle has 
considered that sort of question. However, there is another implication of the analogy that 
can be inferred from the consideration of the relation between faculties rather than that 
between geometrical figures. As we shall see in detail in Section 2 below, Aristotle thinks 
that, for instance, some animals only have the contact senses (touch and taste), whereas 
others have the distance senses (seeing, smelling, and hearing) in addition in virtue of the 
sensitive faculty. Then one might question whether, for instance, the nutritive faculty of a 
plant and the nutritive faculty subsumed in the sensitive faculty of an animal are the same. 
Do they function in the same way? Or, is the nutritive faculty somehow altered by the fact 
that it is subsumed under the higher faculties? 
Aristotle does not think that since this living being here has life, i.e. the nutritive faculty, 
it must or can have other faculties. If he did, he would say that a plant can become an 
animal. Rather, he thinks that being an animal entails being alive. 173 Aristotle says that 
being an animal is primarily having the capacity for sense-perception (413b 2-3). However, 
he does not mean that the animal has only that capacity, but also the capacity for nutrition, 
orexis, etc. (413b 22-24; 414b 1-6). Aristotle believes that, as the function of the nutritive 
faculty in a plant is to keep it alive, the animal utilises all the capacities it has for its survival 
(PA 639b 14 ff.; cf. DA 415a 23 ff.). This suggests that, for instance, the nutritive faculty in 
a locomotive animal functions in relation to other activities, such as sense-perception, 
173 Aristotle ascribes a priority to the triangle, but it is prior logically, but not in time (Hicks's note on ~l~b 
29). 
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orexis, locomotion, etc. for the sake of its survival. Moreover, considering Aristotle's 
concern with the hierarchy of soul-faculties (see below), it seems that he also thinks that the 
lower faculties subsumed under the locomotive faculty will be somehow determined in the 
way in which the ultimate activity that a locomotive animal is supposed to achieve, i.e. 
locomotion, is best actualised. For the capacity for locomotion of a locomotive animal is 
the means by which it maintains its survival. 174 The same inference can be made from the 
consideration of Aristotle's introduction of three types of orexis. 175 It is not the case that all 
animals equally have the same sort of orexis: all animals have epithumia which is the lowest 
form of orexis, whereas some of them also have boulesis which subsumes the lower types 
of orexis. In particular, Aristotle makes it clear that the rational being's capacity for 
boulesis is in virtue of her rational faculty of the soul (esp. 433a 21-25). This kind of 
relation between lower and higher faculties will become clearer as we proceed to examine 
the roles of orexis in the present chapter and those of phantasia in the next chapter. 
(ii) Some Questions Concerning the Locomotive Faculty 
Let us now briefly consider a question about the place of the locomotive faculty in the 
hierarchy of soul-faculties. This question arises in relation to the thesis of the higher 
faculties subsuming the lower ones. According to the thesis, it seems that the rational 
faculty is higher than, or subsumes, the locomotive faculty because an animal is capable of 
locomotion without the capacity for reason which it has in virtue of the rational faculty. 
However, this turns out to be true only with qualification. Aristotle in DA III. 10 appears 
to say that a certain type of animal locomotion must involve the capacity for reasoning. 
That is to say, there cannot be that type of locomotion without the capacity. If so, the 
174 Cf. Sec. 2 (c) below. 
175 See Sec. 3 (a). 
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locomotive faculty seems higher than the rational faculty in the hierarchy of the faculties. 
F or the rational faculty is involved in bringing about locomotion which is an actualisation of 
the locomotive faculty. This sort of difficulty with placing the locomotive faculty in the 
hierarchy might be the reason why Aristotle was elusive about the faculty on several 
occasions. In effect, in the DA he does not mention the locomotive faculty (to Ktvll'ttKOV 
K<X"C<l "C01tov), where it is expected (e.g. 410b 19 ff; 414a 32 ff), except for the place in 
making a list of the faculties of the soul in II. 3 (cf Sens. 436b 20).176 Moreover, in theM4 
where he is chiefly concerned with locomotion there is no mention of the term 'the 
locomotive faculty', either. Also, as we shall see below, in a discussion of animal 
locomotion in DA III. 9-10 Aristotle entirely dispenses with the term and, even, appears to 
identify it with the appetitive faculty. It seems that, at the beginning when he was not 
seriously concerned with the capacity for thinking and its relation to locomotion, he might 
have thought that the locomotive faculty was nicely placed in the hierarchy. However, once 
he thought over the role of thinking in the arousal of locomotion, he might have realised 
that there would arise a problem with the location of the faculty in the hierarchy. 
There is also a question about the status of the locomotive faculty. As mentioned 
earlier, in DA III. 9-10 Aristotle appears to regard the appetitive faculty as a source of 
motion, i.e. the locomotive faculty, despite the fact that he has introduced them as separate 
faculties in II. 3. There is, however, a difficulty in identifying them with each other since it 
is not the case that all the animals that have the capacity for orexis are capable of 
locomotion (41Sa 6-7; 41Sb 22). Since Aristotle maintains that all animals that have the 
capacity for sense-perception also have the capacity for orexis, it is clear that the two 
176 Aristotle at 433b 2-4 makes another list of the faculties of the soul claimed by his predecessors. Here 
among 8p£1t'tu:ov, Op£K'tUCOV, aicr8TJ'tucov, KlVTJ'tlKOV Ka'tcl 't01tOV, and OlaVOTJ'tlKO~, .KlVTJ'tlK~V Ka~cl 
't01tOV is later replaced with (30'OA£'O'tlKOV. Hicks (note on 433b 3) seems to say that this IS a modified hst 
accepted by Aristotle. 
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capacities are not sufficient conditions for locomotion. If so, the appetitive faculty is not 
simply to be identified with the locomotive faculty. I shall return to discuss both questions 
arising in relation to the locomotive faculty in Section 3 (b). For the moment, we need to 
try to determine by what criterion Aristotle distinguishes soul-faculties. 
(b) The Criterion for Distinguishing the Faculties 
Apart from some doubts and peculiarities with reference to soul-faculties discussed 
above, we also need to attend to a couple of points that arise with regard to the 
classification of animals. We saw above that the classification does not tell us all the 
faculties Aristotle mentions in II. 3 for it omits the appetitive faculty. What causes this 
omission? With reference to that question, let us now turn to examine how we know that 
living beings have the faculties and what criterion Aristotle has in mind in distinguishing 
them. 177 
In a discussion of the role of phantasia, D. Frede178 presents two criteria for 
distinguishing faculties, i.e. having a separate capacity (hereafter, the 'capacity criterion') 
and having a separate object (hereafter, the 'object criterion'). She argues that phantasia is 
177 Note that, although I shall not discuss it in detail, there is a problem about the status of phantasia, i.e. 
whether it is to be regarded as a distinct faculty of the soul (see e.g. Wedin, 1988, p. 39 ff.). Aristotle does 
not list it as a faculty at 414a 30-32 nor at 433b 2-4. Although it once appears as a faculty, when he 
introduces a different list at 432a 28 ff. as the one suggested by his predecessors, he is very sceptical about 
accepting it as valid (see 434b 1-2). The answer to the question whether phantasia is a distinct faculty 
seems to rely on the criterion or criteria of distinguishing faculties. Indeed, the treatment of phantasia as a 
separate faculty has been criticised by a number of commentators for different reasons. For example, D. 
Frede (1992, p. 281) claims phantasia does not have a faculty of its own because it has 'no separate capacity 
in the soul' and 'no separate objects for it'. Cf Turnbull (1994), p. 322 ff. On the other hand, Wedin 
(1984, xi and Chapter 2) argues that it is not a faculty "but rather subserves the operation of full-fledged 
faculties ... " Thus their contention is that if phantasia does not satisfy both the conditions, i.e. having its 
own objects and having its own capacity, it cannot be a separate faculty. We shall establish below that the 
most plausible criterion is the capacity criterion; i.e. a faculty is different from another if a living being has 
a certain capacity in virtue of the former, but not in virtue of the latter. For more detailed examination of 
the involvement of ph an tasia in locomotion, see Ch. IV. 
178 D. Frede (1992), p. 281, followed by Turnbull (1994, p. 322 ff.). 
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not a Istmct lacu ty on both counts. I do not here intend to discuss her thesis in detail 
, 
but I do want to point out that her 'object criterion' cannot be a general criterion of 
distinguishing all the faculties Aristotle lists in DA II. 3. Frede is primarily concerned with 
cognitive faculties, e.g. sense-perception, phantasia, and thought, and so with their 
cognitive objects. One of the criteria on which she bases her rejection of phantasia as a 
distinct faculty is that it does not have its own objects, but is 'parasitic' on sense-
perception. ISO What about orexis? Does it have its own objects apart from those perceived 
through the senses? Since the objects of orexis (epithumia) are what is pleasant (414b 6; 
see below), it might be suggested that orexis has fewer objects than those of the senses if 
animals sometimes perceive objects without regard to whether they are pleasant or 
unpleasant. In any case, one thing is clear: that all these objects are recognised through the 
senses, as in the case of ph ant asia (see Chapter IV). If so, Frede's argument might seem to 
lead us to the rejection not only of phantasia, but also of the appetitive faculty as a separate 
faculty. For what the animal desires is presented through the senses in the first instance. In 
other words, the animal does not perceive objects in virtue of the appetitive faculty, but in 
virtue of the sensitive faculty. Similarly, granting that the locomotive faculty is a separate 
faculty, as Aristotle appears to think in DA II. 3, it hardly seems reasonable to talk about the 
objects of locomotion itself. One might argue that since animals move in place to pursue 
what is pleasant and to avoid what is painful or unpleasant, they certainly have some objects 
in relation to locomotion. However, the objects are objects of orexis that are perceived 
through the senses; they are not the objects of locomotion itself. In other words, 
locomotion seems to have some objects not in virtue of itself, but in virtue of involving 
179 D. Frede (1992, p. 281) attends to a passage where Aristotle stresses the dependence of phantasia on the 
activity of sense-perception (428b 11-15; 429a 1; Insomn. 459a 17 f). The relevant passage reads that 
'Phantasia is a motion that does not happen without sense-perception but comes to be as the result of the 
activity of sense-perception and is like the perception' (cited from Frede). 
180 D. Frede, (1992), p. 281. 
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other capacities, e.g. sense-perception, orexis, etc. Thus it hardly seems appropriate to talk 
about the objects of locomotion without taking other capacities into consideration. Thus 
the object criterion fails to be a standard criterion of distinguishing all the faculties Aristotle 
has in mind. 
On the other hand, one might also argue that having a different extension of animals 
(hereafter, let us call it the 'extension criterion') serves as a criterion of distinguishing 
faculties since belonging to a different class of animals means having a different faculty. 
However, this criterion fails to be the overall criterion of distinguishing faculties. For, as 
we saw, Aristotle maintains that animals that are capable of sense-perception are also 
capable of orexis (DA 413b 22-24; 414b 1-6). Thus the sensitive faculty and the appetitive 
faculty are applied to the same extension of animals, namely, to all animals. Thus the 
examination of different extensions of animals does not show all the soul-faculties Aristotle 
lists in DA II. 3. For this reason, extension appears defective as the overall criterion of 
distinguishing faculties. 
In effect, its failure as a criterion is an expected result. For, despite the fact that the 
extension criterion is largely dependent on what kinds of capacities living beings have or 
what kinds they display, it fails to ask what differentiates extensions or classes of animals. 
This is indeed a question about the capacity criterion suggested by Frede (see above). The 
capacity criterion indicates that if the animal has a distinct capacity in virtue of a certain 
faculty (which it will not have in virtue of another), then the two faculties are distinct from 
each other. Thus what is important in determining Frede's enquiry about the status of 
phantasia as a distinct faculty seems to rely on the answer to the question whether the 
animal has a new or additional capacity in virtue of phantasia, but not in virtue of other 
faculties. Thus, although, at first glance, the extension of different classes of animals seems 
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to be a criterion for distinguishing faculties, it is not the extension itself, but the capacity, 
that classifies different animals. 
In the establishment of having a different capacity as a distinguishing criterion, we need 
to ask why Aristotle thinks that there are neither more nor less than the five faculties. In 
answering the question, we need to note that Aristotle's discovery of the faculties is 
dependent on how animals appear to exist and to act. Plants are said to be alive since they 
appear to absorb water and nutrition, decay, and grow, whereas animals seem to have more 
than these capacities and so are capable of more activities. And we observe that among 
animals some move around and others do not. Are all the faculties Aristotle has in mind 
manifested as observable activities? Before answering this question, we need to attend to 
Aristotle's consistent criticism in the DA of his predecessors who had claimed the 
corporeality of the soul (e.g. 404b 30 ff). His criticism initially suggests that he 
acknowledges that the faculties are not immediately observable to our senses. Also, at an 
earlier stage he denied the separate existence of the soul from the body and its activity and 
passivity without involving the body (see 403a 3 ff.). Moreover, his characterisation of the 
soul in DA II. 1 as 'the form of a natural body having life potentially within it' (412a 20-21) 
also suggests that we will be able to gather information about the soul through the 
observation of the living body in which it is actualised. In effect, Aristotle often states that 
his discovery of the different faculties relies on the observation of animal activities (e.g. 
411b 19; 413a 11 ff). 
Let us now return to our earlier question whether Aristotle's list of the faculties derives 
directly from the observation of the different activities that living beings display. Aristotle 
says that the capacity for nutrition is the primary characteristic of living beings (413 a 21 fT.), 
whereas the capacity for sense-perception is what distinguishes animals from plants (413 b 1 
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ff). However, do we observe the process of nutrition itself? The displayed activities of 
living beings in virtue of the nutritive faculty are their growth or their reproduction, rather 
than their nutrition or digestion. We see that this plant is now taller than yesterday, whereas 
we do not directly see its inner physiological processes of the digestion of food. The link 
between growth and nutrition is thus based on reflective thoughts rather than direct sensory 
observations. What about perceiving? Do we observe the perceiving of animals? Aristotle 
seems to think that we do. However, as in the case of nutrition, he would not say that he 
sees that this dog is perceiving a hot object through its sense of touch right now etc. He 
rather seems to say reasonably that he sees the dog's reaction to a certain object. 181 For 
instance, by observing a dog moving away when it touches fire, we might infer that it must 
have the sense of touch. Although the two life capacities, nutrition and sense-perception, 
are not directly observable to us, they manifest some phenomena which we can relate to 
them on a simple reflection. 
Nor does the animal's activity in virtue of the appetitive faculty seem directly observable 
to us. In effect, the case of orexis seems even more difficult. What are the related 
phenomena or activities which we can relate to the operation of orexis? What about 
thinking? Does it have any direct observable manifestation? It seems that Aristotle's 
introduction to them, in particular, in DA III. 10 with regard to the source of locomotion is 
not irrelevant to the questions raised here. Although locomotion is not the only empirical 
datum which suggests the power of thinking in rational beings, his treatment of the relation 
between orexis and thought in the chapter seems to indicate that animal locomotion displays 
the actualisation of them. In other words, their activities are displayed through locomotion. 
If this is right, we can also find a reason for Aristotle's consistent claim that locomotion is 
181 Cf. the example of an insect cut into two, both parts of which have sense-perception and locomotion 
(413b 20-21). 
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the only motion that the soul originates in animals,182 although he clearly acknowledges that 
the soul is also the cause of other motions as well (DA 415b 22-27). Among the three types 
of motion that, Aristotle thinks, the soul gives rise to in the living body (cf 406a 12-13), 
locomotion is the motion that most directly manifests the role of its relevant faculty, i.e. the 
locomotive faculty,183 whereas orexis and thought are unrecognisable without reflecting on 
their roles with reference to locomotion. Locomotion does not at once manifest their 
activities in it. But the observation of the activity and the reflection on the question of what 
other capacities are involved in the arousal of it lead us to understand the necessary faculties 
and the activities of the sou1. 184 What is to be noted at this stage is that Aristotle's 
reflection is centred on the directedness oflocomotion to the external object, which we shall 
see in more detail in a discussion of the locomotive faculty in DA III. 9-10. 
III. 2 Animal Locomotion 
Aristotle says in Ph. VII. 2 that all forms of locomotion are reducible to pulling, 
pushing, carrying, and twirling (243a 15 if.), which are again reducible to pulling and 
pushing (243b 17-244a 3). Since he maintains that there are no more than four types of 
change, change in respect of quantity, of quality, of place, and of substance (200b 33 if.), he 
tries to explain every change in terms of one of them. In doing this, Aristotle makes an 
interesting remark, 
182 DA 4 lOb 20-21; Ph. 259b 6-7; 26la 23-24. 
183 Cf. Ch. 1. Sec. 2 (c) on the priority oflocomotion. 
184 Compare my argument so far with pseudo-Aristotle's remarks at Spirit 482b 17-21; "Of ~es~, t~e 
motion of the pulse is perceptible by the senses wherever we touch the body. That .of the respuaoon IS 
perceptible up to a certain point, but is recognized in the majority of parts b~ a reasomn~ process. That of 
nutrition is in practically all parts determinable by reasoning, but by sense In so far as It c~ ~e obs~rved 
from its results." I have presented three types of recognition of the faculties through the aCOVIoes of h~Ing 
beings: (1) immediate recognition, i.e. locomotion, (2) recognition by relevant phenomena and reasomng, 
e.g. nutrition, and (3) recognition by reasoning for the most part, e.g. orexis. 
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Again, inhaling is a form of pulling, exhaling a form of pushing; and the same is true of spitting and of all 
other motions that proceed through the body, whether excretive or assimilative, the assimilative being forms 
of pulling; the excretive of pushing off (243b 12-15). 
Thus if any living beings inhale or exhale or get nutriment through contact the environment 
or produce excrements or the like, they are somehow capable of locomotion. According to 
this account, we have an intuitively unwelcome consequence that not only animals but also 
plants might be locomotive because all of them have the nutritive faculty of the soul and are 
capable of nutrition. However, as far as the examples in the passage are concerned, 
Aristotle primarily focuses on the activities of animals rather than those of plants. 
Moreover, he would explain the nutrition of plants in terms of increase and decrease, i.e. of 
motion in quantity, rather than in terms of locomotion. 
For Aristotle Ktvll(nc; KCl'ta 't01tOV, i.e. locomotion, designates motion III three 
dimensions rather than in two dimensions, i.e. in a space rather than on a surface (cf. Ph. 
209a 5-6). Thus in ascribing locomotion to animals, he seems to have roughly three types 
of motion in mind, i.e. flying, swimming, and walking (MA 698a 5-7; GA 715a 26-27). At 
first glance, the Ph. passage cited above does not seem consistent with the DA passages 
where Aristotle tells us that even some animals do not have the locomotive faculty and so 
they are incapable of moving in space (e.g. 415a 6-7; b 23). For the passage seems to 
suggest that even so-called non-locomotive animals ('ta ClKtV'll'tU) are capable of some 
primitive forms of internal locomotion, such as respiration, nutrition, excretion, etc. If so, it 
appears that Aristotle's conception of locomotion is widely used than we would normally 
think. 
Aristotle does not offer a separate analysis of the activities of the sensitive soul in non-
locomotive animals other than a general account of the sense of touch, in particular, in DA 
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II. 11 and in III. 1. He does offer a brief account of stationary animals ('tel JlOV1JlU) in the 
HA 1.1, but we initially have to determine whether we are to identify them with non-
locomotive animals (animals that do not have the locomotive faculty) introduced in the 
DA.185 For, in the HA, Aristotle appears to say that such animals as the snail, the oyster, 
etc., which he introduces as examples of stationary animals, are still capable of motion in 
space (see 487b 6-17). If the animals dealt with in the HA are the examples of non-
locomotive animals discussed in the DA, the distinction between those that have the 
locomotive faculty and those that do not hardly seems to depend on whether they are 
capable of locomotion as such. 
What about the directedness of locomotion or, in other words, the point that 
locomotion occurs for the sake of an end? Is it possible that Aristotle regards stationary 
animals as lacking the locomotive faculty in the sense that they are unable to exercise 
locomotion for the sake of an end? I believe that this is what he meant. In what follows, I 
shall thus show in more detail that Aristotle allows stationary animals not only the capacity 
for internal locomotion of their bodies such as the contraction and expansion of the lungs, 
but also the capacity for spatial locomotion in a qualified sense. However, I shall argue, 
when he denies the locomotive faculty to some animals, he is denying them the capacity for 
locomotion that is directed to a specific end. 
(a) An Account of Non-Locomotive Animals in the DA 
As mentioned, Aristotle thinks that the primary activity of soul is 'self-nutrition and 
growth and decay'. 186 Thus since plants are capable of nutrition and undergo decay and 
growth, they are also ensouled (i.e. living) beings. The nutritive soul is that in virtue of 
185 DA 414b 15-16; 415b 22-23; cf. 413b 1-3; 415a 6-7; 432b 19-21. 
186 DA 412a 14; 413a 21 fI.; 416b 17-19. 
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which beings are alive, and so it is in a sense the primary soul (DA 415a 23-26). Animals 
also possess the nutritive faculty and so are alive in so far as they are constantly nourished. 
However, animals are different from plants because they have some additional capacity 
other than the capacity for nutrition. This is the capacity for sense-perception that 'leads us 
for the first time to speak of living things as animals' (413 b 2-3; cf Juv. 467b 18 ff.). 
However, being an animal does not mean having all the senses. We saw that Aristotle 
makes it clear that the classification of different beings according to their capacities is 
primarily based on an empirical observation of their activities (DA 413 a 26; cf b 17-20). As 
he derives the separability of the nutritive faculty from other faculties from the fact that 
plants that only have this faculty are alive (cf 413b 4-9; 414a 2-3), he also derives the 
separability of the sense of touch from the other senses from observation of the animals that 
have only the sense of touch. 187 For Aristotle, the sense of touch is thus the primary sense 
which belongs to all animals and without which "it is impossible for the animal to have any 
other sense" (435a 13-14). He even claims that the loss of this sense 'brings about the 
death of an animal' (435b 4_5).188 
Aristotle relates the sense of touch to obtaining nutriment. That is, the sense of touch is 
primarily the sense for such qualities as dry, moist, hot, and cold. What can be perceived 
through touch has those qualities and it is with the organ of touch that animals perceive 
such qualities (423b 27-31). And the sense of touch is the sense for food that consists of 
what is hot, dry, etc. 
187 DA 413b 4-6; see also, 414a 2-4; 3, 415a 4-6; Somn. 455a 26-27. . 
188 Considering the case of animals in a vegetative state, this might be taken as an exaggeratIon .. Aristotle, 
perhaps, means to emphasise that since the sense is the criterion of the distinction between an arumal and a 
plant, for an animal to be as such it must have the sense. See Hicks's note on the relevant paragraph. 
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'" all animals have the sense for food (for touch is the sense for food; the food of all living things consists of 
what is dry, moist, hot, cold, and these are the qualities apprehended by touch) all other sensible qualities 
are apprehended by touch only indirectly (414b 6-9). 
For Aristotle the sense of taste is also a kind of touch (421 a 19-20). And the two senses 
are closely related to nutrition (cf. Sens. 436b 13-17). The sense of touch discriminates 
between, for example, what is hot and what is cold, whereas the sense of taste discriminates 
between what is sweet and what is bitter (DA 426a 27-b 16). However, "we do not," says 
Aristotle, "perceive what is equally hot and cold or hard and soft, but only excesses, the 
sense itself being a sort of mean between the opposites that characterize the objects of 
perception" (424a 3-4). Thus we can only perceive with the sense of touch either what is 
hotter or what is colder, or what is harder or what is softer, but not the medium state. 
Aristotle thus claims that the sensitive faculty is a power to make distinctions. 189 Those 
that have the sense of touch are capable of making a distinction between tangible qualities. 
However, having the sense means more than that; that is, it also means having the capacity 
for the feeling of pleasure and pain. In answer to the question on what occasions animals 
feel either pleasure or pain, Aristotle seems to be saying that it is that which is 'brought into 
the proper ratio' (426b 4-7) that makes them feel pleasant when 'the sense and the ratio are 
identical' (b 8), whereas when something is out of the ratio they feel pain. 
'" now all animals have one sense at least, viz. touch, and whatever has a sense has the capacity for pleasure 
and pain and therefore has pleasant and painful objects present to it, and wherever these are present, there is 
epithumia, for epithumia is orexis of what is pleasant. (414b 3-6; 413b 22-24) 
In this way, since stationary animals possess the sense of touch and the capacity for orexis, 
they pursue what is presented to them as pleasant and avoid what is not. Since Aristotle is 
189 DA 427a 18 if.; 432a 15 if.; MA 700b 19-22. 
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concerned with stationary animals, for the present we do not need to assume that such a 
capacity for pursuit and avoidance (Ol(oKtOV Kat <pEUKtoV) is at once related to the arousal 
of locomotion. This capacity for pursuing or avoiding in animals is of course in virtue of 
the appetitive faculty of the soul within them. As mentioned earlier, according to Aristotle, 
having the capacity for sense-perception entails the capacity for feeling pleasure and pain, 
and the capacity for this feeling entails the capacity for orexis. Thus these capacities are 
shared by all animals and so they are not the primary conditions for distinguishing 
locomotive animals from non-locomotive animals. In other words, although non-
locomotive animals have the capacity for making a distinction between sensible qualities, the 
capacity for discerning what is pleasant from what is not, and the capacity for orexis, 
Aristotle maintains that these capacities are not sufficient for the arousal of locomotion and 
so they remain non-locomotive. 
This discussion raises a question of what other capacities are necessary for locomotion. 
If non-locomotive animals have all the capacities necessary for locomotion, but are 
incapable of such a motion, Aristotle's thesis will hardly look cogent. As we shall see at a 
later stage, he ascribes the distance senses to all locomotive animals and the capacity for 
thinking to some of them. Since the distance senses are common to all locomotive animals, 
we have to find out how or in what way the capacity for discerning sensibles at a distance is 
related to the arousal of locomotion. If, as we saw, the role of the senses is mainly for 
discerning sensible qualities, it is difficult to see how such a capacity should be what makes 
some animals locomotive. This is not to deny that there must be some close relation of an 
animal's starting to walk to seeing an object at a distance, for instance. However, although 
Aristotle would say that the capacity for seeing in virtue of the sensitive faculty necessitates 
an appropriate bodily organ, i. e. an eye, he would not acknowledge that that capacity 
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necessitates the bodily parts for locomotion (cf 434a 32 if). The necessitation of such 
parts is ascribed to the locomotive faculty.19o Thus, at first sight, it is difficult to see how 
the distance senses are related to locomotion. 
However, considering the question why animals move from here to there, we might see 
a relation between them. That is, they move for the sake of something which is at a 
distance. Thus the distinction of sensible qualities made by the distance senses seems to be 
closely linked with the directedness of locomotion. Such a link suggests that those animals 
that have the capacity for locomotion for an end must have the distance senses as well. This 
is, I further argue below, the ground for Aristotle's claim that although non-locomotive 
animals have the sense of touch, the capacity for orexis, and the capacity for certain types of 
locomotion, they are said to be non-locomotive since they do not move for an object at a 
distance. If so, we might well conclude that, when Aristotle discusses the animal's 
locomotion in virtue of the locomotive faculty in the DA, he has in mind the particular type 
of locomotion which is related to the directedness. Let us turn to see whether this 
conclusion can be reached. 
(b) Stationary Animals 
Aristotle's treatment of animals that do not have the locomotive faculty in the DA is 
obscure on its own. He does not offer here any specific examples of those that are non-
locomotive or that do not have the locomotive faculty. However, elsewhere in the 
biological works,191 Aristotle introduces what he calls 'to. J.10V1J.1<X which he seems to 
identify with non-locomotive animals. He there appears to think that they have the sense of 
touch and so the sensitive faculty, but not the locomotive faculty. And yet he seems to 
190 Cf. Furley (1996), pp. 59-77. 
191 Esp. HA I. 1 and GA I. 1. See below. 
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think that they are not entirely deprived of locomotion. That is, he ascribes to them the 
capacity not only for some types of internal spatial motion, but also for motion from place 
to place in a qualified sense. 
In the GA, Aristotle explicitly offers some specific examples of non-locomotive animals 
for the first time and gives a brief account of their characteristics . 
... all those creatures which do not move, as the testacea and animals that live by clinging to something else, 
inasmuch as their nature resembles that of plants, have no sex any more than plants have, but as applied to 
them the word is only used in virtue of a similarity and analogy. (715b 17-20) 
In the HA I. 1, Aristotle claims that stationary beings are found only in water, but not on 
land (487b 6-7). However, he later on admits that such animals can be found on land as 
well, e.g. snails (527b 34 ff). Perhaps, he meant to say that those land animals also get 
their food in the water and cannot live away from water (487a 24-26). At any rate, it 
appears reasonable to think that the animals mentioned in the above passage also include 
some land-animals that are non-locomotive. However, since he has given more detailed 
information about the testacea than any other animals, we shall focus on his treatment of 
them. 
Testaceans are defined by Aristotle as those "that have their hard substance outside and 
their flesh-like substance within, and their hard substance can be shattered but not crushed; 
and to this genus belong the snail and the oyster" (HA 523b 9-11 ).192 And they live by 
being attached to the external object, as plants are rooted to the ground. Thus 't<X ~6VtJ.HX 
which is in general translated as stationary animals primarily means animals that live by 
clinging or attaching to the external object. 193 However, he elsewhere says that not all 
192 See Peck (1965, notes on 487a 26 and 490b 11) observes that whether to translate OO''tPEOV as the oyster 
or the shellfish depends on the context in which it is used. 
193 By 'stationary,' I shall hereafter mean 'clinging to something else'. 
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testaceans are deprived of locomotion; some of them are capable of locomotion (528a 30 
ff.). Aristotle distinguishes three types of stationary animals that are found in water: (i) 
those that 'live in close adhesion to an external object, as is the case with several kinds of 
shellfish' (487b 6-10), (ii) those that 'adhere at one time to an object and detach themselves 
from it at other times, as is the case with a species of the so-called sea-anemone,194 (487b 
12-14; 531a 32 ff.), and (iii) those that 'are unattached but motionless ('ta UKtvll'tu), as is 
the case with oysters and the so-called holothuria' (487b 14-15). 
At first glance, it seems that only type (i) animals are stationary as well as non-
locomotive. However, Aristotle says at a later stage that this is not true. In HA, V. 15, he 
says that even among the shellfish some 'shift about from place to place' (see 547b 33-548a 
7; PA 681b 32-682a 2). Moreover, although he seems to say above that all type (ii) animals 
are detachable from the ground, he later distinguishes two sub-species one of which is 
detachable and the other of which is not (HA 548a 24-27). Thus he says more or less the 
same thing about (i) and (ii). In particular, (iii) clearly shows that being non-locomotive 
does not necessarily mean being stationary. It then seems that not all stationary animals are 
fixed to external objects nor are they all non-locomotive. 
What is clear from the discussion so far is that it is wrong to think that all the stationary 
animals are incapable of locomotion in external space. What then is the difference between 
locomotive animals and non-locomotive animals that Aristotle tries to distinguish in the DA 
by means of the possession of the locomotive faculty? In order to answer this question, we 
need to focus on the difference in their capacities. Aristotle believes that all testaceans have 
the senses of touch and taste, but not the distance senses (i. e. sight, smell, and hearing),195 
though some of them may have 'the least developed sense of smell' (HA 531a 23-25). Thus 
194 PA 681a 37-681b 1 denies that the sea-anemone is a testacea. 
195 HA 535a 6 if.; 487b 10-12; esp. 531b 1-3. 
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there is no doubt that they have the sensitive faculty of the soul. On the other hand 
, 
although such animals that have the capacity for limited sense-perception, feeling pleasure, 
and orexis do not have the locomotive faculty, it does not mean that they are wholly 
incapable of locomotion; they remain capable of some sort of locomotion. In other words, 
some animals appear to be capable of locomotion without the locomotive faculty. If this is 
the case, it appears that the locomotive faculty is not absolutely necessary for the animal to 
be capable of locomotion. However, before taking any conclusive position, we must ask 
whether Aristotle has some specific type of locomotion in mind, when he denies the 
capacity for locomotion to some animals that do not have the locomotive faculty. 
In DA III. 11, Aristotle says that the main concern in the chapter is to discuss whether 
those animals that have only the sense of touch have the capacity for phantasia (433 b 31-
434a 1). As he does on several occasions, he again claims that since they have the primary 
sense, they must also have the feelings of pleasure and pain and, also, orexis. 
It is evident that they feel pleasure and pain: and, if they have these, then of necessity they must also feel 
epithumia. But how can they have phantasia? Shall we say that, as their movements are vague and 
indeterminate, so, though they have these faculties, they have them in a vague and indeterminate form? 
(434a 2-5. trans. Hicks)196 
What is to be noted here is that Aristotle seems to suggest that the possession of the 
capacity for phantasia in the animal cannot be directly inferred from its capacity for feeling 
pleasure or pain and for orexis. That is, although he has no doubt that those animals that 
have the sense of touch have such capacities, he appears hesitant to admit that the capacity 
for phantasia thereby follows. Aristotle rather seems to suggest that we should infer the 
presence of phantasia in stationary animals from the observation of their motion. Thus, in 
196 Italics are my replacements, respectively, of 'desire' and 'imagination' in Hicks's translation. 
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answer to the question "<pav'tao1.a oE 1t&<; CJ.v EVElll;" he answers that "ft &01tEP Kat 
- , I ,,....,,, '" Kl VEnal aoplO'tw<;, Kal 'tau't EVEon )lEV, aoplO'tw<; 0' EVEO'tW". 
However, what does Aristotle mean by an indeterminate motion (aoplO'to<; K1. Vll0 l<;)? 
There are two sources that we can use to get some information about it. We first need to 
note Aristotle's characterisation of stationary animals in the chapter itself. He calls them 'ta 
a'tEA:i1 (DA 433b 31). It is generally translated imperfect animals, but the literal meaning of 
the term suggests that he regards them as animals without a purpose or an end. As noted, 
Aristotle is chiefly concerned with locomotion in DA III. 9-11. Thus it might be understood 
that he regards stationary animals as those that move about without any determinate or 
particular end. Furthermore, the word aoplo'toC; might well be taken to deliver the same 
implication (434a 4-5). Balme observes Aristotle's use of the word in relation to proximate 
matter and says that "It does not mean uncertain quality of action, nor an inscrutable 
intractability as some have suggested, but simply that the matter has not yet been formally 
determined into a precise state.,,197 When Balme's account is applied to locomotion, the 
aoplO'toC; motion of stationary animals means locomotion without a determined purpose 
rather than an indeterminate sort of motion. As mentioned, some stationary animals, e.g. 
sea-anemones are able to attach themselves to and detach themselves from the external , 
object (e.g. HA 487b 12-14) and they move from place to place to some extent. Thus, 
Aristotle seems to say not that they do not move at all, but that they do not move for some 
purpose, e.g. to catch something to eat. An account of the hydra given in a modem 
biological text will clarify this point. 
197 Balme (1987), p. 283. 
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While remaining fixed by its foot, Hydra is capable of bending movements It can also 0 . 
. , n occasIOn, move 
from place to place. This it does mainly by "looping" like a caterpillar, the animal bending over till the 
tentacles touch the "ground," when the foot is released and moved forwards. 198 
The hydra is an example of a stationary animal in the sense that it lives by being attached to 
an external object, though it is not an example given by Aristotle himself. It moves to a 
certain extent, as is the case of the sea-anemone. The hydra does not seem to move for the 
sake of an end, but it simply moves when its tentacles touch the ground. In general, 
according to Aristotle, such an animal takes in its 'nourishment from below, just as do 
plants with their roots' (PA 683b 20-21). And its locomotion is not for a specific end at a 
distance, although it might happen to catch some prey while it is detached, i.e. it may 
happen to bump into the prey. 
Our discussion of stationary animals so far shows that, although they do not have the 
locomotive faculty, they are still capable of some sort of locomotion. However, we have to 
make it clear that not all animals are capable of the same type of locomotion. Having the 
primary conditions for locomotion (i.e. the sense of touch, the capacity for feeling pleasure 
or pain, and the capacity for orexis), all animals appear to be capable of the primitive forms 
of bodily locomotion, such as nutrition, respiration, contraction, expansion, etc., namely, 
the forms of internal locomotion which they perform without changing their places. On the 
other hand, although stationary animals are said to be non-locomotive, they appear to be 
capable of detaching and attaching themselves which might well be taken by Aristotle to be 
a form of locomotion in a proper sense, i.e. spatial motion. 
However, their locomotion is without a specific end since they are not equipped with 
appropriate sense organs, e.g. eyes, that are necessary for them to recognise things at a 
198 Palmer (1959), p. 237. 
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distance as their end. Strictly speaking, in Aristotle's terms it is in virtue of the lack of the 
appropriate faculty rather than the organs that they are not capable of locomotion for the 
sake of an end. Should they have, for instance, the locomotive faculty, they would have the 
appropriate sense organs that are necessary for the animal to move towards an end at a 
distance. This line of argument indeed upholds our claim made earlier that the lower 
faculties are somehow teleologically determined by being subsumed by the higher faculties. 
If the sensitive faculty were not subsumed under the locomotive faculty, then the animal 
would have only the sense of touch in virtue of it. The animals that have the sensitive 
faculty subsumed under a higher faculty have more senses than those that have the sensitive 
faculty which is not subsumed under any other faculty. 
(c) The Distance Senses and the Teleology of Locomotion 
Let us now turn to examine more closely what kinds of psychological or living 
capacities are necessary for animals to be able to move towards a specific end. Aristotle at 
times implies that the sense of touch is not directly related to the capacity for locomotion 
(DA 414b 16-17; 415a 4-8), although it is indispensable for animals since it is what makes 
them different from plants and since it is closely related to their obtaining food. More 
explicitly, at Sens. 436b 18-19, he says that those animals which are capable of locomotion 
have other senses, i.e. smelling, hearing, and seeing, in addition to the sense of touch. The 
sense of touch is for the being of the animal rather than for its well-being (cf. DA 434b 23-
27; 435b 20 ff). By being, Aristotle, of course, means the maintenance of nutrition and so 
of life. The sense of touch is thus a prerequisite for their living. What about the distance 
senses? Aristotle maintains that they contribute not only to the preservation of the animal, 
but also to its well-being or higher perfection. 
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The senses which operate through external media, viz. smelling, hearing, seeing, are found in all animals 
which possess the faculty of locomotion. To all that possess them they are a means of preservation in order 
that, guided by antecedent perception, they may both pursue their food, and shun things that are bad or 
destructive. But in animals which have also intelligence they serve for the attainment of a higher 
perfection. (Sens. 436b 18-437a 2) 
A characteristic difference between the sense of touch (including taste) and other senses is 
that when we touch objects, we perceive them by immediate contact, whereas with the 
latter senses, such as sight, hearing, and smell, we perceive through media such as air and 
water (DA 424b 24 if; 423b 1 if). Thus these latter senses are distance senses. 
But there remains this difference between what can be touched and what can be seen or can sound· in the , 
latter two cases we perceive because the medium produces a certain effect upon us, whereas in the 
perception of objects of touch we are affected not by but along with the medium; it is as if a man were struck 
through his shield, where the shock is not first given to the shield and passed on to the man, but the 
concussion of both is simultaneous. (423b 12-16) 
If animals have only the sense of touch, they are not able to perceive objects at a distance. 
And should animals not be able to perceive the objects at a distance they would not need to 
move in place in order to reach those objects. For, even if they are able to move in space, 
their locomotion will not be directed to an object at a distance that looks or smells pleasant. 
In other words, their locomotion without perceiving an object in advance would be for an 
indeterminate end. Aristotle thinks that stationary animals are unable to approach or avoid 
specific objects at a distance because they lack the appropriate sense organs for perceiving 
them (see below). Thus if they confront something to eat while wandering about without 
any specific aim, it would be a chance event. In contrast, the animal which possesses the 
sense of sight, for example, is capable of perceiving objects at a distance. Let us take an 
example of a hungry eagle whose eyes are so developed as to see rabbits running in the field 
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from a great distance while flying. Were it not able to see them, it would not have any 
specific aim to pursue, although it has the orexis to alleviate its hunger. On the other hand, 
even if it gets pleasure from perceiving them as such, it would not move towards them if it 
had no orexis for them. Thus the eagle requires both the distance senses and orexis for its 
locomotion. Moreover, it would not be able to pursue the rabbits unless it had the 
appropriate bodily organs for locomotion. The proper combination of the senses and orexis 
calls for all the necessary organs when catching a rabbit. 199 
At this stage, we need to tum to examine Aristotle's account of teleology in relation to 
locomotion. In the MA, he says, 
'" all animals both impart movement and are moved for the sake of something, so that this is the limit to all 
their movement: the thing for-the-sake-of-which. Now we see that the movers of the animal are reasoning 
and phantasia and choice and wish and appetite. And all of these can be reduced to thought and desire. 
...... For insofar as something else is done for the sake of this, and insofar as it is an end of things that are 
for the sake of something else, thus far it imparts movement. And we must suppose that the apparent good 
ranks as a good, and so does the pleasant (since it is an apparent good). (700b 15-29; cf. DA 433b 13-21) 
According to this passage, for animals to be capable of locomotion they must have objects 
presented to them as ends, the capacity for discerning whether they are pleasant or not, and 
the capacity to pursue what is pleasant and avoid what is painful. Aristotle in the passage 
appears to say that the external object is a direct object of orexis. There is no doubt that 
orexis is orexis for an object; that it requires an object. However, as seen in the case of the 
eagle, for its locomotion objects must be presented to it through the distance senses in the 
first instance. Thus the object of orexis is the object presented through the senses. 
However, it is important to note that the object of orexis is not the object presented through 
the senses as such, but the object presented as a pleasant or unpleasant (or painful) thing. 
199 See Section 3 (a). 
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Thus, as far as locomotion is concerned, the phrase 'for the sake of something' is more 
specifically 'for the sake of what is pleasant or what is good'. 
However, although the object of orexis is what is pleasant and so the animal with orexis 
pursues it, it is not the ultimate end of being an animal. As we saw earlier, being an 
ensouled creature designates being a living creature. That is, living is the essence of the 
ensouled being. Thus Aristotle calls the soul the formal cause (DA 415b 12-14). And also, 
being an ensouled creature designates the perseverance of life which is what living beings 
are for. This is the role of the soul as the final cause (415b 15-22). Furthermore, being an 
ensouled creature designates the capacity for performing certain living activities. The role 
of the soul as the efficient cause, however, differs in different beings (415b 22-27). For 
instance, plants are capable only of growth and decay,200 whereas animals are capable of 
more various activities. 
At this stage, we need to attend to some passages in the P A where Aristotle emphasises 
the primacy of the final cause among the causes in zoological or biological explanation. As 
all the parts of the animal are necessary for the sake of life (PA 692b 20-693a 22),201 all 
their functions are also for the sake of it (639b 14 if). However, it does not appear that all 
the functions of the bodily parts are directly related to the ultimate end, i.e. the maintenance 
of life, but that they are initially for the sake of the sub-ends which are again for the sake of 
the higher ends and the like, which are eventually for the sake of the ultimate end (cf. P A 
IV, 10). In making this point, Aristotle seems to have in mind what he calls 'hypothetical 
necessity' . 
There are then two causes, namely, necessity and the final end. . .. There is, however, the third mode, in 
such things at any rate as are generated. For instance, we say that food is necessary in neither of the two 
200 For a discussion of decay in the structure ofteleology, see King (1996), pp. 21-24. 
201 Cf. Nussbaum (1978), pp. 76-80. 
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modes, but because an animal cannot possibly do without it This third m d· h be 
. 0 e IS w at may called 
hypothetical necessity. For if a piece of wood is to be split with an axe, the axe must of necessity be hard· 
. , 
and, if hard, must of necessity be made of bronze or iron Now exactly in the same wa th b d . .. 
. yeo y, smce It IS 
an instrument-for both the body as a whole and its several parts individually are for the sake of 
something-if it is to do its work, must of necessity be of such and such a character, and made of such and 
such materials. (PA 642a 1-13) 
Aristotle's examples in the passage are mainly examples of matter such as wood bronze , , 
etc. Thus it might be thought that the hypothetical necessity is related only to matter or the 
body. However, this seems misleading. We have to note that in that passage Aristotle also 
takes an example of food which is necessary for the animal. To say that the animal 
necessitates food implies that the animal must have not only the capacity to digest the food, 
but also appropriate organs for the digestion. In so far as the animal has the capacity and 
the organs both of which are necessary for the digestion of food, the food can be said to be 
necessary for the animal. 
In effect, all living beings require nutriment or food for their survival. However, they 
require different means to obtain it. F or instance, the locomotive animal requires certain 
organs for its motion in place. However, Aristotle maintains that the animal has the 
capacity for locomotion not because it has the relevant organs, but that it has the organs 
because it has the capacity (432b 24-25; PA 687a 3 ff).202 However, as we saw in Section 
1 (a), he appears to maintain that position not only for bodily organs, but also for soul-
faculties. We saw that Aristotle's analogy of the geometrical figure suggests that the 
triangle subsumed under a quadrilateral exists only potentially in the definition of the 
202 Aristotle criticises Anaxagoras who maintains the opposite view that animals are superior because ~ey 
possess hands. His criticism here seems consistent with the homonymy principle we discussed earher. 
With the principle, Aristotle tells us that a dead body is not a body at all, although it, presumably, has .all 
the bodily parts and structures as the living body does. He does not conceive that a dead body ~1l be alIve 
at some time. Thus he does not think that since animals have appropriate bodily organs, they WIll be able to 
obtain necessary capacities. Cf. Furley (1996), pp. 59-77; Charles (1984), p. 86. 
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quadrilateral. Likewise, the nutritive faculty exists potentially, for instance, in the sensitive 
faculty and will be actualised not on its own, but with reference to the sensitive faculty. All 
animals possess the sense of touch and so the capacity for oreXis, but only some are able to 
move in space for the sake of an end (DA 433b 27-28). That is, although all animals have 
the appetitive faculty which subsumes the lower faculties, the appetitive faculty appears to 
contribute differently to different classes of animals and, eventually, different classes of 
animals produce different activities. However, this is not because one and the same faculty 
on its own is actualised in different ways in different animals, but because it has an 
interaction with some other capacities of which some animals are capable in virtue of their 
higher faculties. 203 
Being a living being as such is different from being an animal as such. That is, for 
something to be a living being it only needs to have the capacity for nutrition, whereas for 
something to be an animal it must have, at least, the sense of touch and appropriate sense 
organs in addition to the capacity for nutrition. Since animals are distinguished from plants 
by the possession of the capacity for sense-perception (i.e. the sense of touch), the capacity 
for nutrition and reproduction in the case of animals is taken for granted. On the other 
hand, being a locomotive animal requires more capacities than simply being an animal. That 
is, locomotive animals are distinguished from non-locomotive animals by the capacity for 
locomotion. However, this does not mean that locomotive animals only have that capacity. 
They must undoubtedly have the capacities for being animals. In other words, being a 
locomotive animal designates having an additional capacity on the hypothesis that it has 
other necessary capacities. The capacity for nutrition is a sufficient condition for a being to 
be alive. However, for a being to maintain its life as an animal it also needs to utilise its 
203 Cf. Section 3 (a) below. 
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capacity for sense-perception. In other words, its capacities need to be geared together for 
it to maintain its life as an animal. However, those capacities are not directly relevant to its 
being called a locomotive animal, although it cannot be locomotive without them. Thus a 
locomotive animal must have hypothetically necessary capacities in order to exercise its 
capacity for locomotion, which is eventually related to the maintenance of the animal's life. 
III. 3 The Locomotive Faculty 
Although Aristotle says that stationary animals also have the capacity for feeling 
pleasure and pain and for orexis, this need not puzzle us since it is clear that the operation 
of such feelings and orexis with reference only to the sense of touch would be different from 
that with reference to the distance senses. Thus he seems to have in mind two types of 
operation based on the feeling of pleasure and the arousal of orexis one of which leads to 
locomotion towards an end and the other of which does not. Thus for Aristotle it seems 
that the locomotion of stationary animals from place to place is not self-motion in a strict 
sense. For, although they are capable of internal locomotion which Aristotle would accept 
as a form of self-motion, they are not capable of locomotion for the sake of an end since 
they lack the distance senses which present the end for them to pursue or not. That is, the 
end entails a direction which is provided by the distance senses, although it is not just by the 
senses but together with orexis that the animal moves in a certain direction. In what 
follows we shall make a fresh start and turn to examine the source of locomotion Aristotle , 
has in mind in DA III. 10-11. 
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(a) The Role o/Orexis in Locomotion 
In the DA, Aristotle first introduces orexis as a faculty of the soul at 413b 22 and then 
puts it in the list of faculties at 414a 30-32. Orexis (OpE~t~) is the genus that has epithumia 
(bn9u}liu), thumos (9u}lo~), and boulesis (~oUAll(n~) as its species (DA 414b2-3; cf. MA 
700b 17_22).204 He ascribes the first two to irrational beings, i.e. to stationary animals and 
irrational locomotive animals, and the last to rational beings (432b 5-6). Aristotle appears 
to imply that this division is meant to be an alternative to Plato's tripartite division of the 
soul which was guilty of a 'failure to recognize that the faculty of desire is a single main 
faculty' .205 He argues that "if the soul is tripartite orexis will be found in all three parts" 
(432b 6-7). Perhaps, Aristotle has an eye on Republic IV where Plato is concerned with the 
division of the soul. In particular, at 440d ff. Plato separates the rational faculty from the 
appetitive faculty and regards it as excluding the characteristics that belong to the appetitive 
faculty. However, Aristotle thinks that this cannot be true (cf. DA 432b 3-4). And he goes 
on to exemplify the case of animal locomotion (cf. 432b 7-9) which shows that orexis is 
involved even in the action of rational beings. That is, if one has boulesis, one also has 
epithumia and thumos, and, if one has thumos, one also has epithumia, whereas, if one has 
epithumia, one does not necessarily also have the others. Aristotle thus tries to resolve the 
problem of how the same sort of capacity can be exhibited in different faculties by showing 
that the higher faculties subsume the lower ones. In this way, he maintains that the living 
being has at least one common capacity, no matter what kind of faculty it has (415a 1-12). 
Nussbaum offers a brief historical survey of the word orexis used by Aristotle and his 
predecessors and points out two major characteristics of it: (1) "it strongly implies 
204 Translators differ in translating OpE~lq and im8vjlia. For example, Hamlyn (1993) translates them ~s, 
respectively, desire and wanting, Hicks (1907) as appetency and concupiscence, Nussbaum (1978) as desne 
and orexis, etc. I leave them untranslated. 
205 Ross (1961), note on 432b 4-7. 
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directedness towards an object" and (2) it "is active more than passive".206 In effect, these 
characterisations are apparent in Aristotle's usage of the word. As Nussbaum claims , 
Aristotle does maintain that orexis is for something. That is, for him animals move for the 
sake of some end (e.g. MA 700b 26-28; DA 432b IS ff.). Moreover, the 'end' is not any 
end picked up at random, but what is pleasant (DA 414b 6) or what is good (41Sb 20-21; 
MA 700b 26-29), and, also, it is something 'that can be brought into being by action' (DA 
433a 29-31; cf MA 700b 2S). In relation to locomotion, Aristotle, in general, uses the 
generic term orexis. 207 But he also uses such terms as epithumid08 and boulesii09 as its 
species. It appears reasonable to think that boulesis belongs to rational locomotive animals, 
whereas epithumia belongs to irrational locomotive animals. However, the reading of DA 
II. 3, 414b 1-6, for instance, suggests that Aristotle ascribes epithumia to non-locomotive 
animals as well. On the other hand, at MA 701 a 37 he introduces thumos as that which 
leads to locomotion or action. 210 It thus seems undeniable that Aristotle firmly believes that 
there is a close link between orexis and locomotion. 
What kind of relation, then, do the species of orexis have between them? A question 
raised at this stage is whether Aristotle thinks that what has the higher forms of orexis 
subsumes the lower forms or that different animals have different forms of orexis. We saw 
Aristotle's claim that the higher faculties of the soul cannot be separated from the lower 
ones, whereas the lower ones are separable from the higher ones.211 Thus the higher 
206 Nussbaum (l983b), p. 132. 
207 MA 70la 4; a 35; 702a 8; 703a 5; DA 432b 17; 433a 10 etc. 
208 MA 700b 18; 70la 32; DA 433a 26; b 7 etc. 
209 MA 700b 18; 70lb I; DA 433a 23-25. . . 
210 I shall largely ignore the role of thumos in locomotion for which Aristotle does not prOVIde any detaIled 
information in the action contexts such as the DA and the MA. But, see e.g. EN 1149a 25-31. Cooper 
(1996) investigates its role in relation to moral values (esp. p. 97) and relates it closely to reason (p. 90; p. 
93). This is a matter of further discussion which I shall not pursue in this thesi~.. . 
211 E.g. DA 413a 32-34; 415a 1-4; 434a 23 ff. For the separability of the senSItIve faculty, see ~13a 32-33, 
b 4-5; 415a 1-3 etc. And for reflective thought, see 413b 25-27; cf. 415a 12. 
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faculties subsume the lower ones and involve attribution of additional capabilities to the 
living being. Does Aristotle also apply this idea to the species of orexis? The first 
indication of a positive answer follows from his remark that orexis is common to the 
faculties that belong to animals (cf DA 432b 5-8). If there is something common in 
different faculties, then it is undeniable that the higher faculties include the capacities that 
are produced in virtue of the lower ones. Then, boulesis is not a completely new form of 
orexis, but a capacity that embraces the lower forms of it. Another indication might be 
suggested by a passage in the EN where Aristotle says that irrational elements in the soul 
are shared in the exercise of a rational principle. 
For we praise the reason of the continent man and of the incontinent, and the part of their soul that has 
reason, since it urges them aright and towards the best objects; but there is found in them also another 
natural element beside reason, which fights against and resists it. For exactly as paralysed limbs when we 
choose to move them to the right tum on the contrary to the left, so is it with the soul; the impulses of 
incontinent people move in contrary directions. . .. No doubt, however, we must none the less suppose that 
in the soul too there is something beside reason, resisting and opposing it (l102b 13 ff.) 
The 'something' that resists and opposes reason turns out in the DA to be epithumia. 
Further, even when thought does command and bids us pursue or avoid something, sometimes no 
movement is produced; we act in accordance with im8vpiav, as in the case of moral weakness. (433a 1-4; 
cf. 434a 12-16) 
Aristotle here seems to contrast thought with epithumia. However, with reference to 
locomotion the contrast must be between reasoned orexis and non-reasoned orexis since no 
thought without involving orexis can bring about locomotion. According to DA III. 11, 
433a 23-26, when thought is said to produce motion it does so in a form of orexis, i.e. 
boulesis. The passages cited above then suggest that a rational being's action is achieved 
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through a conflict between epithumia and boulesis.212 Irrational locomotive animals that 
are not capable of thought will start their motion according to their epithumia without any 
conflict. On the other hand, rational beings are capable of producing two types of action, 
one according to epithumia and the other according to boulesis. However, even in rational 
beings when their epithumia is too great, they will pursue what is perceived as pleasant 
without employing thought and thus without boulesis. It is thus clear that for Aristotle 
epithumia belongs not only to irrational beings, but also to rational ones, whereas boulesis 
belongs to rational beings only. 
Nussbaum claims that boulesis is not orexis 'plus reasoning about how to achieve the 
object,' but orexis 'for a privileged object, which must be presented by reason'. 213 She 
refers to Aristotle's claim at Met. 1072a 27 that "the first object of ~OUA:'1(}"tC; is the real 
K<XAOV" as a supporting passage. However, a caution is necessary in understanding the talk 
of objects of different species of orexis. For it would be strange if two animals, for 
instance, were fighting against each other for two different victims. They can just go for 
different ones. Similarly, all Aristotle wants to emphasise in the Metaphysics passage is that 
the object chosen by employing reason is better than others, not that boulesis and epithumia 
have different objects. The difference rather seems to lie in the fact that epithumia is 
concerned with the pleasant and the painful,214 whereas boulesis is concerned with the good 
and the bad (cf. 1112a 1 if). In other words, the two species of orexis concern different 
212 Aristotle envisages three modes of locomotion that rational beings produce (DA 434a 12-16); (a) 
epithumia overpowers boulesis and sets it in movement, (b) boulesis acts upon epithumia, and (c) epithumia 
overcomes epithumia. For example, (c) when a man is hungry as well as thirsty, he ch~oses a drink ra~er 
than food. This can be a typical example of action deriving from orexis which does not mvolve calculatIon. 
However, (b) even if he sees something edible, he might think that the food is not ga.oo for health an~ 
decide not to eat it. On the other hand, (a) when his starvation is too great, and so even if he knows that It 
is not good for health, he might just decide to eat it. 
213 Nussbaum (1978), pp. 335-336. 
214 DA 413b 23-24; 414b 4-5; 431b 8; EN lllla 31-33; b 17-18. 
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values or aspects of one and the same thing. 215 However, what will be pursued by animals 
that only have epithumia as pleasant might be pursued by human beings as good when it is 
reflected on by reason. In this way, Aristotle makes it clear that orexis as a whole concerns 
the pursuit of what is pleasant (or good) or the avoidance of what is painful (or bad). 
Returning to our earlier question whether the higher species of orexis subsume the 
lower ones, the answer seems positive. As mentioned, all the species of orexis seem to have 
in common the tendency to pursue or avoid something. However, as Nussbaum claims, 
boulesis is not epithumia plus reason, but the result of the interaction between orexis and 
reason. In other words, we might say that boulesis is a refined form of orexis. As noted, 
the object of epithumia and boulesis must be one and the same thing, but epithumia and 
boulesis value it differently. That is, one and the same thing might appear to have different 
values such as pleasant or good. But what is pleasant is not always what is really good; 
what appears pleasant to epithumia might appear to be bad on the reflection of reason. 
Thus orexis itself hardly seems to have any relation to the real worth (or the genuine good) 
of its object. Indeed, seeing an object as pleasant or unpleasant has a lot to do with the role 
of phantasia, which we shall discuss in the subsequent chapter. Orexis pursues or avoids 
what appears pleasant or unpleasant. And the capacity for orexis thus involves the capacity 
for pursuit or avoidance. 
In general, orexis comes first in the order of the capacities involved in the arousal of 
locomotion. For instance, an eagle feels hungry and looks for prey, although there is, of 
course a case when it sees a rabbit and, all of a sudden, feels hungry. We might have the , 
following two processes that lead to locomotion: 
(i) Orexis - sense-perception (the distance senses) - orexis - locomotion 
215 Charles (1984), pp. 87-88. 
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(ii) Sense-perception (the distance senses) - orexis - locomotion 
In (i), an eagle is hungry, which makes it feel pain. There occurs an orexis to avoid the 
feeling and starts to look for something to eat. The eagle sees a rabbit at a distance and the 
end which was vague at the beginning of looking for prey becomes specific, i.e. catching 
that very rabbit to satisfy its appetite. Between the stage of seeing a rabbit and moving 
towards it, there must be one more operation of orexis. That is, if the eagle sees a flower, it 
would not move towards it. But since the prey is a rabbit which gives it pleasure, the eagle 
pursues it. However, at the beginning of the operation of orexis the eagle does not have 
any concrete aim. On the other hand, in the case of (ii) the object of orexis is concrete from 
the beginning, e.g. the rabbit over there, not just something to eat. In a 'drink example' at 
MA 701 a 31 if, Aristotle seems to have process (i) in mind. However, although he 
acknowledges that orexis is the proximate reason for locomotion, he does not seem to 
notice orexis which comes just before the arousal of locomotion, i.e. the second orexis in 
(i). When Aristotle says that orexis is for the sake of what is pleasant, he would mean a 
specific end. If not, his claim that locomotive animals must have the distance senses will be 
vacuous. A vague orexis for an object at a distance is made concrete by the operation of 
the distance senses and, eventually, leads the animal to move towards it. Thus it might be 
said that orexis is incorporated in the perception, e.g. seeing a rabbit as pleasant to eat (cf. 
Chapter IV). Since we have so far seen the role of orexis in locomotion, we shall now tum 
to examine Aristotle's introduction of the appetitive faculty as the source of locomotion DA 
III. 9-10. 
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(b) The Search for the Locomotive Faculty in DA III. 9-10 
Aristotle in DA III. 9 raises a question concerning "the soul which originates 
movement" (432a 19; b 13-14). At the outset, he proposes three possible alternatives; (a) it 
is one of the faculties so far mentioned, or (b) it is a single faculty which has not been 
mentioned, or (c) it is all the faculties as a whole (432a 19-22; cf. PA 645b 5 if). It appears 
indubitable that Aristotle presents (a) as an answer to the question since he claims that 
"That which moves therefore is a single faculty and the faculty of orexis" (DA 433a 22). 
However, this statement needs further clarification. 
Considering Aristotle's proposal, it might be expected that the overall trend of the 
chapter in question will be focused on denying that each of the faculties alone is sufficient to 
bring about locomotion. He does appear to embark at DA 432b 15-433a 8 on examining 
each of the faculties separately and questions whether each of them alone is sufficient for 
arousing locomotion. However, as we shall see presently, this impression is misleading. 
Aristotle does not treat them as individual faculties, but as the faculties that subsume the 
lower ones. He first claims that the nutritive faculty must not be the source of locomotion 
for the reasons (1) that 'the motion is always for an end' and (2) that 'it is accompanied by 
orexis or by phantasia'. However, these are indeed poor reasons to support his claim. For 
in DA II. 3 he has said that the souls in all living beings are for the sake of some end (415b 
15-22). Thus for Aristotle even the souls of plants are also the final causes. Moreover, 
orexis and phantasia are not only in locomotive animals, but also in stationary animals 
(434a 3-5). It is not clear whether Aristotle realises that such reasons are thus insufficient. 
But he soon turns to appeal to our sense-experience and says that "if it were the nutritive 
faculty, even plants would have been capable of originating such movement and would have 
possessed the organs necessary to carry it out" (432b 18-19). Again on the basis of an 
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empirical observation, he also denies the sensitive faculty as the source of locomotion for 
the reason that, although all animals have the faculty, some are incapable of locomotion 
(432b 19-21). 
We saw earlier that the difference of the sensitive faculty is the primary reason for 
distinguishing locomotive animals from non-locomotive animals. It then seems that the 
distance senses are the criterion for the distinction. For all animals have the contact senses , 
the capacity for feeling pleasure or pain, and the capacity for orexis. However, Aristotle 
argues that the distance senses are not sufficient for locomotion, but that there must be 
some other capacity in virtue of which the animal moves for an end. And he relates this 
capacity for the pursuit of an end to the capacity to provide appropriate bodily parts 
necessary for locomotion (MA 702a 17-19). That is, although the sensitive faculty provides 
the distance senses necessary for locomotion, those that do not have appropriate organs are 
not capable of locomotion and so there must be some other faculty that necessitates the 
organs. 
In rejecting the theoretical rational faculty as the source of locomotion (DA 432b 26-
31), Aristotle focuses on the fact that locomotion necessitates the capacity for 'avoiding or 
pursuing an object'. He says that (i) the calculative or speculative reason (9Ec.oPl1'ttKO<; 
VOEt) does 'nothing' practical to bring about locomotion, such as saying something about an 
object to be avoided or pursued (432b 26-29; cf. 433a 1-2). However, he, on the other 
hand, seems to think that the 'nothing (ouBE)' is too extreme. Thus he promptly 
acknowledges that (ii) the calculative reason sometimes leads to locomotion and goes on to 
say that not all speculations arouse locomotion, i. e. "the mind often thinks of something 
terrifying or pleasant without enjoining the emotion of fear" (432b 29-31). 
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The difficulty with these remarks is that Aristotle here is not consistently concerned with 
separate or individual faculties of the soul as excluding other faculties. Individual faculties 
are supposed to mean that the higher ones do not include the lower ones. When he denies 
thought to be the source of locomotion, he sometimes seems to think that the rational 
faculty does not include the lower faculties. For instance, in the case of (i) where Aristotle 
says that no locomotion would follow from the capacity of reason, he must regard it as a 
capacity that does not involve any form of orexis. For since he maintains that every animal 
locomotion involves orexis (433a 22-23), reason must bring about some locomotion if it 
were to include some orexis. On the other hand, in (ii) he seems to include a form of orexis 
since he is concerned with the case in which a man is sometimes led to locomotion by 
calculative reason. 
On other occasions, Aristotle also implicitly takes some basic living capacities for 
granted, i.e. as hypothetically necessary conditions. For instance, when he considers the 
question whether orexis on its own without involving other capacities is sufficient for 
locomotion (433a 7-8), he must presuppose that the possessor of orexis also has the 
sensitive faculty since there cannot be the appetitive faculty without it. 216 In the same way, 
when he talks of the calculative reason above, he at times regards it as including and, at 
times, as excluding orexis. However, Aristotle's denial of the appetitive faculty as a 
sufficient condition for explaining animal locomotion in the following passage does not 
seem to concern the inclusion of the lower faculties. 
Lastly, orexis too is incompetent to account fully for movement; for those who successfully resist temptation 
have orexis and epithumia and yet follow thought and refuse to enact that for which they have orexis. (-l33a 
7-9) 
216 However, only when he considers knowledge, does he treat it as separate from other faculties (see 433a 
5-7). 
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Here it is clear that Aristotle is concerned with the motion of rational beings. He uses the 
generic form orexis in the passage, but, as Hicks suggests,217 it should be read as denoting 
the lower species of it. As noted, rational beings have the capacity for thinking as well as 
the capacity for orexis. Aristotle thinks that they originate their motion not only from 
orexis (epithumia), but also from thought, though not without orexis (boulesis). The claim 
made there is that epithumia cannot explain every type of locomotion because there is 
another form of orexis (boulesis) that pursues an object presented by thought. 
Aristotle's position may appear confusing because his contrast is not between epithumia 
and boulesis, but between epithumia and thought. However, a short statement from DA 
III. 10 illustrates that epithumia in irrational locomotive animals requires a relationship with 
something, as rational locomotive animals have a certain relationship between boulesis and 
thought in their locomotion. What is this something that has a relationship with epithumia? 
Aristotle uses a conditional phrase 'if we consider phantasia as a kind of thinking' /18 and 
says that orexis (boulesis) and thought are sources of movement under that condition (433a 
9-12). Thus, he is saying that, as rational animals cannot bring about locomotion without 
the relationship of boulesis with thought, irrational animals also need phantasia with which 
epithumia has a certain relationship. Thus phantasia and thought hold the same place (MA 
700b 19_22).219 However, if we are to accept the relations between epithumia and 
phantasia and between boulesis and thought, we also have to accept that sense-perception 
is always accompanied by phantasia. For, among the locomotive animals, those that do not 
217 Hicks's note on 433a 6. 
218 El 't1~ 'titv q>av'tacriav 't1.8Eill ch~ vOllcriv 'twa (433a 10). . 
219 However, giving an account of the status of phantasia in this way raises a problem because Aristo~e 
maintains that (sensitive) phantasia is common to all animals (DA 434a 6; 433b 29-30). As noted, t~s 
statement needs a careful consideration in relation to 428a 9-11 where Aristotle appears to contradict 
himselfby saying that it is not found in all animals. See Ch. IV. esp. Sec. 2 (a). 
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have the capacity for thought have, at least, the capacity for sense-perception. If sense-
perception is not always accompanied by phantasia, then we have to assume that there 
might be another relation between epithumia and sense-perception, which does not involve 
phantasia.220 
For the present purpose, it is crucial to note that Aristotle finds the appetitive faculty, 
whether it is epithumia or boulesis, as a common faculty in every type of locomotion. 
That which moves therefore is a single faculty and the faculty of orexis; for if there had been two sources of 
movement-thought and orexis-they would have produced movement in virtue of some common 
character. As it is, thought is never found producing movement without orexis (for boulesis is a form of 
orexis; and when movement is produced according to calculation it is also according to boulesis), but orexis 
can originate movement contrary to calculation, for epithumia is a form of orexis. (DA 433a 22-26; cf. MA 
701a 31-b 1)221 
In DA III. 10, Aristotle wants to show the capacities necessary for animal locomotion. It 
seems that his emphasis on the involvement of orexis leads him so far as to give the 
impression that the appetitive faculty is a single faculty that must be identified with the 
originating source. However, it cannot be the sole source of locomotion because, as 
Aristotle himself admits here, it cannot explain every type of motion on its own without 
taking also into account either sense-perception, phantasia, or thought. 
In brief, epithumia is a crude form of the appetitive faculty which belongs to rational 
beings as well as to irrational beings. However, not all the locomotion of locomotive 
animals is due to epithumia. But, since human beings are capable of calculation in virtue of 
the rational faculty, their actions might be due to their boulesis which produces them 
according to calculation. Actions that are derived from orexis without calculation are much 
220 Cf. The four types of the locomotive faculty I discuss in subsequent chapter (Ch. IV. esp. Sec. 2 (b) and 
(c». 
221 Cf. Charles (1984), p. 89. 
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quicker since there need not be the conflict between orexis and thought (MA 701a 28-30). 
As we have so far seen, there are two types of locomotion (or action) to which human 
beings give rise according to their epithumia or boulesis. In consequence, there cannot be 
any motion in the absence of orexis. And neither sense-perception nor phantasia nor 
thought can be the source of motion independently of orexis. When Aristotle uses the 
generic term orexis and speaks as if it were the locomotive faculty, he is merely saying that 
it is found necessary for every locomotion. 222 
At this stage, however, we need to ask why he singles out this particular faculty any 
more than e.g. the sensitive faculty as most responsible for locomotion. At first glance, this 
question appears difficult to answer since there is no doubt that Aristotle maintains that all 
animals must have the sensitive faculty and the appetitive faculty. However, the answer to 
that question is unexpectedly simple. It is to be noted that, as seen earlier, although 
Aristotle maintains that the sensitive faculty is common to all animals, he, in effect, ascribes 
different senses to different animals. That is, he ascribes the contact senses, such as the 
senses of touch and contact, to all animals, and all the five senses, including the distance 
senses, to locomotive animals. Thus the fact that the animal has the sensitive faculty does 
not guarantee that it is capable of locomotion towards an end without including the distance 
senses which present objects at a distance. Thus there remains the appetitive faculty as the 
most common and responsible faculty of locomotion. 
In consequence, Aristotle's treatment of the appetitive faculty in DA III. 9-10 as the 
sole source of locomotion should not be taken literally. The faculty as an individual faculty 
which excludes the lower faculties (cf 433a 22 ff) can be best regarded as a common 
222 However, this does not, of course, mean that for Aristotle all sorts of motions by ~mals inv~lve orexis. 
This account should be restricted to voluntary motions (h:o'\)O"io~ 1C1V"O"El<;). Aristotle enVIsages th~t 
nonvoluntary (OUX h:o'\)O"io~) motions, such as sleep, waking, etc. are not under the control of ph an taSlQ 
and orexis (.MA 703b 8-11). Nonetheless, he seems to allow in the DA and in the AlA that all sorts of 
locomotion are voluntary motions, though not the reverse. 
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faculty in every locomotion. And this faculty cannot be identified with the locomotive 
faculty because there are some animals that have the appetitive faculty, but that are not 
capable of locomotion for the sake of an end. That is, if the appetitive faculty were the 
locomotive faculty, then those that have it would be capable of the kind of locomotion 
Aristotle has in mind, i.e. locomotion for the sake of something. For Aristotle maintains 
that what has a certain capacity will be able to actualise it at some time. In other words, to 
say that something is never capable of actualising a certain capacity implies that it does not 
have the capacity in question, because to say that "this is capable of being but will not be" is 
not sound (see Met. l047b 3 if). Thus Aristotle's restriction of the locomotive faculty to 
some animals, but not to all animals, suggests that it must be different from the appetitive 
faculty. Finally, we need to note that the locomotive faculty cannot be treated as lower than 
the rational faculty at those times when the latter is a necessary condition for locomotion. 
On the other hand, the rational faculty appears higher than the locomotive faculty insofar as 
reason is only sometimes instrumentalised in relation to locomotion, whilst the rational life 
can also be seen as the end of a human being's locomotive efforts. 
Summary 
Our examination of the account of stationary animals in Aristotle's biological works has 
shown that he does not deny them all forms of locomotion, but ascribes to them some forms 
of internal bodily locomotion. Moreover, he also admits that they are capable of 
locomotion in space, i.e. moving from place to place, in a qualified sense. Thus stationary 
animals introduced in the DA as those that do not have the locomotive faculty, are non-, 
locomotive not in the sense that they are entirely deprived of each and every form of 
locomotion, but in the sense that they are incapable of the sort of locomotion that is 
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directed towards a specific end. Their locomotion is indeterminate and without an end 
because they do not have appropriate sense organs that allow them to represent an end at a 
distance. That is, their motion in space cannot be determinate without recognising an end at 
a distance. Aristotle also maintains that the reason for their lack of appropriate organs is 
that they do not have the faculty of the soul that will utilise such organs. However, such a 
faculty is not the sensitive faculty in virtue of which some animals have the contact senses 
and others have the distance senses in addition. But the sensitive faculty plays different 
roles in different classes of animals not in virtue of the faculty as such, but in virtue of the 
influence of the higher faculty that subsumes it. 
In concluding again that the locomotive faculty is not to be identified with the appetitive 
faculty, but must be different from it, we first have to note that any species of orexis alone 
cannot be the source of motion without involving such capacities as sense-perception, 
phantasia, or thought and, also, presupposing hypothetically necessary conditions such as 
nutrition and the contact senses. And, secondly, even if the appetitive faculty subsumes the 
lower faculties, it cannot explain why the locomotion of non-locomotive animals is without 
an end. If it were to be identified with the locomotive faculty, non-locomotive animals 
would be able to move from place to place for the sake of an end since Aristotle 
undoubtedly maintains that they also have the appetitive faculty, but are still incapable of 
such locomotion. Thus it appears that the locomotive faculty of the soul listed in DA II. 3 is 
not an illusory or misplaced concept, but a concept to which Aristotle wants to ascribe a 
special kind of sense of its own, as he does to other faculties. 
We have so far seen what locomotion is and what factors are involved in its arousal. 
However it is not sufficient on its own without a further discussion of the involvement of , 
phantasia since, as we shall presently see, Aristotle has no doubt that phantasia plays an 
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important role in the arousal of locomotion. It is now time for us to tum to enquire into its 
role and its significance in the account of locomotion. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PICTURE (2): 
THE ROLE OF PHANTASIA IN LOCOMOTION 
Aristotle at times appears (i) to emphasise a close relationship of phantasia with the 
arousal of orexis and to claim that the picture of animal locomotion cannot be completed 
without considering its involvement in it (DA 433b 28-30; MA 702a 17-19). It is, however, 
a matter of discussion whether we have to take his claim to mean (ii) that phantasia is a 
necessary condition for each and every animal locomotion without exception or (iii) that it 
plays a significant role in some types of locomotion, though is not indispensable for others. 
The present chapter examines which of these alternatives is implied in claim (i). 
There are two major difficulties in accepting (ii) as the right interpretation of (i). Firstly, 
Aristotle sometimes appears to acknowledge that there are some animals that do not have 
the capacity for phantasia and, secondly, he also appears to say on several occasions in MA 
chs. 6-7 that sense-perception and thought can individually arouse orexis without involving 
phantasia. If either of these appearances proves true, then what Aristotle really meant by 
(i) is (iii), whereas if both prove false, then it is (ii). Nussbaum, in her commentary on 
Aristotle's MA, discusses in detail the necessity of phantasia in animal locomotion and 
notes an intimate relation of sense-perception and thought to phantasia, which excludes the 
possibility that such cognitive capacities can arouse orexis without involving phantasia.
223 
Thus, she takes the right reading of (i) to be (ii). 
In the present chapter, I shall be concerned with two main questions: firstly, what is the 
role of phantasia in animal locomotion? and, secondly, is it always involved in the arousal 
223 Nussbaum (1978), esp. pp. 232-269. 
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of locomotion? As for the first, Nussbaum claims that the role of Aristotle's phantasia is to 
present an object as 'an object ofa certain sort', e.g. 'an object of five foot', 'an object that 
is red', or the like.224 However, for Aristotle, animal orexis is aroused, not because the 
animal sees an object at a distance, but because it sees it as something that is pleasant or 
painful. That is, once the animal perceives an object as pleasant, there arises orexis in the 
animal, which is followed by its immediate action. In Section 1, I shall thus argue that 
Nussbaum's characterisation of phantasia as 'an object of a certain sort' is not essentially 
wrong, but it needs a further specification as 'an object of pleasure or pain'. 
I shall, in Section 2, turn to argue that the reading of (i) must be (iii) rather than (ii); that 
IS, Aristotle does not think of phantasia as an absolutely necessary condition for 
locomotion, as opposed to Nussbaum's claim. I shall first examine Aristotle's occasional 
remarks that appear to deny phantasia to some animals such as the grub. This question is 
related once again to the role of ph ant asia in animal locomotion, i.e. presenting an object as 
pleasant or painful. If the grub has a capacity that plays this role, then it would be able to 
move although it does not have phantasia. Indeed, Aristotle at times appears to think that 
the animal can perceive things as pleasant or painful without involving phantasia 
particularly in the case of smelling. Although this is, if right, a sufficient ground to reject 
Nussbaum's claim, I shall further argue that he seems to apply the same idea to the case of 
thinking, i.e. human beings might think of an object as pleasant or painful or, rather, as good 
or bad, without involving phantasia. 
224 For references, see IV, 1 (c) below. 
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IV. 1 The Place of Phantasia in Locomotion 
As we saw earlier, in DA II. 3, Aristotle is concerned with making a list of the faculties 
and, also, with their relation to one another, i.e. the higher faculties subsuming the lower 
faculties. However, he is hesitant about including phantasia in the scheme and makes a 
promise to deal with it elsewhere (414b 14-15). The promise is kept in III. 3, where he 
treats it in comparison with other cognitive capacities. At the outset, he opens the chapter 
by speaking as if he were going to discuss both "distinctive peculiarities by reference to 
which we characterize the soul-(I) local movement and (2) thinking, understanding, and 
perceiving" (427a 18-20). However, the chapter is silent about (1), but focuses on (2) in 
relation to phantasia. As Wedin points out, in the chapter in question Aristotle "is not even 
talking about objects of the imagination but only about its occurrence relative to objects of 
perception".225 In the chapter, Aristotle seems to be interested in the common 
characteristics of phantasia in animal activities rather than its specific roles in each activity. 
Although in DA III. 10-11 and MA 6-8 he often emphasises the significance of its role in 
locomotion, it is not immediately clear what kind of role he ascribes to it. Thus the present 
section chiefly concerns the role of phantasia in locomotion. On the other hand, whether 
phantasia must be always involved in animal locomotion is not immediately clear. For 
Aristotle, on the one hand, says that there cannot be any locomotion without phantasia and 
he, on the other hand, also appears to say that it is not absolutely necessary. Thus the 
determination of this matter naturally involves enquiry into the role of phantasia in 
locomotion. Let us begin by examining some conflicting remarks on the place of phantasia 
in locomotion made in the DA and, in particular, in the MA. 
225 Wedin (1988), p. 26 (Italics are his emphasis). Cf. D. Frede (1992), p. 281. 
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(a) Some Conflicting Remarks concerning the Place of Phantasia in the MA 
Aristotle has made it clear throughout DA III. chs. 9-10 that there is a close link 
between orexis and locomotion. Thus he goes on to conclude DA III. 10 by saying, 
In general, therefore, as we have said, in so far as the animal is capable of orexis so far is it capable of 
moving itself; and it is not capable of orexis without phantasia. And all phantasia is either concerned with 
reasoning or perception. In the latter then the other animals share also. (433b 27-30. trans. Hamlyn)226 
Although the claim about orexis in the above passage is supported by his earlier discussion, 
it is undeniable that his emphasis on the significance of phantasia in locomotion is rather 
unexpected since Aristotle nowhere in the DA makes any detailed examination of the 
relation of phantasia to orexis or to locomotion. In the above passage, he introduces 
phantasia as a necessary condition for orexis, which is again a necessary condition for 
locomotion. The passage per se appears to suggest that every orexis, and so every 
locomotion, involves phantasia. 227 The same picture is suggested in the following MA 
passage: 
That is why it is pretty much at the same time that the creature thinks it should move forward and moves, 
unless something else impedes it. For the affections suitably prepare the organic parts, desire the affections, 
and phantasia the desire; and phantasia comes about either through thought or through sense-perception. 
(702a 15-19) 
226 I have replaced Hamlyn's 'desire' and 'imagination' with 'orexis' and 'phantasia', respectively. 
227 DA 432b 15-17 might be read in the same fashion. This passage initially appears to suggest that eith~r 
phantasia or orexis can have a direct relation to animal locomotion without involving each other. This 
seeming inconsistency, however, does not puzzle us here because in 111.9-10 Aristotle makes it clear ~at no 
locomotion can arise without involving orexis. That is, since for Aristotle all animals possess a certam type 
of orexis and no locomotion is possible without it, it is clear that phantasia alone without orexis cannot 
bring about the motion in question. Thus we should read the passage as "phantasia and orexis are 'jointly 
necessary, if not sufficient, conditions' for locomotion", as Nussbaum (1978, p. 221) does. The relevant 
passage in Greek is "aEi 'tE yap evEK:a 'to'\) it Ki VT)<H<; a:o'tl1, Kat 1\ }1E't<l q>av'taO"1.a<; 1\ 6PE~Ero<; EO"'tl v" . 
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Again, phantasia is said to be a necessary condition for orexis And . b' b 
. oreXIs nngs a out 
locomotion by means of preparing appropriate bodily parts that are necessary for the 
motion. Thus Aristotle calls orexis the proximate reason for locomotion (701a 34). What 
draws our special attention is that phantasia is introduced as coming from either thought or 
sense-perception. This claim appears consistent with Aristotle's statement elsewhere that 
makes a division of phantasia into the sensitive phantasia which belongs to all animals and 
the calculative phantasia which belongs only to rational beings (DA 433b 29-30; 434a 6-7). 
It thus appears that phantasia is always related either to sense-perception or thought in 
arousing orexis. In other words, orexis cannot be aroused either by sense-perception or 
thought without involving phantasia. 
However, there are other passages where Aristotle seems to acknowledge that sense-
perception or thought on its own can arouse orexis. That is, 'sense-perception and orexis' 
or 'thought and orexis', can arouse locomotion without involving phantasia. 
For whenever a creature is actually using sense-perception or phantasia or thought towards the thing for-
the-sake-of-which, he does at once what he desires. For the activity of the desire takes the place of 
questioning or thinking. "I have to drink," says appetite. "Here's drink," says sense-perception or 
phantasia or thought. At once he drinks. This, then, is the way that animals are impelled to move and act: 
the proximate reason for movement is desire, and this comes to be either through sense-perception or 
through phantasia and thought. 228 (A£4 701a 29-36.; cf. 70lb 16-17. Underlines are my emphasis.) 
Aristotle here appears to say that not only phantasia, but also sense-perception and thought 
can individually arouse orexis without necessarily involving one another. Thus the above 
passage seems to conflict with both passages (DA 433b 27-30 and MA 702a 15-19) cited 
228 This last paragraph might be read to suggest that orexis for an end comes about 'through sense-
perception or phantasia plus thought' (it Ot' ai(Jel)(JEro~ 11 OtU <pav'tacria~ Kal VOl)(JE~). However, 
reading it in that way hardly seems to be on a par with Aristotle's earlier remarks in the same passag~. 
That is if he said that it would weaken the force of the claim made in the passage. It thus seems that m , , . 
order for the passage to be consistent as a whole we have to replace Kai with ii oux or read it as 'or', as IS 
sometimes the case. 
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earlier in that it dismisses the absolute necessity of phantasia in locomotion. Moreover, it 
also conflicts with the later passage (702a 15-19) that seemed to suggest that phantasia 
always comes about through sense-perception or thought. 
On the other hand, although it is a matter of further discussion, the 'drink' example in 
the above passage (MA 701a 29-36) primarily suggests that the three psychological 
capacities are related to orexis as capacities for presenting an object, i.e. a drink. On one 
occasion in the MA, Aristotle makes an explicit remark on the role of phantasia by 
grouping it in the same class as other cognitive faculties. 
For both phantasia and sense-perception hold the same place as thought, since all are concerned with 
making distinctions-though they differ from each other in ways we have discussed elsewhere. (700b 19-
22) 
How are we supposed to understand Aristotle's characterisation of phantasia as a capacity 
for making distinctions? What kind of distinctions does he have in mind? Does he identify 
the role of presenting an object with the role of making a distinction? These questions will 
be immediately dealt with in the following section. 
(b) A General Account of Phantasia 
Aristotle's treatment of phantasia puzzles us in a number of respects. The puzzle 
begins with the translation of the Greek term 'q>ClVtClO"ia.'. It is sometimes translated 
imagination, but the modem term tends to mean a mental image, or an after-image, which 
excludes the immediate sensory data obtained from perceiving the external object in its 
presence. 229 Such a translation does not convey the full extension of Aristotle's usage of 
the Greek term. For one thing, Aristotle seems to allow that one can have phantasia not 
229 Modrak (1986), p. 47 n. 1.; Schofield (1979), p. 105. 
156 
only in the absence of an actual activity of sense-perception, but also in its presence (DA 
428b 26_29).230 In DA III. 3, he defines phantasia as 'that in virtue of which a phantasma 
arises in us' (428a 1-2) and, also, as a certain kind of movement (K1Vll(nc;) brought about as 
a result of the activity of sense-perception.231 
According to Schofield's etymological account, phantasma derives from the verb 
phantazo which "means 'make apparent', 'make show', 'present'" and thus the original 
meaning of phantasma suggests 'appearance' or 'presentation' "often with a strong 
implication of unreality. ,,232 He also says that phantasia which is associated with the verb 
phainesthai (to appear?33 also derives from the same verb phantazo.234 If a phantasma is 
an appearance, then, according to Aristotle's definition, phantasia is primarily the capacity 
to make such an appearance. 235 However, even if they are thus related to appearance, we 
should ask whether the appearance is 'a mere appearance (a phantom) or a real appearance 
(a phenomenon)'?236 
230 Cf. Nussbaum (1978), p. 223; Modrak (1987), p. 88; D. Frede (1992), p. 285. 
231 DA 428b 10-17; 429a 1-2; Somn. 459a 18-19. 
232 Schofield (1979), pp. 119-120. Cf. Modrak (1987), p. 82. According to Modrak, the ordinary usage of 
the term 'phantasma' primarily refers both to 'a purely mental representation' and to 'the appearance 
produced in a percipient by an external object'. See also D. Frede (1992), p. 280; Ross (1949), pp. 142-143. 
For more detailed discussion of the usage of phantasma, see Nussbaum (1978), pp. 241-255 and Modrak 
(1987), pp. 82-87. Both of them (Nussbaum, p. 244; Modrak, p. 84 n. 20) note that Plato uses phantasma to 
refer to a sensory appearance. 
233 Schofield (1979), p. 103. 
234 Schofield (1979), p. 105 n. 11. 
235 D. Frede (1992, p. 279) observes thatphantasia in Aristotle designates '(i) the capacity to experience an 
appearance, (ii) the on-going appearance itself, and (iii) what appears', i.e. 'the capacity, the activity or 
process, and the product or result', respectively. Cf. Hicks (1907), note on 428a 2; also, Rees' analysis 
(1971, p. 497 ff.) of the passages in DA III. 3. D. Frede (p. 280) also notes that 'in the case of phantasia 
Aristotle also often switches to phantasma to designate the product, and occasionally uses phantastikon for 
the capacity (432a 31)'. Cf. Nussbaum (1978, p. 222) thus comments that there is 'no canonical theory of 
phantasia in Aristotle'. On the contrary, in his extensive examinations of Aristotle's theory of phantasia, 
Wedin (1988, p. 23) strongly claims that DA III. 3 offers 'a systematic account of imagination proper' 
which he thinks can be legitimately called the 'canonical theory of imagination'. 
236 D. Frede (1992), p. 280. 
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In the DA, Aristotle at times appears to use phantasma to refer to a mental imagery or 
representation. 237 Also, his use of the term in such cases as dreaming and remembering 
seems primarily to be related to the role of mental representation. For the senses are at rest 
in sleeping and so what appears in one's dream must be a mental image, though it must be 
based on sensory impressions. And, unlike the senses with which we recognise what is 
present, "memory relates to what is past. No one would say that he remembers what is 
present, when it is present ... " (Mem. 449b 9 ff.). A 'past' phantasma, of course, implies 
the absence of the object it represents. 
The reading of phantasma as a mental representation appears suitable in remembering 
as well (e.g. Insomn. 458b 10 ff). It is conceivable that, for instance, a wolf might begin to 
move about from the recollection of a piece of meat left from last night's hunt (cf. Somn. 
456a 24-26). In this case, the distance senses are not immediately at work. In brief, 
Aristotle appears to maintain that memory or dream is not possible without the information 
initially obtained by the senses,238 but sense-perception is not necessarily at work in both 
cases (e.g. Mem. 449b 24 ff). Phantasia in such cases may preserve some, but not 
necessarily all, of the characteristics of the objects of perception, but it is, as Modrak claims, 
different from sense-perception in that (i) "it may represent an external object in a distorted 
fashion" or (ii) it may not represent it at all. 239 In brief, "Cl>«v"C«O't« need not be the 
immediate result of the stimulation of a sense organ by an external object; «to'911O't<; must 
237 E.g. 431a 17, b 2 if., 432a 8-9 etc. See Hicks (1907), note on 428a 1; Schofield (1979), p. 104; cf. 
Nussbaum (1978), pp. 222-223. 
238 Cf. Somn. 456a 25-26; Insomn. 461a 24 if.; Mem. 450a 26 if 
239 Modrak (1986), p. 52; cf. (1987), p. 82 if. From a similar point of view, Schofield (1979, p. 106; see 
also p. 115) regards phantasia as a distinct faculty of the soul in virtue of which we ap~rehend. 'non-
paradigmatic experiences' which he defines as 'experiences so diverse as drearn~ and the mterpretmg of 
indistinct or puzzling sense data, which may be held to resemble the paradigm of success~ sense 
perception in one way or another, yet patently lack one or more of it~ centr~ features, and so gI~'e ns~ to ~e 
sceptical, cautious or non-committal phainetai'. His argument IS a~amst those who c.onsl~er It as ,a 
comprehensive faculty in virtue of which we apprehend sensory and quaSI-sensory presentatlons m general 
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b,,240 I h ' 
e . t appears t at Modrak s characterisations of phantasia, (i) and (ii), are true of 
Aristotle's usage of the term. 
However, what about the case of a wolf starting to pursue a rabbit that runs across the 
field at a distance at this very moment? It is not cogent at all to say that the wolf is 
pursuing the rabbit at the moment because it recollects seeing it during the other night's 
hunt. It sees or smells the rabbit or hears its movement and it immediately begins to pursue. 
According to DA III. 3, 42Sb IS ff, Aristotle thinks that there can be the operation of 
phantasia even while actual perception is at work. Such cases as recollection and dreaming 
do not involve the operation of actual perception at the time of the animal's starting 
locomotion. Although, as mentioned, in recollection the animal employs the senses to direct 
itself to the place at which it aims, the senses are not necessarily related to the animal's 
initiating its motion. Thus Aristotle appears to conceive two cases of phantasia in relation 
to sense-perception: (i) phantasia that is at work in the presence of actual sense-perception 
and (ii) phantasia that is at work in its absence as in recollections and dreams. 
In placing sense-perception, phantasia, and thought on the same level (MA 700b 19-22 
cited above), Aristotle makes a backward reference to DA III. 3 where he compares the 
intrinsic features of phantasia, sense-perception, and the activities of thought. In a 
comparison of sense-perception with phantasia, he there conceives that sense-perception is 
always true because it "functions precisely with regard to its object" (42Sa 11_13),241 
whereas phantasia may be either true or false242 because "there may be some failure of 
accuracy in the exercise of phantasia" (4 2Sa 14). The function Aristotle has in mind seems 
to be the presentation of the external object, whereas the failure is the misrepresentation of 
240 Modrak (1986), p. 51. 
241 Cf. DA 418a 10 if.; 427b 11-12; 428b 18-19. 
242 428a 15; a 17-18; b 2-3. 
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it. He later on says that the presence of the object does not necessarily imply that phantasia 
will represent the object correctly. 
In DA II. 6, Aristotle distinguishes three kinds of objects, two of which are called 
objects per se (Ko.8' o.u'ta.) and one of which is called objects per accidens (Ka't<l 
0"'\)Jl~£~l1K6~). Objects per se are either those that are perceived by a single sense (i.e. 
proper sensibles) or those that are perceived by more than one sense (i. e. common 
sensibles). The latter include movement, number, figure, magnitude, etc. On the other 
hand, objects per accidens are those which are perceived as things or substances rather than 
as qualities. Aristotle gives an example of a white object which is seen as the son of Diares 
(418a 20-23). Seeing an object as white, for instance, is an object per se of sight. 
However, seeing an object as the son of Diares is an object per accidens of sight. For the 
white object might turn out to be a statue of Venus or a meaningless painting on the wall or 
the like. This indicates that Aristotle seems to rely on his conviction that the whiteness of 
an object, for example, will be seen as white to one's eyes without any error. That is, he 
has no doubt that when the senses perceive their objects per se, they will never or least of 
all make any mistake (see 428b 18-29 cited below). This view appears to lead him to think 
that since, for instance, seeing a white object as a black object cannot be the failure of 
sense-perception, there must be some other cognitive capacity that presents it as black. 
And the role of misrepresentation of an object is thus in general ascribed to phantasia?43 
This tendency appears more explicitly at DA III. 3, 428b 18-25. However, we need to 
note that there is a significant difference between that passage and Aristotle's account given 
in DA II. 6. 244 In II. 6, Aristotle treats common sensibles as the objects of touch, sight, and 
243 Cf. Ross (1949), pp. 142-143. 
244 Cf. Hicks's note on 428b 18. 
160 
the like, and appears to regard them as infallible. However, in III. 3 he claims that they are 
fallible. Aristotle's own words are as follows: 
Perception of the special objects245 of sense is never in error or admits the least possible amount of 
falsehood. Next comes perception that what is incidental to the objects of perception is incidental to them: 
in this case certainly we may be deceived; for while the perception that there is white before us cannot be 
false, the perception that what is white is this or that may be false. Third comes the perception of the 
common attributes which accompany the incidental objects to which the special sensibles attach (I mean 
e.g. of movement and magnitude); it is in respect of these that the greatest amount of sense-illusion is 
possible. The motion which is due to the activity of sense in these three modes of its exercise will differ the , 
first kind of derived motion is free from error while the sensation is present; the others may be erroneous 
whether it is present or absent, especially when the object of perception is far off. (428b 18-29) 
In the last paragraph, Aristotle claims that distance might be one of the factors which make 
the representation of phantasia erroneous. For example, phantasia is false when the figure 
which appears to be a woman from a distance proves to be a man on close examination, 
whereas it is true when the figure proves to be a woman even on close examination (428a 
14-15; cf. 'the sun example' at 428b 2 ff)?46 And he elsewhere says that an interval of time 
can also be one of such factors (Mem. 449b 24-30). However, although he regards such 
factors as reasons for the fallibility of phantasia, it is conceivable that they do not always 
make phantasia false. There might be the cases in which phantasia represents the objects 
at a distance as they really appear. On the contrary, even if the external objects at a close 
distance are present at the moment, it is also possible that phantasia might give 
misinformation about them. If so, the causal distance (which may be temporal or spatial) 
mayor may not make the misrepresentation of objects possible. However, in the above 
245 The Oxford translation of 'objects per se' . . . . 
246 In talking of truth or falsity of phantasia, we must not assume that ~t implies propOSItIOnal or ra~ona1 
judgements. As noted, for Aristotle such an activity is in virtue of the ratIonal faculty and there are arumals 
without reason (e.g. 410b 23-24; cf. 427b 15-16; 432a 10-11). For this rea~g, ~ee Turnbull (1994, 323) 
and Nussbaum's quotation (1978, p. 334) from 1. Cooper's unpublished paper, Aristotle on the Ontology of 
the Senses'. Cf. Rees (1971), esp. pp. 498-500. 
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passage Aristotle does not clearly tell us when the objects can be misrepresented. Thus it 
makes it difficult to determine on what occasions or by what criterion the objects per se 
would be perceived by the senses rightly other than Aristotle's own words that they would 
always or almost always appear as they are. 
We have talked about the presentation of objects. What do we mean by that? Let us 
first examine in what way sense-perception presents an object. In DA III. 2, Aristotle 
discusses a distinction made by sense-perception. He there talks of a distinction between 
sensible qualities, e.g. hot and cold, white and black, and the like. 
Each sense then is relative to its particular group of sensible qualities: it is found in a sense-organ as such 
and discriminates the differences which exist within that group; e.g. sight discriminates white and black, 
taste sweet and bitter, and so in all cases. Since we also discriminate white from sweet, and indeed each 
sensible quality from every other, with what do we perceive that they are different? it must be by sense; for 
what is before us is sensible objects. (426b 9 ff.; 431a 20-431b I) 
In virtue of sense-perception, the animal is capable of making a distinction between 
contraries. The contraries mentioned in the passage as the objects of sense-perception are 
sensible qualities. Different senses have different qualities as their objects; for instance, 
colours, e.g. white and black, are the objects of sight, whereas flavours, e.g. sweet and 
bitter, are the objects of taste. Each of the senses discriminates more than one set of 
different qualities (cf. 418a 14). In the above passage, Aristotle does not appear to think 
that the presentation of objects is the presentation of things or substances. In fact, he thinks 
that such a presentation belongs to common sensibles and so it is the operation of all the 
senses rather than a single sense (419a 18 ff.). Thus each sense individually presents a 
sensible quality to the animal by making a distinction between the contraries which are 
proper to each sense. 
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What about phantasia and thought? Does the animal make the same sort of distinction 
in virtue of them, as it does in virtue of sense-perception? And, if not, what sort of 
distinction does it make? To put the question differently, granting that phantasia and 
thought must be based on sensory experience, do they also present their objects as sweet or 
bitter or hot or cold? Aristotle deals with that question in DA III. 7-8 in an account of 
thought in terms of phantasma. 
Since it seems that there is nothing outside and separate in existence from sensible spatial magnitudes, the 
objects of thought are in the sensible forms, viz. both the abstract objects and all the states and affections of 
sensible things. Hence no one can learn or understand anything in the absence of sense, and when the mind 
is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware of it along with a phantasma; for phantasmata are like 
sensuous contents except in that they contain no matter. (432a 4-9) 
To say that phantasmata are 'without matter (1tA1}V liVE'\) UAll~)' is to say that they are 
abstractions of sensible qualities such as sweetness or bitterness. Considering Aristotle's 
statement that phantasia is 'that in virtue of which a phantasma arises in us,' it seems that 
phantasia is a capacity that presents such abstract qualities. However, what does it present 
them to? It seems that since the capacity for phantasia belongs also to irrational animals, 
phantasmata are not necessarily the objects of thought. Thus they might simply be the 
objects of phantasia and their abstractness need not be taken seriously other than as 
meaning that the objects in question are not present in reality. At any rate, it is clear that 
both phantasia and thought take as their objects the abstractions of sensible qualities. 247 
247 Cf. Ross (1961), notes on 432a 1-3 and on 432a 3-6. He, however, appears to distin~sh them in that 
thought also manipulates 'concepts which can be grasped by a higher degree of abstractIon, such as the 
concepts of the various moral virtues'. 
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(c) The Role of Phantasia in Locomotion 
Aristotle's view that sense-perception, phantasia, and thought are all related to the 
presentation of objects is implied at MA 701 b 16-19 where he says that they all bring about 
an alteration. However, unlike sense-perception, phantasia and thought do not presuppose 
the presence of the external object, and yet the objects they present produce an actual 
alteration in the body.248 We saw earlier that in rational animals, thinking of something does 
not always lead to action, but their action may be interrupted by the operation of irrational 
orexis (epithumia) (DA 433a 1-4). And yet, this does not mean that thought does not 
accompany emotions, e.g. fearful, pleasant, etc., that bring about bodily affections (427b 
21-24; MA 701b 19 ff.); it does. However, it is not clear whether Aristotle thinks that 
thought is always accompanied by emotions. On the other hand, as for phantasia, he says 
that "when we merely imagine we remain as unaffected as persons who are looking at a 
painting of some dreadful or encouraging scene" (DA 427b 23-24). 
On close examination of MA 702a 17-19 and comparing it with Aristotle's remarks on 
such feelings as pleasure and pain at DA 413b 22-24 and 414b 3-5, he seems to have in 
mind two types of affections, i. e. one in virtue of phantasia and the other of orexis or, in 
other words, one related to the arousal of orexis and the other to the arrangement of 
appropriate bodily parts for locomotion. He nowhere works it out explicitly. However, if 
this is right, it seems to give us another clue about why Aristotle thinks that non-locomotive 
animals are incapable of locomotion for the sake of an end, despite the fact that they are 
capable of phantasia and orexis. Locomotion requires certain affections to arrange 
appropriate bodily organs necessary for it. However, Aristotle might want to say that, apart 
from the fact that non-locomotive animals do not have the distance senses, their 
248 MA 701b 19 if.; cf. 703b 18-20; DA 429a 23-24. 
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indeterminate phantasia does not bring about the affections that are necessary for arranging 
the bodily organs for locomotion. If so, it seems that Aristotle ascribes a special role to 
phantasia in locomotion, which is different from its role in other types of motion. 249 
The question we are to ask at this stage is if orexis is the proximate reason (ahia) for 
locomotion (MA 701a 34-35), what is the proximate reason for orexis? In the DA III. 7, 
Aristotle explicitly tells us that the animal must have the capacity to recognise the object as 
good or bad so as to bring about orexis (that again arranges appropriate bodily parts for 
locomotion) (DA 431b 10-12; cf MA 702a 15-19). That is, seeing an object as good or bad 
is closely related to the question why animals move at all. However, the capacity for 
recognising objects as what is good or bad belongs only to rational beings. Thus irrational 
animals (that have only the capacity for sense-perception) perceive objects as pleasant or 
painful (DA 431b 2-9; cf 431a 8 ff).250 
There is no doubt that orexis is orexis for an object. Therefore, in the first instance, the 
animal must have the capacity to present an object as an object with some sensible qualities. 
But perceiving such qualities is not sufficient to motivate animals to move; in addition, the 
objects must be presented as pleasant or painful. However, it is not yet clear whether the 
two activities, i.e. perceiving the quality and recognising the object as pleasant or painful, 
are derived from two different capacities or from one and the same capacity. In 'the drink 
example' in anMA passage (701a 29-36) cited earlier, Aristotle regards the drink as an end, 
i.e. a for-the-sake-of-which, by which animals are motivated to move. However, it is not 
the case that they pursue the drink because it is a drink. It is, of course, undeniable that in 
order for them to move they must have a capacity to present an object to them. But they 
249 I thus concur with Modrak who thinks that Aristotle wants to assign some additional function to 
phantasia in the account of locomotion. However, I differ from her in characterisin~ its ~ctio~ as 'to 
focus desire on a particular object' (1986, p. 59 ff.; 1987, pp. 95-99). For a detailed diSCUSSIOn agamst her 
position, see below subsection (d). 
250 See below for a detailed discussion of these two passages. 
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must recognise it as worthwhile to pursue, i.e. as a desirable end that is pleasant, not simply 
as an object as such. 
What is the capacity that interprets an object as pleasant or painful? There are some 
indications that Aristotle might appear to associate with phantasia the interpretation of 
sensible qualities as involving the feelings of pleasure (it8oV'q) and pain (AU1tT)). The initial 
association ofphantasia with those feelings can be found at DA 413b 22-24 where Aristotle 
is concerned with the various faculties of the soul and their relations. There he makes a 
claim that sense-perception is accompanied by phantasia and orexis and then reiterates it by 
inserting pleasure and pain in the place of phantasia. The passage can thus be taken to 
suggest that Aristotle envisages a close connection between phantasia and such feelings. 
Also, the passage at 414b 3-6 appears to support that reading. In that passage, he does not 
even mention phantasia and appears to say that the presentation of an object as pleasant or 
painful is sufficient for the arousal of orexis. If we interpret the two passages in this way, 
we can also take Aristotle's remarks at DA 433b 28-29 and MA 702a 15-19 to imply the 
same thing. He there suggests, without mentioning pleasure or pain, that phantasia is the 
necessary condition for orexis, and so perception calls for phantasia which again calls for 
orexis. Thus if the animal is not capable of making a distinction between pleasure and pain 
in perceiving the external object, its orexis would not be brought about. It seems that 
phantasia emerges at this stage as a capacity that makes such a distinction. 
In effect since there is no direct evidence that supports the above argument, the , 
association of phantasia with the interpretation of an object as pleasant and painful to it 
appears to be circumstantial. However, I believe that that argument bears some strong 
points. There is no doubt that there must be the feelings of pleasure and pain in order for 
orexis to be aroused. As mentioned, orexis simply does not arise without those feelings. 
166 
Aristotle believes that it is not orexis itself that brings them about, but the other way 
around. However, this is not to say that phantasia is the only capacity that interprets an 
object as pleasant and painful. Indeed, there is no reason to think that Aristotle would 
allow only phantasia to play such a role and not other cognitive capacities such as sense-
perception and thought. If we can prove that either (or both) of them can play the role on 
its own, namely, the role of perceiving, or thinking of, an object as pleasant or painful, then 
we are entitled to conclude that it is wrong to say that it is only phantasia that arouses 
orexis. Again, if this reading is right, then Aristotle's placement of 'the feelings of pleasure 
and pain' and phantasia on the same level must be understood as entailing not only that 
phantasia is a capacity for such feelings, but also that sense-perception orland thought can 
play the same role. I have so far argued that the role of phantasia in locomotion is not to 
present an object merely as sweet or green or the like, but as pleasant or painful. 251 
However, it is still a matter of question whether Aristotle ascribes this role only to 
phantasia. If he does, then we are forced to accept Nussbaum's claim that it is an 
absolutely necessary condition for locomotion. Let us now tum to Nussbaum's position in 
more detail. 
(d) Nussbaum's Characterisation of Phantasia 
Nussbaum focuses on such passages as DA 432a 31 and Insomn. 459a 15 ff. (cf. 428b 
11-429a 2) where Aristotle emphasises a close connection between sense-perception and 
phantasia. At 459a 15 ff., for instance, Aristotle tells us thatphantasia is identical with the 
faculty of sense-perception, but different from that faculty in its being (einai). Nussbaum 
understands the passage as meaning "not that two activities are based on a single capacity 
251 Although phantasia may also represent the object as sweet or green etc., what is important is that it 
represents it as a pleasant or painful thing. 
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but that two capacities are the same, implying that activities traceable to the one could also, 
under some description, be traced to the other". 252 In this way, she goes on to conclude 
that phantasia in Aristotle means 'appearing' or 'seeing as' in contrast to 'images'; that is, 
she regards the role of phantasia as interpreting the sensory impressions. She understands 
sense-perception as that which presents an object and phantasia as that which interprets it 
and goes on to claim that phantasia must be involved in every animal locomotion. 
Nussbaum clearly notes that for the animal to be capable of locomotion it must have 
some capacities that present an object and, also, that interpret it as what is or is not 
desired. 253 However, she seems to think that the external object perceived by the senses is 
simply presented as an object which has no character of its own, whereas phantasia 
interprets its characters as x or y. Thus, by x or y Nussbaum means general sensible 
qualities. She thinks that characterising it as 'seeing an object as a thing of a certain sort' 
conveys the implication that the object is the object of pursuit or of avoidance. 254 However, 
her characterisation of phantasia is not quite clear enough to show the role Aristotle assigns 
to it. For the animal's seeing an object as 'an object of a certain size,255 does not explain 
why the animal should move in place. As repeatedly stressed, no locomotion would arise 
without the feeling of pleasure or pain. Again, for Aristotle orexis is orexis for something 
pleasant. In other words, the animal's orexis is not aroused by its seeing an object as 
merely an object three inches long or a red object or the like, but by seeing it as an object of 
pleasure or pain. Perceiving sensible qualities without involving such a feeling does not lead 
the animal to locomotion. Thus in order for the animal to pursue what is pleasant and to 
avoid what is painful, it must have some capacity that presents an object as pleasant or 
252 Nussbaum (1978), p. 235. 
253 Nussbaum (1978), p. 232; see also, (1983), p. 137. 
254 Nussbaum (1978), p. 246. 
255 Nussbaum (1978), p. 249. 
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painful. Thus we have to characterise the role of phantasia as the awareness of an object 
not simply as a thing of a certain sort, but, more specifically, as a thing of a pleasant or 
painful sort, as argued in the previous section. 
As noted, Nussbaum's characterisation of phantasia is to distinguish its role from that 
of sense-perception so that she can go on to claim that the animal must have both capacities 
in bringing about locomotion. In this way, she claims that phantasia is an absolutely 
necessary condition for locomotion. Supposing that the role of phantasia is to interpret an 
b" hi f I " 256 o ~ect as a t ng 0 a peasant or pamful sort, her argument seems to go as follows: 
firstly, when sense-perception is at work, it presents an object to orexis. However, it 'is, by 
itself, insufficient to present the object in such a way that the animal is moved to act'. 257 
Thus, there must be something that interprets it as pleasant or painful. In the animal that is 
capable both of sense-perception and phantasia, if the role of sense-perception is to present 
the sensible qualities of an object as such, it seems that it is phantasia that interprets the 
object as pleasant or painful. On the other hand, when sense-perception is not at work, 
phantasia in locomotion cannot merely present an object without also interpreting it as 
pleasant or painful. Thus it does a double job.258 
However, it is to be noted that, however plausible Nussbaum's argument may sound, it 
is made at the expense of two important points. Firstly, it contradicts Aristotle's denial of 
phantasia to some locomotive animals. 259 If he does indeed deny this, then it is plain that 
phantasia is not absolutely necessary to arouse orexis and so locomotion for the obvious 
reason that such animals only have sense-perception without phantasia and are still 
locomotive. Secondly, as a result, it also rejects the possibility that Aristotle might have 
256 As noted, Nussbaum does not construe phantasia in this way. 
257 Nussbaum (1978), p. 256. 
258 Nussbaum (1978), pp. 259-260. 
259 Cf. Nussbaum (1978), p. 236 
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envisaged that sense-perception orland thought might arouse orexis without involving 
phantasia. These points will be discussed in Section 2. For the moment, let us examine 
Modrak's discussion of phantasia. 
(d) Modrak's Characterisation of Phantasia 
Modrak has suggested that the role of phantasia in locomotion is to enable the agent to 
select 'with respect to an object of satisfaction' .260 She refers to the A1A passage that reads 
as follows: 
1 need covering; a cloak is a covering. 1 need a cloak. What 1 need, 1 have to make; 1 need a cloak. 1 have 
to make a cloak. And the conclusion, the "I have to make a cloak," is an action. And he acts from a 
starting-point. If there is to be a cloak, there must necessarily be this first, and if this, this. And this he 
does at once. (701a 17-22) 
All animals need to make a distinction between what is pleasant and what is not and so they 
give up' what is painful and go for what is pleasant. Thus, before animals decide to pursue 
what is pleasant in virtue of the appetitive faculty, there should be something that 
discriminates what is pleasant from what is not. It does not matter at this stage whether the 
'something' is a capacity to interpret the object wrongly or not, since once animals realise 
that they were deceived by a false, or wrong, presentation and so they were pursuing 
something which is indeed painful, they will immediately stop pursuing it. 
Modrak argues that there is still something missing, i.e. something that makes animals 
go for this one, but not for that one. The example given in the above passage is a rational 
choice made by human beings. And yet it is to be noted that it is a choice between what is 
good or bad (or what is pleasant or painful), but not between things that are equally good or 
260 Modrak (1987), p. 96. 
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pleasant. The process involved in the decision to make a cloak starts from one's need for a 
covering. I feel cold, I need to wear something to make myself warm, a cloak is such a 
something, and therefore I have to make a cloak. In this account, reasoning seems to be 
involved, i.e. choosing a cloak. However, the process between my feeling cold and the 
decision to wear something might be rephrased as follows: I feel cold, feeling cold is 
painful, and, therefore, I need something warm. The last stage of this process "I need 
something warm" is the choice of avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure. Thus the phrase 
"what I need, I have to make" needs to be understood as meaning "what I feel to be 
pleasant, I pursue". However, it is doubtful that Aristotle thought that it was necessary to 
consider the question why animals go for what is pleasant. When I feel pleasant about 
something, the decision to pursue it is already made. I do not have to think again that this 
pleasant thing will be pleasant. In effect, it does not matter whether a cloak or another kind 
of garment is warmer, in so far as I can avoid the feeling of pain, i.e. feeling cold. 
If the pronoun'!' confuses us, then let us take an example of a wolf. A wolf feels cold, 
feeling cold is painful to it, warming is pleasant, and so, it desires to be somewhere warm. 
We do not have to think that there is any reasoning involved in this process since a wolf is, 
of course, not rational. It does not matter whether the warm place is a cave or a deserted 
house in a mountain. The wolf s orexis does not hesitate to make a choice between them. 
Modrak, however, appears to think that it does. 
Phantasia seems to focus desire on a particular object in a way in which neither perception nor thought 
does. Phantasia provides the "something else" that explains the agent's choice. Suppose a hungry animal 
is looking for food and discovers two edible fruits, either of which, if eaten, would satisfy her desire. She 
chooses one of them and eats it. While it is certainly true that she would not have eaten the fruit had she 
not seen it or had she not been hungry, the piece of fruit she chooses is not uniquely determined by these 
factors. For some reason, a particular piece of fruit appealed to her more than any other. Perhaps certain 
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features of its appearance called up especially pleasurable sensations; perhaps its scent produced an 
intrinsically pleasant perception of sweet nectar (cf. E.N. 1174b 15-1175a 1).261 
Modrak clearly notes that animal's locomotion is directed to a pleasant object. She thus 
says elsewhere that "To move an animal, desire must be aroused and focused on a particular 
object",262 but she ascribes to phantasia the unique role of focusing animal's attention on 
the object. This seems to be the reason for her claim that phantasia is involved in animal's 
selection or choice between two pleasant objects. 
We have to attend to the fact that Modrak is concerned with two pleasant or good 
objects. Thus, for her the capacity for making a selection arises as a problem. However, 
we have to ask whether such a capacity can be a problem for Aristotle in his account of 
anima/locomotion as a whole. As may be well be noted, in EN III. 3 Aristotle makes it 
clear that he does not wish to ascribe the capacity for choice to irrational animals (1111 b 12 
ff.) nor to children (cf 1111a 26-b 10). Moreover, Aristotle's discussion of choice in the 
chapter concerns either what is good or what is bad (1112a 3 ff.). Modrak's discussion of 
the capacity for 'selection' cannot be identified with Aristotle's 'choice'. For she ascribes 
the capacity also to irrational animals and her 'selection' seems to be a selection between 
two pleasant objects. Strictly speaking, for Aristotle, the animal's pursuing what is pleasant 
and avoiding what is painful is due to its capacity for making a distinction, rather than, a 
selection. To Modrak's question why a hungry animal selects this fruit rather than that one, 
Aristotle would answer that this fruit appears pleasant to the animal, whereas that one 
appears unpleasant or painful. Again, for Aristotle there seems to be no question about why 
the animal selects this fruit rather than that one despite the fact that both appear pleasant 
261 Modrak (1987), pp. 96-97; cf. (1986), p. 59. 
262 Modrak (1986), p. 59. 
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nor does there seem to be the question about why the animal feels more pleasant about this 
fruit and less pleasant about that one. 263 
Modrak's worry is, as shown in the passage cited above, that the relation between 
phantasia and orexis does not seem to explain the reason for orexis focusing on a particular 
object. Thus she thinks it necessary for the animal to have some capacity that inspires 'the 
animal's desire and channels it in a particular direction'. 264 She is thus led to think that 
phantasia plays that role of focusing orexis on a particular object as well as the role of 
providing the information about the object. However, for Aristotle 'the particular direction' 
is ascribed to the nature of orexis itself and it does not require any other capacity in leading 
the animal to a particular object. Unfortunately, he does not explain why or how, but he 
rather simply thinks that animals either pursue or avoid according to whether objects are 
presented as pleasant or painful, respectively. For Aristotle orexis simply pursues what 
appears pleasant to it when the distinction is made by other cognitive faculties (cf. 414b 6). 
He hardly seems to think that orexis would hesitate to choose what is pleasant or what is 
not. Indeed, for Aristotle to ask why orexis pursues what is pleasant, but not what is 
painful, is to ask why "Nature never makes anything without a purpose and never leaves out 
what is necessary" (432b 21-22) or why "Nature does nothing in vain" (434a 30). 
However since for him all animals that exist by Nature pursue "what is the best and the end , 
265 hink . t of the things that lead up to it" (Ph. 195a 23-25), he does not t It necessary 0 
question why it does that way. Aristotle would say that orexis pursues 'by Nature' what is 
. 1 f h . 1266 pleasant and ensures the survlva 0 t e aruma. 
263 In effect, if two objects are equally pleasant, the choice is indifferent and, if they are not, it is obvious 
which of them the animal will choose. Thus this seems to be a pseudo-problem. 
264 Modrak (1986), p. 59. 
265 Cf. DA 434a 31-32;.M4 700b 24 ff. 
266 Cf. Charles (1984), p. 86 ff. 
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IV. 2 Sense-perception and Thought without Phantasia 
Just as the difference between plants and animals is due to the former possessing the 
nutritive faculty of the soul only and the latter possessing an additional capacity (i.e. the 
capacity for sense-perception), it is clear that for Aristotle the difference between what is 
locomotive and what is not must be due to a psychological faculty they possess. We saw in 
the preceding chapter that although two types of animals are said to have the sensitive 
faculty, Aristotle indeed attributes two different types of capacy to them. That is, the 
sensitive faculty of locomotive animals entails the capacity for smelling, hearing, and seeing, 
whereas that of non-locomotive animals does not. Although the possession of the 
appetitive faculty is also closely related to the capacity for locomotion, it is not a decisive 
faculty for locomotion since the animals which do not move also have the faculty. We also 
saw that there are two different classes of animals that have different capacities in virtue of 
the same sort of faculty because one of them has a higher faculty that the other does not. 
F or instance, the lower faculties that are subsumed under the locomotive faculty tend to be 
geared in the way in which the locomotive faculty is best actualised (so that the animal 
maintains its life). In the same way, we might also expect that phantasia in different classes 
of animals might play different roles according to whether the animals have the locomotive 
faculty or not. With reference to phantasia, we are chiefly concerned with two questions: 
firstly, whether all the animals, i.e. non-locomotive animals as well as locomotive animals, 
possess it and, secondly, whether it is involved in every locomotion. We now tum to 
examine Aristotle's notorious statements in which he appears to say that some animals do 
not have phantasia. 
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(a) Aristotle's Denial of Phantasia to Some Locomotive Animals 
Aristotle's introduction of two types of phantasia, i.e. the sensitive (aicr911tt1(1l) 
phantasia and the calculative or deliberative (AOYlcr'tt 1(11) phantasia, appear rather abruptly 
at DA III. 10, 433b 29-30 without any previous discussion. He gives an account of them in 
the subsequent chapter as follows: 
Ph an tasi a concerned with perception, as we have said, is found in other animals also, but that concerned 
with deliberation in those which are capable of reasoning (for the decision whether to do this or that is 
already a task for reasoning ... ) (434a 6-8. trans. Hamlyn) 
Aristotle here appears to ascribe the sensitive phantasia to whatever is capable of sense-
perception and the calculative phantasia to rational beings (433b 29-30; 434a 6-7). Thus, 
unlike Hamlyn, the Oxford edition goes on to translate as 'all animals' '&AA01<; S<P01<;' in 
the above passage quoted and 'aAACJ. stpa' at 433b 29-30. However, in accepting the 
translation as it stands we have to consider a couple of points implied in it: firstly, it implies 
that the sensitive phantasia belongs also to non-locomotive animals. However, considering 
that Aristotle ascribes them the indeterminate phantasia,267 we first need to determine 
whether the sensitive and the indeterminate are one and the same phantasia or different 
from each other. And, secondly, the translation appears to rule out the possibility that 
Aristotle might have acknowledged the existence of some animals that do not have 
phantasia. Is this right? We shall at once turn to consider whether the implications are 
just. 
Aristotle at times appears to deny the capacity for phantasia to a certain class of 
locomotive animals. The discussion of this matter is crucial because, if it proves true, it will 
be the primary ground for rejecting not only the Oxford translation but also Nussbaum's 
267 See Ch. III. Sec. 2 (b). 
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thesis that phantasia is always involved in locomotl·on.268 L et us read one of the passages 
that might be taken to deliver such a message. 
Lastly, certain living beings-a small minority-possess calculation and thought, for (among mortal 
beings) those which possess calculation have all the other powers above mentioned, while the converse does 
not hold-indeed (1) some live by phantasia alone, while (2) others have not evenphantasia. (415a 8-1l. 
Numbers are mine.) 
Since Aristotle is here concerned with rational beings in contrast to irrational beings, it is 
expected that he is making the same sort of contrast in (1) and (2). If so, since the criterion 
of distinguishing the former from the latter is whether they have rational capacities, the 
phantasia in both cases should be the calculative phantasia. 269 Then, the 'others' in (2) is 
irrational animals and the paragraph means that "there are other animals that do not have 
the calculative phantasia". However, the 'alone (JlOVU)' in (1) raises a difficulty in 
maintaining such an interpretation. (1) is surely an exaggeration for Aristotle maintains that 
if something is to be alive, it must have, at least, one faculty which enables it to be alive. 
That is, as we saw earlier, whatever has life must have the capacity for nutrition which is the 
primary condition for life. And, if something is to be an animal it must also have the 
capacity for sense-perception in addition. On the other hand, if anything has a higher 
faculty, then it must also have the lower faculties since Aristotle maintains that the higher 
faculty subsumes the lower faculties (Ch. III. 1 (a)). Thus it is an impossibility that there 
should be animals that have phantasia only without also, at least, having the capacity for 
nutrition, the primary sense of touch, and so on. If so, the animals in (1) are irrational 
animals and, most likely, non-locomotive animals that have those primary capacities, rather 
268 Nussbaum (1978), pp. 232-269. . 
269 Nussbaum (1978, p. 236), following Ross (1961, note on 413b 33), contends that Fhtharta ~nshable 
beings) "may well include plants, so the statement cannot be taken as evidence that Aristotle beheved there 
are animals that lack phantasia". 
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than rational animals, as opposed to our initial assumption above. For if they are rational 
animals, then it is difficult to see what the 'alone' means, even if we allow that Aristotle 
there presupposes the primary capacities. That is, again, if they are rational animals and so 
the phantasia in (1) refers to the calculative phantasia, then (1) does not make any sense 
because for Aristotle there can be no rational animals that have the calculative phantasia 
without the sensitive phantasia. When we use the word 'alone', we tend to ask 'without 
what or who?', i.e. 'phantasia alone without what?' The calculative phantasia alone 
without the sensitive phantasia cannot be present in Aristotle's terms (see e.g. 434a 2-5) 
because there cannot be the rational faculty without subsuming other lower faculties and so 
there cannot be the calculative phantasia without the sensitive phantasia. 
Thus the sensitive phantasia alone without the calculative phantasia does read better 
and seems perfectly reasonable since, as noted, there are animals which do not have the 
latter without the former. Granting that in (1) Aristotle refers to those animals that do not 
have the calculative phantasia, (1) reads that "there are animals that have the sensitive 
faculty without the calculative faculty also", whereas (2) is construed as saying that "others 
do not even have the sensitive phantasia" . If Aristotle maintained that there cannot be any 
animals without the sensitive phantasia, then this interpretation would not be a reasonable 
alternative. And both statements would be regarded as miswritten or, at any rate, would 
remain mysterious. However, as we shall see shortly, since he allows those animals that do 
not have the sensitive phantasia, the interpretation of the phantasia both in (1) and (2) as 
the sensitive phantasia does not seem to give us any trouble. 
There is another passage that presents an explicit denial of the ascription of phantasia to 
some animals. Aristotle in III. 3 writes, 
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If actual phantasia and actual sensation were the same, phantasia would be found in all the brutes: this is 
held not to be the case; e.g. it is not found in ants or bees or grubs. (428a 9-11. Italics are my emphasis) 
There is controversy concerning how to read the last paragraph about the examples of the 
animals that do not have phantasia. Some read it as ',.l'OPllllKt llEV 11 llEA1."C"Cll, O"KWAllKt 8' 
" ,270 h th d h b 271 . OU, w ereas 0 ers 0 as tea ove passage. Hicks, on the other hand, takes Aristotle 
to deny phantasia to all the examples mentioned, but goes on to argue that he is denying to 
the insects "not any and every kind of phantasia, but phantasia as the developed faculty 
hi h h . h ki d fi ,,272 W C e IS ere see ng to e ne. He seems to regard the examples given in the above 
passage as the 'imperfect animals' to which Aristotle ascribes a vague sort of phantasia in 
DA III. 11. If so, he is wrong because the above examples are not non-locomotive animals; 
some, if not all, of them are no doubt locomotive animals. F or instance, since a bee has 
eyes, i.e. a distance sense, (see PA 683a 29-30) and, also, orexis, it is capable oflocomotion 
towards an end at a distance. Thus it hardly seems plausible to regard all the insects in the 
above passage as the non-locomotive animals dealt with in DA III. 11. 
On the other hand, referring to 433b 31-434a 10, Ross comments that Aristotle ascribes 
to all animals the sensitive phantasia,273 but, nonetheless, he seems to say that Aristotle 
would deny phantasia to grubs 'which he recognizes as answering to eggs' ?74 There is 
some evidence that indicates that Aristotle grants phantasia to the bee.275 However, we do 
not have any direct textual evidence that enables us to refute the literal reading of the denial 
of phantasia to the ant. Aristotle at times seems to classify the ant in the same group as the 
270 Cited from Hamlyn (1993, p. 54). Hamlyn, Ross (1961, note on 428a 11), Nussb~um (19;8, p. 236), 
and Schofield (1979, n. 35) accept this reading, i.e. 'it is found in ants and bees, but not m grubs. 
271 E.g. the Oxford translation and Hett (1957). 
272 Hicks's note on 428a 10; also, on 415a 10 and 434a 1. I have replaced Hick's imagination with 
ph an tasia. 
273 Cf. Ross (1961), note on 413b 22-23. 
274 Ross (1961), note on 428a 11. . . . 
275 Read Met. 980a 28-980b 25 where he ascribes the capacIty for memory to the bee m relatIOn to Mem. 
451a 15 ff. where he defines the capacity as 'the having of phantasm a'. 
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bee (e.g. PA 650b 24-27; 683a 3-7), though there is a difference between the two (678bI4-
18).276 It' I h h 
IS not c ear w et er we have to accept the ant as being as intelligent as the bee 
and so as capable of memory which entails the capacity for phantasia. 
If we follow Hicks's reading, then the phantasia denied to some locomotive animals 
need not be the sensitive phantasia, but the calculative phantasia. On the other hand if we 
, 
follow Ross's reading, then whether both types of phantasia can be denied to some 
locomotive animals depend on the status of grubs. In effect, as stated, Ross seems to 
understand grubs as motionless eggs that might have the primitive internal bodily 
locomotion (cf. 665b 2-5). But he does not seem to have in mind the primitive type of 
locomotion, i. e. motion in space without an end, which Aristotle ascribes to non-locomotive 
animals. Ross gives references to HA 489b 12-13 and GA 733a 1-2 in which Aristotle 
introduces grubs in comparison with eggs. However, even if it were true that Aristotle 
denies phantasia to 'all' the grubs, he would not agree that they are as motionless as eggs. 
For he admits that some grubs are capable of locomotion. At HA 489b 16-17, Aristotle 
explicitly notes that "Of the grubs, some are from the first capable of movement, others are 
motionless." Furthermore, in HA V. 19 where he is chiefly concerned with grubs, he also 
says that even the same grub might be capable of locomotion at one stage, but not at 
another stage, namely, the grub in the stage of a pupa is motionless (551b 1-5). It thus 
seems that the denial of phantasia to the grub has nothing to do with whether it is capable 
of locomotion or not. If so, since phantasia is denied to some locomotive animals, i. e. 
locomotive grubs, it then seems to follow that Nussbaum's thesis that Aristotle appears to 
imply that phantasia is an absolutely necessary condition for locomotion is not acceptable. 
Her argument is, primarily, based on such passages at DA 432b 15 and 433b 26-30 where 
276 Cf. Schofield (1979), nn. 35, 55; Hicks's note on 428a 10. 
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Aristotle appears to emphasise the involvement of phantasia in locomotion. Thus, rejecting 
Nussbaum's thesis will naturally raise a doubt about the credibility of those passages. 
Although it is not yet clear at this stage why Aristotle thinks that some locomotive animals 
are capable of locomotion without phantasia, his denial of phantasia to them appears 
unquestionable and so it strongly suggests that it is possible for some animals to be 
locomotive without it. Our discussion so far has shown that, although Aristotle at times 
appears to claim that phantasia is common to all animals in so far as they have the capacity 
for sense-perception and that every locomotion requires the involvement of it, he still leaves 
room for the possibility that such claims are not exceptionless.277 
We still have to consider another reading of 'the grub example' passage. Hicks's 
translation is, as shown, not acceptable since it leads us to think that Aristotle would allow 
that the bee can start its locomotion from its memory, i.e. from the operation of phantasia. 
For, granting that the ant is also capable of memory, it will also have phantasia. Moreover, 
it is clear that both types of insects have eyes and therefore for Aristotle they must be 
capable of locomotion for the sake of an end. On the other hand, considering that he 
elsewhere tells us that some animals do not have the capacity for memory, though without 
specific examples (Mem. 450a 14 if.; Met. 980a 28-29), it is still conceivable that he is 
thinking of some animals that do not have the capacity for phantasia. However, this is not 
any decisive evidence that supports the claim that Aristotle denies phantasia to some 
locomotive animals. The immediate evidence is rather the grub that hardly seems to have 
eyes or any other distance senses, but is, nonetheless, locomotive. 
277 Hicks (note on 415a 10) supplies other passages that suggest Aristotle's denial, of ~h,antasia t~ some 
animals. He writes, " ... cf. 428a 21 'trov Of 811pirov OU8EV1. {>1tapxEl. 1ti<J't1.~, <p<XV't<X.(H<X 0 EV 1tOAA01.~: ~d 
ib. 23 'trov Of 811Pirov £vi01.~ <p<xv't<xoi<x ).LfV {)1tapxEl., where Evi01.~ and 1tOAAOi<; Imply that <p<xv't<xo1.<x 1.S 
not universally found. This is true, in so far as the term '<p<xv't<x~i~' is Ymited .to p~rce~ts rem:ned. B~t It 
is not in this sense of rpavca(Yia that (in 433a 11 sq. and 434a 4) It IS Sald to be Imphed m all at(y(jT/(Yu;. 
180 
Aristotle's examples of stationary animals at GA 715b 17-20 include not only the 
testaceans, but also some other animals that he does not clearly exemplify. It is not clear 
whether he would include the grub into the group since the grub is not a stationary animal 
that lives by clinging to the external object. However, since it does not have the distance 
senses, it seems that its locomotion must be indeterminate. If so, it is one type of non-
locomotive animals and it must have, at least, the indeterminate or vague type of phantasia, 
according to DA III. 11. To recapitulate, Aristotle in the chapter claims that non-
locomotive animals have the indeterminate phantasia because of their incapacity for 
determinate locomotion. We, on the other hand, saw that the indeterminacy of their motion 
explains their lack of distance senses. But it is not yet excluded that the grub might have 
the phantasia that works jointly with the capacity for sense-perception, i.e. the sense of 
touch, to arouse orexis. However, since it lacks the distance senses, it cannot fix its aim on 
a particular object. If so, the phantasia denied to the grub is primarily the one that is 
combined with the distance senses that allows the animal to move towards a specific end 
that is at a distance. It then follows that Aristotle might have distinguished the 
indeterminate phantasia from the sensitive phantasia, when he denies the latter to the grub 
that is incapable of determinate locomotion. Thus, according to this reading, the thesis that 
phantasia is always necessary in the arousal of locomotion is not necessarily rejected by 
Aristotle's denial of phantasia to the grub. We need to specify what kind of phantasia is 
denied to it: it is the sensitive phantasia (not to mention the calculative phantasia) that is 
associated with the distance senses that allow the animal to perceive objects at a distance. 
Lacking the appropriate sense organs, the grub's phantasia does not represent an object at 
a distance and does not move towards that very object. Once again, according to this 
reading, Aristotle's denial of phantasia to the grub does not necessarily dismiss the thesis 
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that phantasia is always involved in the arousal of locomotion. The rejection of the thesis 
can still be approached by the examination of sense-perception orland thought that directly 
represent an object as a thing of pleasure or pain. In effect, the following discussion of the 
case of smelling can be presented as such a rejection. 
(b) Sense-perception without phantasia 
At this stage, we need to recall our earlier discussion of the senses. Aristotle thinks of 
the sense of touch as primary in the sense that it is the sense for food (414b 6-9). On the 
other hand, the distance senses (seeing, smelling, and hearing) are not directly related to 
nutriment (414b 9-10), although they certainly have something to do with obtaining food 
(cf. Sens. 436b 19-437a 3; 441b 24 ff). Since those animals that do not have them can still 
survive and so they are not absolutely necessary for their survival, Aristotle says that they 
are for well-being rather than being. However, he again says that the distance senses 
necessarily belong to the animals that are capable of motion in space (DA 434b 23-27); that 
is, the distance senses are necessary for their survival given that they move in space. All the 
five senses including the contact senses have the distinction-making capacity in common. 
For example, touch makes a distinction between different tactile qualities (418a 14-18), 
sight, between various colours (418a 26 ff.), hearing, between what is flat and what is sharp 
(420a 26 if.), and the like. 
On one occassion in the DA, Aristotle makes an analogy between such an activity of the 
senses and the activity of thinking. He says, 
To perceive then is like bare asserting or thinking; but when the object is pleasant or painfuL the soul makes 
a sort of affirmation or negation, and pursues or avoids the object. To feel pleasure or pain is to act with the 
sensitive mean towards what is good or bad as such. Both avoidance and appetite when actual are identical 
182 
with this: the faculty of appetite and avoidance are not different either fro th fr 
, m one ano er or om the faculty 
of sense-perception; but their being is different. (431a 8-14; cf. 414b Iff.) 
It is obvious that before orexis is evoked, there must be something that recognises the 
object as either pleasant or painful. Since orexis is of what is pleasant (414b 6) the animal 
with orexis pursues pleasure and avoids pain. The above passage reads as if sense-
perception is that which distinguishes the object as pleasant or painful and there is no 
mention of phantasia. Aristotle here suggests three activities in the process leading to 
locomotion: (i) feeling pleasure or pain, (ii) making a sort of affirmation or negation, and 
(iii) pursuing or avoiding. The last activity is clearly ascribed to orexis. As for the first two 
activities, Aristotle appears to say that they are one and the same activity, e.g. feeling 
pleasant is itself making a sort of affirmation. It seems that if the capacity for (i) is ascribed 
to sense-perception, it would appear that sense-perception can at once arouse orexis, and so 
locomotion,· without necessarily involving phantasia. For instance, if, when a dog sees 
something, it sees it as a white or black thing and, also, as a pleasant or painful thing, then 
the involvement of phantasia in locomotion does not appear to be absolutely necessary. 
Aristotle does seem to maintain this view in the case of smelling. 
Now let us examine the case in detail. Primarily, saying that phantasia works when 
animals are not perceiving with their senses suggests that there is no reason to think that 
phantasia is always working together with sense-perception in perceiving an object as 
pleasant or painful (4 28a 5 ff.). The following discussion will show that this is an idea 
Aristotle himself maintains. He says that "the distinguishing characteristic of smell is less 
obvious than those of sound or colour" (421a 8-9) or taste (a 30-b 2) for the reason that 
human beings have a limited capacity for distinguishing smell, a capacity which is inferior to 
that of other animals (421a 9-26). That there is a difficulty in defining the objects of smell is 
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a worrying matter for Aristotle because without being able to define the objects, it will be 
also difficult to define the sense organ by which we perceive them.278 However, he finds a 
way to resolve the problem by making an analogy of the objects of smell with those of taste. 
He thinks that smell and taste might have objects that can be called by the same name in 
virtue of the same sort of quality, namely, the objects of both may be called sweet, pungent, 
acid, etc.279 In Sens. ch. 5, Aristotle makes a division of odours into those that are pleasant 
or unpleasant per se and those that are pleasant or unpleasant per accidens. He writes, 
One class of odours, then, is that which runs parallel, as has been observed, to savours: to odours of this 
class their pleasantness or unpleasantness belongs incidentally. For owing to the fact that savours are 
qualities of nutrient matter, the odours connected with these are agreeable as long as animals have an 
appetite for the food... The other class of odours consists of those agreeable in their essential nature, e.g. 
those of flowers. For these do not in any degree stimulate animals to food, nor do they contribute in any 
way to appetite; their effect upon it, if any, is rather the opposite. . .. Of this species of odour man alone is 
sensible; the other, viz. that correlated with tastes, is, as has been said before, perceptible also to the other 
animals. And odours of the latter sort, since their pleasureableness depends upon taste, are divided into as 
many species as there are different tastes; but we cannot go on to say this of the former kind of odour, since 
its nature is agreeable or disagreeable per se. (443b 19-444a 8) 
Let us first have a look at the second class of odours. These odours are pleasant or painful 
per se without reference to the state of the perceiver. In other words, whether the perceiver 
feels hungry or not, it perceives the objects as pleasant or unpleasant, or painful. Thus they 
are not directly related to the nutriment of animals. For instance, the perceiver comes to 
have a feeling of pleasure from smelling the odours of a rose, not because there is some 
other capacity such as phantasia, but because the odours themselves are pleasant. This 
kind of feeling of pleasure arising from smelling the odours of flowers does not, however, 
'contribute in any way to appetite', which implies that the perception of them will not lead 
278 For a discussion of this problem, see Johansen (1998), pp. 226-228. 
279 Sens. 443b 9 ff.; cf. DA 421a 27 ff.; 426a 14-19. 
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to locomotion. Aristotle conceives that the perception of this class of odours is peculiar to 
man, but not to other animals (444a 4 fT.), because of the constitution of his brain (a 29-31). 
On the other hand, Aristotle also introduces another class of odours that all locomotive 
animals perceive. This class of odours is that which can be either pleasant or unpleasant in 
accordance with the state of the perceiver's desire for nutriment. That is, when the 
perceiver feels hungry, the odours are presented as pleasant to the perceiver. Aristotle does 
not clearly account for the relation between the perceiver's smelling and locomotion which 
is invoked by it. However, in an account of non-breathing animals such as fish, he tells us 
that the sense of smell also belongs to those animals and so they are capable of searching for 
food at a distance. That is, this class of odours brings about orexis in animals and the orexis 
arranges the bodily parts for locomotion. His own words are: 
But that creatures which do not breathe have the olfactory sense is evident. For fishes, and all insects as a 
class, have, thanks to the species of odour correlated with nutrition, a keen olfactory sense of their proper 
food from a distance, even when they are far away from it; such is the case with bees, and also with the class 
of small ants, which some denominate knipes. (444b 7-12; cf. DA 421b 19 ff.) 
This passage implies that the distance senses allow the animal to have some anticipation 
before its actual locomotion. As discussed in the preceding chapter, an eagle has to know 
in advance whether the object at a distance will be pleasant or not before it starts to move 
towards it. Locomotion thus presupposes the perceiver's orexis and, also, its orexis 
presupposes the distinction between pleasure and pain concerning the object at a distance. 
The eagle will neither pursue nor avoid it, if it does not anticipate that the object will be 
pleasant or painful. And the anticipation is closely related to the state of the perceiver. 
That is, whether the perceiver would see an object at a distance as a pleasant thing or not 
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depends on how far the object would contribute to the satisfaction of the perceiver's state 
of hunger and, also, on whether the perceiver is in the state of hunger or not. 
As seen so far, Aristotle conceives that the two classes of odours are pleasant and 
unpleasant either per se or per accidens. The odours of a rose which are pleasant per se do 
not necessarily evoke orexis for locomotion, whereas the other class of odours calls for the 
orexis of animals in the state of hunger. The former class of odours is a clear example that 
shows that the animal perceives an object as pleasant without involving phantasia, but only 
by sense-perception. However, this case does not necessarily refute the claim that 
phantasia is necessary for every locomotion unless we show that odours of this sort 
somehow contribute to the arousal of orexis that leads to locomotion. In effect, it is not 
difficult to show such cases. For instance, a man sees a rose in a garden at a distance, 
desires to have it on his desk, and moves towards the rose. Although odours that are 
pleasant per se are perceived as such by human beings only, the example is sufficient to 
show that locomotion does not always involve phantasia. 
What about the class of odours that are perceived as pleasant in accordance with the 
perceiver's state? Does it also show that phantasia is not necessarily involved in 
locomotion? This question is once again whether sense-perception as such perceives the 
external object as pleasant or painful. The animal perceives objects as pleasant or 
unpleasant according to its state. Since the odours of food correspond to the perceiver's 
feeling hungry, the perceiver will immediately move to get to the food, in so far as she 
perceives it as pleasant. Aristotle's statement that "animals have an orexis for the food" 
(Sens. 443b 23-24) suggests that the presence of orexis determines to a certain extent the 
object as pleasant or unpleasant. Thus Johansen comments on the passage, Sens. 443b 19-
444a 8 cited above, as follows: 
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This passage deepens the analogy between odours and flavours as it shows that some odours are also said to 
be 'pleasant' in relation to flavours. Odours are not just called 'bitter', 'sweet', etc. by analogy to flavours. 
They are also called 'pleasant' or 'unpleasant' according to whether the corresponding flavour is pleasant or 
unpleasant. Odours are pleasant whenever flavours are pleasant. Since flavours are pleasant when you 
would like to eat or drink the flavoured object as nourishment, odours too become pleasant whenever you 
would like to eat or drink the fragrant object. If you find a sweet flavour pleasant because you would like to 
eat something sweet, then you will find a sweet odour pleasant toO.280 
According to Johansen's reading, we do not just smell something as sweet or bitter in 
relation to flavours, but also as pleasant or unpleasant. He seems to attend to the fact that 
"Co 1101> and "Co AU1tllPOV generally translated, respectively, as sweet and bitter, in the Sens. 
passage also mean pleasant and painful (or unpleasant). In this way, if to perceive 
something as sweet or bitter is also to perceive it as pleasant or painful, then there is no 
need for any other psychological activity, i.e. phantasia, to be involved in the arousal of 
orexis since the representation of the external object and the interpretation of it as pleasant 
or unpleasant are sufficient for evoking orexis. Thus the cases of smell and taste appear to 
suggest that there is no reason for asserting that feeling pleasant or painful is a peculiar 
activity that belongs only to phantasia. In consequence, in understanding the passage of 
DA 431a 8-14 cited earlier, we do not necessarily have to assume that Aristotle is insistent 
about the role of phantasia. That is, animals can dispense with phantasia in arousing their 
orexis. 
However it is not clear whether Aristotle wants to apply the same sort of analysis also , 
to the cases of sight and hearing. Indeed, we do not find any conclusive evidence which 
might suggest that he does. At 431a 8-14 (cited earlier), he contrasts perceiving with 
thinking and says that "To feel pleasure or pain is to act with the sensitive mean towards 
what is good or bad as such". If we understand this as meaning that, as thought recognises 
280 Johansen (1998), p. 229. 
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something as good or bad, sense-perception also perceives it as pleasant or unpleasant, 
Aristotle does not seem to allow any room for the involvement of phantasia. However, for 
the present purpose, the analysis of smelling is sufficient to show that phantasia is not 
always necessary for the arousal of locomotion. Let us now tum to the case of thought 
where I shall try to show that, although it is undeniable that there must be phantasia as the 
representation of objects to thought, thought itself interprets the objects as pleasant or 
unpleasant or, rather, good or bad. 
(c) Thought without Phantasia 
Those who claim that phantasia is always necessary for thinking focus on Aristotle's 
statement that "the soul never thinks without a phantasma" (DA 431a 17). Thus 
Nussbaum, for example, claims that Aristotle uses phantasia "to explain how it is that the 
mere thoughts of some object, in the absence of actual perception, can suffice to cause 
motion,,?81 She seems to mean by 'the mere thoughts of some object' the thoughts 
containing some phantasmata as their objects. Thus she goes on to conclude as follows: 
Although he occasionally (e.g., in the "drink" syllogism in MA 7) suggests that perception or thought alone 
could operate with desire to produce action, his considered view seems to be that an extra factor must be 
mentioned in the account of motion and that there is a single faculty (or a special aspect of the faculty of 
perception) in virtue of which an animal becomes aware of its object of desire, whether that object is 
initially presented via the senses or by thought. Furthermore, even theoretical thinking must, it seems, go 
on concurrently with some activity ofphantasia.282 
As mentioned earlier, Nussbaum closely relates phantasia to sense-perception.283 In this 
way, since what has sense-perception also has phantasia, she, as a result, rejects the literal 
281 Nussbaum (1978), p. 239. 
282 Nussbaum (1978), pp. 240-241. 
283 Nussbaum (1978), esp. pp. 234-236. 
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reading of Aristotle's remarks at 415a 10 if. and 428a 10 if where he appears to deny 
phantasia to some animals. And, moreover, since she thinks that in the absence of 
perception phantasmata are the only objects of the thinking soul, she is led to conclude that 
phantasia is always involved both in perceiving as well as in thinking in order to arouse 
orexis. However, our discussion of smell initially shows that this conclusion concerning 
sense-perception is wrong. And, indeed, the following discussion of thinking will show that 
the second half of her conclusion concerning thinking also fails. 
We first have to ask in what sense thinking presupposes phantasia. It is undeniable that 
thinking requires some objects in order to contemplate. All the same, all the phantasmata 
require objects initially presented by sense-perception. However, as we saw, there was a 
case in which sense-perception is not at work and phantasia alone does all the work to 
arouse orexis. In such a case, we do not deny that phantasia must presuppose the previous 
operation of sense-perception, i.e. the presentation of objects to phantasia, but we say that 
phantasia on its own is at work when the actual operation of sense-perception is not 
presently going on. In the same way, it is conceivable that, although phantasia is necessary 
for thinking as the capacity for representing phantasmata to the thinking soul, thinking 
might work alone to contemplate the phantasmata represented by phantasia. The 
following paradigm might be suggested in relation to our discussion so far: 
(i) (Actual) sense-perception -orexis -locomotion 
(ii) (Actual) sense-perception -phantasia - orexis-locomotion 
(iii) (Idle sense-perception) -phantasia - orexis -locomotion 
(iv) (Idle sense-perception - idle phantasia) - thought - orexis -locomotion 
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(i) is presented as a result of the discussion of smell. The 'smell' case shows that there 
might be locomotion by orexis resulted from sense-perception alone without involving 
phantasia. (ii) shows Aristotle's discussion of phantasia in the presence of actual sense-
perception claimed in DA III. 3, which seems to suggest that sense-perception and 
phantasia share the roles of presenting objects and interpreting them. On the other hand, 
(iii) illustrates such cases as dreams and memories. In those cases, we do not exclude that 
sense-perception is previously necessary for gathering information about the external 
objects. However, it is not actually working at the time of dreaming or recollecting. 
Finally, (iv) suggests the case of contemplation of thought which requires phantasia for 
supplying information in the first instance, but which does not employ its actual operation at 
the time of contemplating. As phantasia in (iii) does not require the actual operation of 
sense-perception in its manipulating the perceived data, thought in (iv) does not require the 
actual operation of phantasia in its contemplating the data previously supplied by 
phantasia. Thus Aristotle clearly states that "To the thinking soul phantasmata serve as if 
they were contents of perception (and when it asserts or denies them to be good or bad it 
avoids or pursues them)" (DA 431a 15-16). 
The following passage again suggests this view. In DA III. 7, Aristotle explains the 
relation between thoughts and the feeling of pleasure and pain in comparison with sense-
perception as follows: 
The faculty of thinking then thinks the forms in the phantasmata, and as in the former case what is to be 
pursued or avoided is marked out for it, so where there is no sensation and it is engaged upon the 
phantasmata it is moved to pursuit or avoidance. E.g. perceiving by sense that the beacon is fire, it 
recognizes in virtue of the general faculty of sense that it signifies an enemy, because it sees it moving; but 
sometimes by means of the phantasmata or thoughts which are within the soul, just as if it were seeing, it 
calculates and deliberates what is to come by reference to what is present; and when it makes a 
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pronouncement, as in the case of sensation it pronounces the object to be pleasant or painful, in this case it 
avoids or pursues; and so generally in cases of action. (431b 2-9) 
Aristotle's account of thinking shows a similarity to his earlier discussion of sense-
perception. He regards calculation and deliberation as the activities of the rational faculty. 
And the rational faculty requires phantasmata or thoughts as its objects as the perceptible 
objects in the case of sense-perception. We need to attend to the fact that Aristotle in the 
passage is saying that either phantasmata or thoughts are represented to the rational faculty 
as its objects. These remarks at once suggest that the actual operation of phantasia is not 
always necessary for thinking other than as a capacity to represent phantasmata to the 
thinking soul at an earlier stage. Thus the phantasmata are the objects for pursuit and 
avoidance that are represented to rational beings. 284 In the above passage, Aristotle 
explicitly tells us that in perceiving the one that 'pronounces the object to be pleasant or 
painful' is sense-perception, whereas in thinking it is calculation and deliberation. We saw 
earlier that Aristotle regards feeling pleasure or pain is analogous to making an affirmation 
or a negation. 285 Perceiving or thinking pronounces some object as 'pleasant or painful' or 
'good or bad' and orexis immediately pursues or avoids. All the same, in thinking 
calculation and deliberation take 'the form of judgment or proposition', 286 as in perceiving 
the sensory activities such as taste and smell are also making a sort of judgement. 
However, Aristotle states that the necessary objects in calculation and deliberation are 
either phantasmata or thoughts and thus, as mentioned, he does not exclude the possibility 
that an activity of phantasia, as representing phantasmata to the thinking soul, can be 
previously involved. In this way, Aristotle can offer without necessarily involving the 
284 However, this does not necessarily mean the absence of perception. 
285 See Hicks's note on 431a 8. 
286 Hicks's note on 431b 8. 
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concept of phantasia an account of sense-perception and thought as the capacities for 
making a distinction between what is pleasant and what is not. 
On another occasion, Aristotle goes further to say that phantasmata might be absent in 
some cases of thought activities. 
And because phantasmata remain in the organs of sense and resemble sensations, animals in their actions 
are largely guided by them, some (i.e. brutes) because of the non-existence in them of thought, others (i.e. 
men) because of the temporary eclipse in them of thought by feeling or disease or sleep. (429a 5_8)287 
Aristotle here envIsages the cases in which animal motion results from adopting 
phantasmata because they are without thought and, also, the cases in which those that are 
capable of thought might be troubled with operating them properly because of their 
physiological states. A man may have illusions because of his illness. However, in saying 
this, Aristotle seems to think that such an example will illustrate why a man does not 
employ phantasmata rather than why he relies on phantasmata. He here talks of the 
sensitive phantasia that belongs to those that have sense-perception, not of the calculative 
phantasia that belongs only to rational beings in virtue of their capacity for thinking. 
However, Aristotle in the above passage appears to think that the man in a state of illness is 
not capable of adopting phantasmata at all in his thinking. That is, in such a case a man 
thinks without involving any phantasmata. It is not clear what Aristotle means here. Does 
he mean that there might be some thinking that is purely creative so that a man thinks 
something original without relying on any of his previous experience whatsoever? In any 
case, the above passage clearly shows that Aristotle acknowledges some cases of thinking 
that do not involve phantasmata and so phantasia. In consequence, in the passages where 
287 See also, III. 3, 428a 23-24. Aristotle there says that " ... there are some of the brutes in which we find 
phantasia, without discourse of reason." 
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he says that there cannot be any judgement withoutphantasia (427b 15; 431b 7-9) and that 
"the soul never thinks without a phantasma" (431 a 17), Aristotle believes that phantasmata 
are elements that are as necessary as thoughts in the case of the rational faculty forming a 
judgement. However, it is clear that we are not entitled to conclude that phantasmata are 
the only objects of thinking. 
Our discussion so far suggests that when Aristotle in the MA says that phantasia holds 
the same place as sense-perception and thought (700b 19-21), he wishes to ascribe to the 
former a sort of judgmental capacity as he does to the latter two cognitive capacities. As 
noted, the judgmental (or propositional) capacity of sense-perception and of thought is the 
affirmation or the negation offeeling 'pleasant or painful' or of judging 'good or bad'. This 
implies not only that animals require objects, e.g. the perceptible objects (i.e. the sensible 
qualities) or the objects of thinking (i.e. phantasmata and thoughts), but also that they have 
such capacities as smelling or tasting or calculating or deliberating that interpret the objects 
as pleasant or painful. In this sense, Aristotle says that sense-perception, phantasia, and 
thought hold the same place in terms of making distinctions. This line of interpretation also 
appears consistent with Aristotle's use of phantasia in relation to other faculties in other 
passages of the MA. 288 
Summary 
In the present chapter, we have focused on the question whether Aristotle maintains 
phantasia as an absolutely necessary condition for orexis and so for locomotion. And we 
have given a negative answer to the question. Our primary enquiry began with the question 
what are the necessary conditions for the arousal of orexis. In arousing orexis, there must 
288 E.g. 700b 19-22; 701a 29-b 1; 701 b 16 if. etc. 
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be two conditions, the presentation of an object and the interpretation of it as a pleasant and 
painful thing. In effect, the representation of an object is the representation of an object as a 
certain sort. That is, when seeing a red ball, we perceive it as red or as round in the first 
instance. Nussbaum thus understands phantasia as a capacity to represent an object as an 
object of a certain sort. However, unless the object is interpreted as what is pleasant or not, 
orexis is not evoked to pursue it. Thus I have argued that the role of phantasia must be 
more than that, i.e. it represents an object not only as a certain thing, but as a pleasant or 
painful thing. 
I have also considered Nussbaum's claim that phantasia must be always involved in the 
arousal of orexis. Aristotle's denial of ph ant asia to some animals does not contribute on its 
own to the rejection of the claim. Nonetheless, it has revealed that he might have 
distinguished the indeterminate phantasia from the sensitive phantasia. The former belongs 
to all animals whether they are locomotive or not and so it is clear that it is not necessarily 
related to locomotion, whereas the latter belongs to all locomotive animals and is related to 
the arousal of locomotion. Thus I have examined whether Aristotle envisages some cases in 
which the presentation of an object as pleasant or painful does not involve phantasia. In 
doing so, we have seen that, in particular, in his discussion of two types of odours he has 
made it clear that in smelling sense-perception does not necessitate phantasia in the arousal 
of orexis, although it still remains unclear whether he holds the same position about the 
other distance senses. Moreover, his account of thought also leaves room for the 
interpretation that thought can also arouse orexis without the actual operation of phantasia, 
although it seems undeniable that phantasia is previously engaged as a capacity to represent 
phantasmata to the thinking soul. 
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At this stage, it is important to note that our discussion has suggested at least four types 
of the locomotive faculty, i.e. four groups of psychological capacities that arouse 
locomotion. In what follows, we shall see the significant implication of this point in relation 
to the physiological aspect of animal locomotion. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE PHYSIOLOGICAL PICTURE: 
THE ROLE OF THE SUMPHUTON PNEUMA289 IN LOCOMOTION 
In the preceding two chapters, we have examined what kinds of psychological capacities 
are involved in arousing animal locomotion and seen that Aristotle has in mind four types of 
the locomotive faculty. The present chapter turns to Aristotle's account of the physiology 
of locomotion which he, in the MA, explains in terms of the conception of the sumphuton 
pneuma (crUJ,l(j>u'tov 1tVEUJ,l<X, hereafter, pneuma).290 
As seen in Chapter II, the functionalist claims that Aristotle would accept the 
compositional plasticity of functional states. In relation to Aristotle's biology, the 
functionalist argues that, if a certain sort of animal is defined in relation to its organs that 
function in a certain way, then an animal will be that sort of animal whatever the 
compositions of the organs that serve those functions. 291 On many occasions, Aristotle 
appears to acknowledge that different species of living beings have different bodily organs, 
though performing the same function (HA 497b 3 ff.; cf. GC 321b 17-322a 16). That is, he 
talks about the blood or the analogous stuff (e.g. GA 726b 2 ff), the heart or an analogous 
part in some animals (e.g. MA 703a 14-16; GA 781a 20 ff), lungs in some animals or gills in 
others (cf. Resp. 476a 22 ff), mouths of animals or roots of plants (IA 70Sb 7-9), and the 
289 As we shall see (cf. Peck, 1953, p. 111), there is a difficulty in translating the Greek word 1CvEvJLa into 
English and so commentators (e.g. Peck, Solmsen, Nussbaum, Freudenthal, etc.) tend to leave it 
untranslated. I shall follow this practice. It cannot be simply translated as 'breath' or 'air'. On the other 
hand, although Beare (1906, p. 94, note. 1) is aware of the difficulty, he (p. 120 ff.) translates sumphuton 
pneuma as 'connatural spirit' (see also, his translation of Somn., for example, 456a 11 in the Oxford 
translation), whereas in an article about the Stoic use of the term Long (1996, p. 229) calls pneuma 
'intelligent breath' . 
290 This conception of inborn or connate pneuma must be distinguished from pneuma breathed in by the 
animal and, also, from the ordinary air which Aristotle sometimes appears to refer to by the term, as will be 
discussed below. Different uses of the term will be so stated. 
291 See Nussbaum (1978), esp. p. 82 ff. 
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like. What does Aristotle mean by analogous parts? Does he mean that, as the functionalist 
argues, they are made of different materials from, but function in the same way as, the 
materials of their corresponding bodily organs? In order to answer this question, we need 
to ask what Aristotle would say about the constituents of different bodily organs, though 
performing the same sort of function, in different beings. 
In what follows, I shall argue that the functionalist claim is wrong. In Section 1, I shall 
briefly examine the characteristics of pneuma and its involvement in the account of 
reproduction and sense-perception expounded in Aristotle's biological works. It is often 
pointed out that the weakness of the arguments based on this conception of pneuma is that 
he did not systematically work it out. 292 It is undeniable that in analysing its role we have to 
rely on the fragments of his remarks on pneuma. Nonetheless, our discussion will primarily 
suggest that Aristotle thinks (i) that pneuma is a significant material or physiological 
substance in the account of the living being's various activities and (ii) that it has a close 
relation to the soul-capacities. 
These general points will be made concrete in Section II, as we examine (a) Aristotle's 
introduction of pneuma as a factor that distinguishes sexes, species of animals, parts of the 
animal, and even the lives and deaths of the living being; and (b) his employment of the 
conception in the account of locomotion with reference to orexis. Once this is done, we 
shall be able to see that pneuma is a necessary material element in the living being, without 
which the living being is not capable of actualising its psychological or living capacities. 
However, I shall argue, the relationship of the soul-capacities with pneuma Aristotle has in 
mind is far closer than the functionalist maintains. That is, he thinks that the soul-capacities 
must be actualised in pneuma, in which case no other matter than pneuma could serve these 




We shall also see in detail in what way, although Aristotle thinks that the 
locomotive faculty of the soul must be actualised in pneuma he st1'11 es . . 
, capes comnnttmg 
himself to the ontological reductionism. 
V. 1 The Conception of the Sumphuton Pneuma 
Commentators have attended to the fact that Aristotle employs pneuma as an 
indispensable conception in explaining various types of animal motion. 294 This section deals 
with its characteristics as they engage in his accounts of sexual generation and sense-
perception. Three points will be made here: (i) pneuma is a material or physiological 
substance, (ii) it belongs only to living beings, and (iii) it has a close relationship with the 
capacity for living activities. This last point will be further discussed in Section 2 with 
reference to the question of how to construe the relationships between the physiological 
substance and the soul-capacity. 
(a) The Characteristics of Pneuma 
In GA II. 2 in his account of the nature of the semen, Aristotle talks of the semen as a 
compound of 'pneuma and water' and pneuma as 'hot air (eEp~OC; <XllP)' (736a 1). 
293 Since, as noted, the present chapter attempts to verify, on the basis of a specific living activity of the 
living being, our position against functionalism made in Ch. II, a portion of our earlier discussion will be 
repeated to revive the reader's memory. I hope that this will be excused. 
294 For Aristotle's use of the conception in animal generation, see Balme (1992), esp. pp. 160-164; Preus 
(1970), pp. 1-52; (1975), pp. 48-107. For the GA text, see esp. II. 3 if. More references can be found in 
Freudenthal (1995), p. 106, notes 2 & 3. On the other hand, Beare draws attention to the role of pneuma in 
sense-perception (cf. Peck, 1942, pp. 589-593). He says that "if we could discover all the properties and 
functions of the cr'i>~q>'\)'tov 1tVEU~a., we should (from Aristotle's point of view) have penetrated to the 
inmost secrets of sense-perception" (1906 p. 336; cited after Peck, 1942, p. 593). This view is implicitly 
challenged by Johansen (1998, p. 92) who points out that "a passage in De Insomniis says that the blood 
plays a role in mediating sense-impressions from the sense-organs to the central sense-faculty in dreams". 
Johansen's remarks might be taken to mean that pneuma might not reveal all the secrets of sense-
perception. On the other hand, Nussbaum notes that pneuma plays an important role in animal locomotion. 
See Nussbaum (1978), pp. 143-164. Cf. Peck (1942), p. 576 if.; Peck (1953), pp. 117-118; Freudenthal 
(1995), pp. 134-137. Nussbaum (1978, p. 143) reports that Jaeger and DOring also held this position. 
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Considering that air is already compounded of the hot and the wet (cf GC 311 a 13 ff.), it 
appears that pneuma has more heat than the heat which air already has, as Balme says. 295 It 
is, however, controversial how much weight we can give to such a characterisation of 
pneuma. Balme takes it as a starting basis and argues that the ''pneuma is basically 
atmospheric air," but differs from the latter only in 'levels of purity' because of the influence 
of the vital heat in the animal. 296 He also thinks that Aristotle 'equates animal heat with 
fire,' but differentiates them only in degrees. Thus he says that "animal heat need not be an 
altogether different element from other heat, nor generative heat from the rest of animal 
heat" . 297 He then goes on to claim that although all pneuma contains heat, the pneuma in 
the seed is different in that its heat is generative heat. In this way, he seems to think that the 
pneuma in the seed is purer than the pneuma in other parts of the body. It is, however, not 
clear what exactly Balme means by 'less grossly material, purer, or superior' .298 As it 
stands, he appears to be saying that the same matter can be purer or superior depending on 
which part of the body it belongs to and what degrees of the vital heat it possesses (see Sec. 
1 (c) below). This line of Balme's interpretation of pneuma and vital heat is, however, 
subject to criticism in various aspects. 299 
Aristotle's treatment of pneuma is undeniably puzzling. However, there are several 
points that can be made clear. In an article on pneuma, Peck observes two significant 
characteristics of pneuma: firstly, it is inborn or connate air, which must be differentiated 
from atmospheric air and, secondly, it is material or corporeal. 300 As mentioned, Balme 
295 Balme (1992), p. 162. 
296 Balme (1992), pp. 163-164; see also p. 71. 
297 Balme (1992), p. 164. 
298 Balme (1992), p. 163. ,. . . ,. . 
299 E.g. Freudenthal's criticism (1995, pp. 109-111) is focused on B~me.s l~entificatJ.o~ o~ fire mth VItal 
heat'. However, Balme's identification of pneuma with atmosphenc au IS not convmcmg, eIther (see 
below). 
300 Peck (1953), pp. 111-121. 
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thinks that pneuma is basically atmospheric air or inhaled air which comes to have different 
levels of purity when it is somehow worked upon by animal heat Ho 'f thi h 
. wever, 1 s were t e 
case, then non-breathing animals would not be able to have pneuma in them. But Aristotle 
has no doubt that they also possess pneuma. 301 This point at once suggests that the 
sumphuton pneuma is not the air breathed in from without by the animal, but the connate or 
inborn air present in the animal from its birth until its death. Moreover, granting that life 
begins at the very moment of the formation of the embryo, Aristotle's emphasis on the place 
of the pneuma in the heart (which is the first part to be formed in the embryo) implies that it 
is not the air inhaled by the possessor itself, but that transmitted to it 'either by its mother or 
by embryo itself. 302 
On the other hand, Aristotle clearly regards pneuma as 'a sort of corporeal or material 
air' when he talks of pneuma as a component of the semen. Once again, it cannot be 
identified with atmospheric air since he thinks that it is 'more divine' than any other simple 
bodies (i.e. air, fire, earth, and water). The relevant passage runs thus: 
Now so far as we can see, the faculty of Soul of every kind has to do with some physical substance which is 
different from the so-called "elements" and more divine than they are; and as the varieties of Soul differ 
301 GA 741b 37 ff.; see also, Somn. 456a 11 ff.; Juv. 475a 28 ff.; PA 659b 14-19; 669a 1-2. Cf. Johansen 
(1998), p. 250. 
302 Peck (1953), p. 117. Aristotle tells us that pneuma is contained in the semen (GA 736b 36), whereas his 
position about the menstrual fluid is obscure. At this stage, the pneuma of the foetus seems to come from its 
father or from both parents. However, Aristotle states that there is nothing material from the semen that 
contributes to the formation of the embryo since "the semen dissolves and evaporates due to its 'watery 
nature'" (737a 8-11; cf. 730b 11-15). It thus follows that the pneuma comes from the mother. This 
interpretation appears consistent with his characterisation of the female as the provider of matter. However, 
this seems misleading. As noted, for Aristotle there cannot be any change ex nihilo. This phrase might 
well be read as a denial of change simpliciter. In Ph. I. 5 (GC I. 2 and 3; GA 724a 14 ff.; 733b 24 ff.), 
Aristotle has shown his sympathy with the Parmenidean thesis that denies the possibility of a becoming out 
of nothing. At the same time, he also denies a being's passing-away simpliciter. Thus, there must be 
something material remaining even after the semen's evaporation. That is, the semen cannot simply pass 
the soul onto the menstrual fluid without leaving some matter from the male in it. If it can, then Aristotle 
inevitably has to acknowledge the soul's separability from the body, to which he does not wish to commit 
himself. Thus the semen's evaporation does not mean a complete disappearance. If so, it seems that there 
must remain some matter from the semen which contributes to the formation of the embryo. However, 
Aristotle does not accept that the matter of the semen is involved in the formation (see e.g. 716a 5 if.; 729a 
9-10; 736a 24 ff.; esp. 730b 9 if.). 
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from one another in the scale of value, so do the various substances concerned with them differ in their 
nature. In all cases the semen contains within itself that which causes it to be fertile-what is known as 
"hot" substance, which is not fire nor any similar substance, but the pneuma which is enclosed within the 
semen or foam-like stuff, and the natural substance which is in the pneuma; and this substance is analogous 
to the element which belongs to the stars. That is why fire does not generate any animal, and we find no 
animal taking shape either in fluid or solid substances while they are under the influence of fire; whereas 
the heat of the sun does effect generation, and so does the heat of animals, and not only the heat of animals 
which operates through the semen, but also any other natural residue which there may be has within it a 
principle of life. Considerations of this sort show us that the heat which is in animals is not fire and does 
not get its origin or principle from fire. (GA 736b 29-737a 8) 
This passage is important in various respects: it tells us (1) that there is a close relation of 
pneuma to the soul by emphasising the divinity of pneuma, (2) that, as there is a scale of 
soul-faculties, there is also a scale of matter that corresponds to it, (3) that the pneuma in 
the semen contains the vital heat, and (4) that this heat is the generative heat of animals 
which is different from the heat of fire, but which is analogous to the heat of the sun which 
h b ·· 303 generates ot er emgs m nature. 
Aristotle characterises pneuma as the substance that "is analogous to the element which 
belongs to the stars". 304 This heavenly element is aither that is characterised in the DC as 
being ungenerated, indestructible, and unalterable, moving in a circle, and having no weight 
(270a 13 ff.). The celestial spheres or the heavenly bodies that are made of this body are 
thus "eternal and not subject to increase or diminution, but unaging and unalterable and 
unmodified" (270b 1-2). In what aspects is this heavenly element analogous to pneuma? 
When Aristotle, in the DC, treats aither as a distinct element from other simple bodies (i.e. 
303 These points will be considered in tum below. .... 
304 It is to be noted that it is controversial what is contrasted with the SImple. bodies or w~at ArIstotle ~,nks 
of as more divine which is said to be analogous with aither. Peck, for mstance, claims that the hot 
substance" is not 'Of course Fire, but it is the pneuma which the semen con~n~" ~eck, ~ 9U, p. 582, 
followed by Nussbaum (1978, p. 162) and Preus (1970, esp. pp. ~5-36)). Thi~ VIew IS straIg~tfon~'ard~~' 
denied by Balme who claims that "It is not pneuma but the generatlve heat that IS comparable \\1th azther . 
(1992, p. 163, followed by Freudenthal (1995, pp. 118-119)). 
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aIr, earth, fire, and water), it is not because they are different in degrees of purity, but 
because they are different elements.305 That is, aither does not share any common 
characteristics with other simple bodies. However, Aristotle's definition of pneuma as 'hot 
air' suggests that pneuma has something in common with fire or air or both. Thus, if 
pneuma and the simple bodies appear to have 'something' in common, it is not itself aither. 
N or is it any of the simple bodies since having some of their characteristics in common does 
not make it the same as them. The reason for Aristotle's analogy of pneuma with aither 
will become clearer as we further discuss its role in animal activities: it is that pneuma 
contains the generative heat (736a 1-2; 732a 19-20) and, also, that it is unalterable in a 
special sense (MA 703a 24-25) (see below). 
(b) The Connection between Soul and Pneuma 
With reference to the introduction of pneuma in the MA, both Peck and Nussbaum think 
that Aristotle posits it as 'a gap-filler' which is material stuff and without which animal 
locomotion cannot be fully accounted for. However, what kind of gap is to be filled in by 
adopting such a conception? 
Peck, in an appendix (B) to his translation of the GA (1942), says that pneuma is "the 
'organ' or 'instrument' of movement, that which bridges the gap between the immaterial 
OPE~l~ on the one hand and the material limbs of the body on the other". 306 He goes on to 
say, 
Pneuma, like aither, acts as an intermediary between immaterial mover and material objects. As we have 
seen the unmoved mover moves the Heaven and the heavenly bodies which are made of aither, and the 
, 
heavenly bodies in turn "move" sublunary bodies, viz. they bring about the transformation of the elements 
305 Freudenthal (1995), p. 116. Balme's interpretation of 'more divine' as a degree of purity (1992, p. 163 
ff.) has been criticised by Freudenthal (1995, p. 109 ff.). 
306 Peck (1942), p. 579. 
202 
into one another, and also they bring about rtvE(yl~ and f{J8opa. So too the immaterial l/fVx'Ij moves 
pneuma, and pneuma in turn causes aAAOi{[)(Yl~, thereby (i) moving the limbs of the body or (ii) causing the 
"movement" which is the development of the embryo.307 
Basically, what Peck is saying is that pneuma is a tool or instrument of the soul that imparts 
motion to the other parts of the body. It is not immediately clear what he means by 
'bridge'. In effect, the way he speaks leaves room for the interpretation that he is thinking 
of so-called 'instrumental dualism', i.e. the view 'that the soul is a non-material substance 
, 
identifiable separately from body, that imparts motion to body using some part of it as a 
tool,.308 If so, then Aristotle is understood as having the Cartesian 'pineal gland' problem, 
which raises a difficulty of explaining how the non-material soul separated from the body 
can cause changes in the body which has nothing in common with the soul. 309 Some ten 
years later, Peck (1953) describes pneuma in a different way, saying that it is "the vehicle by 
which 'movements' originated by the soul, which has its seat in the heart, are transmitted 
and propagated outwards from the heart, or from the semen which contains the pneuma and 
the 'movements' with which the heart has charged it".310 This remark might well be taken 
to mean that pneuma is a material substance in which the soul is actualised rather than an 
instrument that the soul uses to alter other parts of the body. 
Nussbaum is also in favour of Peck's latter interpretation. 311 She argues that pneuma 
for Aristotle is used as an exemplification of orexis involving a physiological actualisation, 
by which he completes his hylomorphic account of soul and body. Aristotle does describe 
307 Peck (1942), p. 589. cf. Peck (1953), pp. 118-119. Cf. Nuyen's instrumental view discussed by e.g. 
Nussbaum (1978, pp. 148-150) and Ackrill (1981, p. 72). According to Ackri~l, Nu~ens postulates ~ree 
stages of the relationship between soul and body in the development of Aristotle s ~~ught: dua1IS~, 
instrumentalism, and hylomorphism. Among these, "Instrumentalism is a sort of tranSItional theory: It 
treats the soul as more like an independent thing than hylomorphism does, but it connects soul and body 
more closely than dualism does" (Ackrill, ibid.). 
308 Nussbaum (1978), p. 149. 
309 See Ch. II. Sec. 1 (a). 
310 Peck (1953), p. 119. 
3ll Nussbaum, (1978), pp. 146-164. 
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pneuma as 'the immediate vehicle of the soul' at Resp. 474a 30-b 1 (cf. DA 433b 18). 
However, the role of pneuma might well be seen as an organ in which the soul is actualised 
(DA 415b 17-18), as the capacity for sense-perception is realised in sense-organs. Aristotle 
derives the conclusion that the semen that is composed of pneuma and water must involve 
the soul, from the homonymy principle that "there is no such thing as face or flesh without 
soul in it" (GA 734b 19 fr.), which he has claimed in many other places.312 If this is a 
generalised view, it is conceivable that he would acknowledge that the soul is in pneuma, 
i.e. it actualises itself in it. We need not take Aristotle's 'tool' or 'instrument' language as 
meaning that the soul 'causes' changes in a distinct body.313 We saw in Chapter II that the 
soul-body relationship of living beings is not between the soul and the body as separate 
entities, but between the soul of the living body and the body of the living being. That is, 
the soul is not an immaterial substance that causes bodily changes by means of pneuma, as 
in the case of a man cutting wood with an axe. Aristotle does regard the soul as a 
triggering force in the sense that the living being is not capable of its supposed function 
without it. However, Aristotle's description of 'the activities of the living being in virtue of 
the soul' might well be conceived as meaning that the doings of the soul are the doings of 
the living being. As we shall see,314 his introduction of pneuma in the heart as a middle part 
from the ground that orexis is middle (MA 703 4 fr.) may well be taken to suggest that 
pneuma is not something that the soul uses to bring about changes in some other part of the 
living being, but a place in which the soul is actualised. 
312 E.g. Meteo. 390a 10-17; DA 412b 12-24; 412b 27-413a 2; Met. 1035b 23-25; 1036b 31-33. 
313 Nussbaum (1978), p. 150. 
314 See Sec. 2 (c) and (d). 
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(c) The Vital Heat31S 
In effect, the primary relation of pneuma to soul in animal generation appears to be its 
use as a carrier or vehicle that transmits the soul from the sire to the offspring. However, 
Aristotle sometimes refers to the vital heat, rather than to pneuma, as a soul-carrier. It thus 
appears important to determine the role of vital heat apart from pneuma. However, this is 
not the right place fully to discuss its role in diverse activities of the animal. 316 I shall thus 
focus on its relation to pneuma. 
Aristotle firmly maintains that "all living beings, animals and plants alike ... have a 
natural source of heat (PA 650a 1-6). Also, on many occasions in the Juv., he claims that 
the life of the living being is closely related to the presence of vital heat in it. That is, living 
beings require a certain amount, or degree, of heat to be alive. This heat is certainly 
variable in degrees since the death of the living being is due to its temperature falling below 
that which it requires to stay alive. 317 And in living beings (including plants) it can be 
affected by 'their nutriment and the surrounding air supply' (esp. 470a 21-b 2). That is, 
nutriment increases their bodily temperature and there must be something that controls the 
temperature. Without such a controlling device, the consumption of nutriment will only 
increase the heat in the living being's body (470a 23-25). Thus Aristotle thinks that the 
excess of heat or of coldness in the living being is controlled by the opposite effects 
produced by the digestion of food, or the nutriment, and the surrounding air (see esp. 470a 
5 ff) or water in some other cases (478a 31-33). However, in the account of the relation 
between heat and air he does not make a clear distinction between atmospheric air around 
315 Freudenthal offers an extensive analysis of the nature and role of the vital heat in ~is book e~titled 
Aristotle's Theory of Material Substance in which he concludes that "for Arist~tle ~tal hea~ IS the 
physiological factor underlying all operations of soul-nutritive, perceptive, locomotIOn, ImagmaUve, to a 
great extent even intellective" (1995, p. 74). 
316 See Freudenthal (1995), pp. 7-105. 
317 E.g. Juv. 469b 5 ff.; 470a 5 ff.; 474a 25 ff.; b 10 ff.; 478b 32 ff. 
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plants and inhaled air in breathing animals At P A 668b 35 ff Ari t tl I· . I II 
. ., s 0 e exp IClt y te s us 
that in breathing animals the cooling agent must be external 1· e al·r or t h . 
, . . wa er, w ere as In 
non-breathing animals (and, presumbly, in plants as well) the sumphuton pneuma is the 
cooling agent. However, it does not necessarily follow that the pneuma of breathing 
animals does not play such a role, i. e. a cooling effect, too. Aristotle might well mean that 
since breathing animals are hotter than non-breathing ones, they need some extra cooling 
effect from without (cf Resp. 475b 19 ff; Meteo. 379b 22-25). 
Considering Aristotle's ascription of the capacity not only for nutrition, but also for 
generation to the same faculty of the soul, i. e. the nutritive faculty, it might be anticipated 
that he would ascribe to the heat a certain role in generation. In effect, the GA passage 
cited earlier (736b 29-737a 8) tells us that he identifies the vital heat with the generative 
heat. He there makes an analogy between the vital heat of the animal and the heat of the 
sun, both of which are differentiated from the heat of fire? 18 In his consideration of the 
generation or reproduction of locomotive animals (cf 715a 25-27), Aristotle says that they 
possess two sexes both of which are responsible for generation in that the male provides the 
form and the female the matter (716a 5 ff; 729a 9_10).319 That is, the offspring is formed 
during the concoction320 by the semen from the male and the menstrual fluid from the 
female. The menstrual fluid is formed into an embryo by the aid of heat (Met. 1040b 8-10). 
In GA I. 21, Aristotle makes it clear that the contribution of the female to the embryo is not 
318 See Freudenthal (1995), p. 110. 
319 Note that Aristotle tells us that some locomotive animals are produced by their parents (sexual 
generation), whereas others are produced from decaying matter (spontaneous generation). As for the 
animals that undergo spontaneous generation, he says that "some of them are brought forth as larvae~ both 
the bloodless ones that are not formed from living animals, and some blooded ones (examples are a kind of 
cestreus and other river fishes also the eel tribe): all of these, although by nature they have but little blood, 
nevertheless are blooded anim'als and have a heart, which is the "principle" of the parts and blood-like in 
constitution" (762b 21-26). . 
320 Concoction is defined as "a process in which the natural and proper heat of an object perfects the 
corresponding passive qualities, which are the proper matter of any given object" (Meteo. 379b 18-20). ~~e 
also Meteo. IV. 2-3 for Aristotle's own definition and discussion of this matter. Cf. Peck (1942), pp. bUll-
lxx; Freudenthal (1995), pp. 22-23; Lloyd (1996), pp. 83-103. 
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the same as that of the male.321 If it were, the female would be able to produce offspring on 
her own. Since it is not, "it needs some source or principle to supply the material with 
movement and determine its character" (730a 28-30). Thus it requires the male to play this 
role. The male contributes to the formation of the embryo by supplying to the female the 
semen that is composed of water and pneuma which contains the vital heat (736a 1-2), i.e. a 
. £ (322 . 
motIve orce 732a 19-20). On the other hand, In spontaneous generation Aristotle 
maintains that the material containing the internal heat has, at least, the capacity for 
nutrition, viz. the nutritive soul. He thus writes, 
Animals and plants are formed in the earth and in the water because in earth water is present, and in water 
pneuma is present, and in all pneuma soul-heat is present, so that in a way all things are full of Soul ... 
Now it gets enclosed as the liquids containing corporeal matter become heated, and there is formed as it 
were a frothy bubble. The object which thus takes shape may be more valuable in kind or less valuable; and 
the differences herein depend upon the envelope which encloses the soul-principle; and the causes which 
determine this are the situations where the process takes place and the physical substance which is enclosed. 
(GA 762a 19-22; cf. GC 318b 29; 321b 9; Resp. 471b 2 if) 
Living beings that do not have different sexes reproduce their offspring by means of 
spontaneous generation. Thus some animals and plants that belong to this group must be 
able to actualise their soul in the 'enclosed envelope'. They would not be able to reproduce 
without having such a capacity within themselves. 
Aristotle thus maintains two types of generative heat, i.e. the internal heat of sexual 
generation of some animals (the heat of the animal) and the external heat of spontaneous 
generation of plants and other animals (the heat of the sun). As shown, in both cases he 
associates life closely with the presence of the vital heat. That is, there cannot be any life 
321 The reason for the difference between the two sexes that Aristotle offers at a later stage is that the 
natural heat in the male is superior to that in the female (765a 4 fl.; 775a 4 fl.). 
322 Peck (1942, lix) identifies the vital heat with pneuma. However, compare the two statements at 736b 
35-37 in the passage quoted above (736b 29-737a 8). 
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without this heat, though the possession of the heat does not thereby guarantee the 
possessor's capacity for sexual generation. Aristotle would say that in the case of 
spontaneous generation a living being requires external heat to reproduce its offspring. 
However, the need for external heat does not mean the complete lack of internal heat: all 
animals must have internal heat in order to be alive. 
There remain two questions to consider: whether all living beings, including plants, 
require pneuma in their reproduction and whether it is to be identified with the vital heat. If 
the answer to the latter question is positive, it then follows that the answer to the former 
must be positive as well. However, a negative answer to the latter does not necessitate a 
negative answer to the former since Aristotle might well posit pneuma as a vehicle or a 
container of the vital heat, as in the case of sexual generation where the pneuma in the 
semen transmits the soul to the next generation. As we saw, the semen is said to be 
composed of pneuma and water. However, it is plain that pneuma alone without containing 
the vital heat in it would not enable the female to reproduce its offspring since the vital heat 
in this case is the generative heat. In any case, there seems to be no doubt that pneuma is 
the vehicle or the container of the heat. If so, there is no reason to doubt that plants also 
have pneuma. Their possession of the heat is clear from the fact that Aristotle regards them 
as living beings and, also, acknowledges their capacity for reproduction. 323 In so far as they 
are alive and reproductive, they have the vital heat and, also, pneuma as the container that 
the heat resides in and as the vehicle that carries it to the next generation. However, 
Aristotle does not seem clearly to make up his mind about the relation between pneuma and 
323 "Ripening is a sort of concoction; for we call it ripening when .ther~ is .a concoction of the nutri~ent i~ 
fruit. And since concoction is a sort of perfecting, the process of npemng IS perfect when the seeds .m fruit 
are able to reproduce the fruit in which they are found ... In the case of boils and phlegm, and the like, the 
process of ripening is the concoction of the moisture in them by their natural heat ... " (Meteo. 380a 11 ff.; 
cf. PA 650a 2-7) On the vital heat in plants, see Freudenthal (1995), pp. 70-73. 
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the vital heat and, as a result it is difficult to determine which of th h 'd h 
' em e conSl ers as t e 
vehicle of the soul and, also, whether he identifies them as one and the same thing. 324 
(d) Pneuma in Sense-Perception 
In the account of the process of sense-perception in GA II. 6, Aristotle suggests that 
pneuma has a certain relation to the perception of the external object. 
The reason is that the sense-organ of the eyes is, just as the other sense-organs, set upon poroi: but the 
organ of touch and taste is simply the body or some part of the animal's body. Smell and hearing are poroi 
connecting with the outer air and full of connate pneuma, and ending in the veins [Cj>A.E[31a] from the heart 
that extend around the brain. (743b 35-744a 5)325 
In the DA II. 12, Aristotle tells us that perceiving the external object brings about a change 
in the body so that excessive perception of the object might destroy the sense organ (424a 
24-32). As for the contact senses, the contact between the external object and the sense 
organs is an immediate contact without any medium (422a 16 if.). 
What about the distance senses? The GA passage cited above does not clearly show 
what kind of role pneuma plays in the animal's perceiving the external object. However, it 
seems to suggest that the information gathered by the sense-organs reaches the heart by 
means of pneuma which fills the poroi (passages). 326 Aristotle conceives that in the case of 
smell and hearing pneuma is connected with the external air. The external air is, of course, 
not the sensible quality itself that the animal perceives, but the medium through which it 
perceives the sensible quality. Thus hearing can also be explained in terms of the voice 
324 Cf. Annas (1992), p. 18. Thus some commentators tend to say loosely that the sumphuton pneuma or 
the vital heat is that which transmits the soul to the embryo (e.g. Nussbaum, 1982, p. 159). 
325 Cited after Johansen (1998), p. 91. 
326 Johansen (1998), p. 91. For Aristotle's ambiguous usage of the term 'poroi', see Beare (1906), p. 86 n. 
1. 
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stirring up the external air that again brings about a change in our ears. It seems that the 
medium undoubtedly undergoes a certain change for "the actuality of the medium is to 
cause the actuality in the perceiver". 327 
Aristotle, in the GA passage above, says that the parai end at the veins that are spread 
out to the heart and the brain. 328 On the other hand, at GA 781 a 20 if, he tells us that the 
parai themselves are those which run from the sense-organs to the heart (or an analogous 
part). In any case, this statement implicitly suggests how the information perceived through 
the sense-organs can eventually bring about changes in the heart which result in animal 
locomotion. It appears that the change of the pneuma in the parai is caused by the external 
object which is perceived through the medium and it again causes a change in the heart. 
The animal perceives an object as pleasant or painful (Ch. IV. Sec. 2 (b)). However, its 
perceiving an object also involves bodily changes: that is, when it has those feelings, the 
pneuma in the heart gets hot or cold and works on the fluid that resides in the heart. As a 
result, the fluid evaporates and either pulsation or respiration is produced (Resp. 479b 16-
180a 15). Aristotle's account here sounds very much physiological or, rather, mechanical. 
In effect, as we shall presently see, he also explains the process from perception to the 
arousal of locomotion in that way. However, he notices that if animal locomotion is to be 
explained in such a way, then it has no difference from the purely mechanical motion of the 
puppet. Thus Aristotle ascribes to pneuma the title of 'unmoved mover' and tries to 
distinguish the two types of motion (see below). 
327 Johansen (1998), p. 131. , . , 
328 See Beare (1906), p. 335. He observes that in Aristotle the <PAE~lCl translate~ here as vem.s mea~, 
sometimes, 'nerves' and, sometimes, 'blood vessels' and that it is not always possIble to deterrrune which 
translation is correct. 
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V. 2 Pneuma in Animal Locomotion 
The preceding discussion of pneuma in reproduction or generation and sense-perception 
clearly suggests that Aristotle thinks of it as a material substance that belongs only to the 
living being and that has a close relation to its soul-capacities. In sub-sections (a) and (b), I 
shall discuss Aristotle's characterisations of pneuma in the account of animal locomotion in 
the MA, which will once again show his thesis that pneuma is a necessary condition for the 
animal to be able to perform its living activities. And then I shall turn to argue that Aristotle 
maintains the position that those activities of the soul can be actualised only in pneuma. In 
supporting this view, I shall examine, in (c), his use of the conception as a criterion of 
distinguishing animals and their parts and, in (d), the implication of his introduction of the 
conception in relation to his treatment of orexis in MA ch. 10. 
(a) The Project of the MA 
At the outset of the MA, Aristotle states that the treatise is devoted to the consideration 
of 'the common reason [aition] for various types of motion, e.g. flying, swimming, stepping 
etc.' (698a 4-7). Then he promptly goes on to examine the physiological mechanism of the 
arousal of locomotion. In doing this, Aristotle frequently shows that he is relying on the 
hypothesis that what is true of a small world will also be true of the universe and vice versa, 
one of the basic hypotheses he believes in. 329 His discovery of the conception of pneuma 
seems to be based on two grounds (i) that, as there is an unmoved mover in the universe, 
there must also be some unmoved origin in the living being for it to move itself in place (cf. 
700a 6-11) and that must be distinguished from the non-living being (a 12 ff.) and (ii) that, 
where there are psychological processes, there must be corresponding physiological 
329 E.g. Ph. 252b 25-29; cf. 252a 29-30; MA 698a 8-14; cf. 698b 8-15; 699a 22-27. See Ch. I. Sec. 1 (a). 
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processes (esp. 701b 33 ff.). We saw in Chapter I that Aristotle's observation of animals 
(that appear to move themselves without being moved by anything external) led him to the 
conclusion that they must include unmoved movers within themselves. However, this does 
not immediately entail (ii). (ii) is, rather, related to his conviction that the living being is 
composed of soul and body and the soul is not a separate entity from the body. That is, for 
a living being to be in motion, the soul must be embodied. However, this 'embodiment' of 
the soul in the body does not entail the conception of pneuma, either. That is, if the 
'embodiment' merely means the actualisation of the soul in any body, not in some specific 
body, then there is no need for Aristotle to relate orexis to such a specific corporeal 
substance as pneuma to which he ascribes a specific role. On the other hand, (ii) alone does 
not entail the existence of pneuma since, if the soul were not to be characterised as the 
unmoved mover, Aristotle would not require a corporeal substance that plays such a 
specific role. Thus the conception of pneuma is reached on the basis of both (i) and (ii) 
because neither of them alone can lead to the postulation of this particular material 
substance which corresponds to orexis. 
In MA ch. 6, Aristotle tells us that the rest of the treatise will concern the problems of 
'how the soul moves the body' and 'what the origin of an animal's motion is' (700b 9-10). 
It is important to note that in saying this he appears to regard 'how the soul moves the 
body' and 'how the soul is moved' as two separate questions (cf. 700b 4-6). It is 
undeniable that, as mentioned earlier, the language Aristotle uses sounds like Cartesian 
dualistic interactionism which claims that the alteration of the soul brings about the 
alteration of the body, and vice versa. However, as argued in Chapter II, it is wrong to 
assume that Aristotle takes such a position. As for the passivity of the soul, his position is 
that the soul is related to the body as its host or vehicle. That is, the soul is in no way 
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directly moved by anything, but it might be moved accidentally in virtue of being embodied 
(e.g. Ph. 259b 17 ff.).330 Moreover, such an embodiment must not be taken to mean that 
the soul is present in the body as an extra entity. 
At this stage, we need further to recapitulate our earlier discussion in Chapter I. We 
there saw that the key answer Aristotle gives to the question, raised in Ph. VIII, in what 
sense the living being is the self-mover is that it has an unmoved moving part and a moved 
part. Having such parts is a sufficient internal condition for a self-mover to move itself 
without being moved by anything external. In the case of forced change, it is, in general, 
clear that the source of the change is external, whereas in self-motion the source must be 
inside the living being. However, Aristotle maintains that there cannot be any living body 
without involving the soul. This suggests that, in so far as the living being is concerned, it is 
not possible for the external mover to impart motion to a body in a way that dispenses with 
a soul. The moved part of the living being (or the self-mover) is by definition that which is 
moved and so it must go through a certain change, whereas the SF (i.e. the unmoved 
moving part) or the soul is not itself in motion and so it is non-material or non-bodily since 
for him whatever is in motion must have a magnitude?31 Thus the soul as the source of 
motion must reside in the body. The ensouled body is itself a living being. Thus we can 
talk about the soul of a living being and, also, the body of a living being. 
Although Aristotle sets out to discuss the problem of 'how the soul moves (K1VEt) the 
body', he appears to think of the relation between the psychological and the physiological 
processes as simultaneous rather than causal which involves a time gap. That is, their 
. . 'h h ' b h h' 332 
relationship is 'one with, or In accordance Wlth, the other rat er t an one y t e ot er . 
330 See also Ch. 1. Sec 2 (b). 
331 Esp. DA 403a 3-25; cf. 407a 3 ff.; Ph. 240b 8 ff. 
332 See Nussbaum's examination of the relevantU4 passages (1978, pp. 151-153). 
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Thus Aristotle says that what moves and what is moved are indeed one, but different in 
einai (being). 
And the actuality of that which is capable of causing movement is no other than that of the movable. For it 
must be the fulfilment of both. For a thing is capable of causing movement because it can do this, and is a 
mover because it is active; but it is on the movable that it is capable of acting, so that the actuality of both 
alike is one, just as there is the same interval from one to two as from two to one, and as the ascent and the 
descent are one, but being them is not one; the case of the mover and the moved is similar. (Met. 1063a 28-
34) 
He is thus saying that, in the case of animal locomotion, it is the animal as a whole that 
moves, but its motion can be described in two ways; in psychological terms and in 
physiological terms. At DA 424a 24 if and 425b 26 if, Aristotle also makes a similar point 
in the account of the relation between the capacity for sense-perception and the sense 
organs. The activity described in terms of the capacity for sense-perception can be also 
described in terms of the activity of the bodily sense organs. If so, Aristotle's discussion of 
the relation between the parts of the living being can be understood as his emphasis that the 
soul and the body move together as 'the union of elements' acts as a whole towards an end 
which can be achieved only by virtue of being united,333 although the relationship between 
soul and body cannot be explained in the same way as the relationship between two 
corporeal elements because the soul is not corporeal. In what follows, I shall argue that 
Aristotle's project of the MA is to clarify this point in terms of orexis and pneuma. 
(b) Pneuma - The Material UnmovedMover 
Aristotle's investigation of animal locomotion begins with the attempt to make sense of 
the observation that animals appear to start their motion without being moved by anything 
333 Easterling (1966), p. 157. 
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external (Ph. 251 b 29 ff.). However, despite the fact that he has dealt with the matter in 
terms of the inner parts in the Ph. VIII and the DA, he now seems, in the MA, to think that 
his previous discussion was not satisfactory. What more does he want to say about it? As 
mentioned, Aristotle's primary concern in the treatise is with the question of how the soul 
moves the body. 
In chs. 1-5 of the MA, Aristotle often draws the conclusion that, as there is an unmoved 
mover in the universe, there must be an unmoved mover in the self-mover as well. One 
might think that this thesis has already been discussed in Ph. VIII and so there is nothing 
new to say about it. However, if we look more closely into his discussion in the MA 
chapters, Aristotle intends to discover a material unmoved mover, not an immaterial 
unmoved mover which has been dealt with elsewhere. For instance, in MA ch. 1 just after 
emphasising the necessity of an unmoved mover in the animal which is no doubt immaterial 
(698a 7-11), he tells us that animal joints are like unmoved movers which are not moved by 
anything else, but, nonetheless, move something else (698a 11 ff.; cf 702a 21-b 11). In ch. 
2, he tries to persuade us to accept that the resisting surface is a material unmoved mover 
(698b 8 if). And the rest of the chapters steer towards the same point about the necessity 
of a material unmoved mover. All these efforts turn out to lead to the discovery, in ch. 10, 
of pneuma as the unmoved mover necessary for animal locomotion. The questions we need 
to ask are then in what sense pneuma is a material unmoved mover and why Aristotle 
endeavours to find such a substance. 
(i) Pneuma as a Basis of Strength 
Aristotle's characterisation of a material substance as an unmoved mover does not 
sound as surprising as it first appears, once we read his characterisations of pneuma in MA 
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ch. 10. He tells us: (i) pneuma is where animals derive their strength frOm,334 (ii) it is 
situated in the heart (or an analogous part in some animals) (703a 14-16), (iii) it imparts 
movement by being moved (703a 11-14; cf. a 4-7), (iv) it is capable of expanding, 
contracting, pulling, and pushing without constraint (703a 19-23), (v) it does not bring 
about changes in others by being itself altered (703a 24_25),335 and (vi) it is heavier than the 
fiery and lighter than its opposite, i.e. the earthy (703a 23-24; cf. GC 311a 13 ff.). This is 
indeed all the information about pneuma we can gather from the MA. Among these 
features, we shall chiefly focus on (i) and (v) in relation to the discussion of pneuma as a 
material unmoved mover. 
In MA ch. 1, Aristotle attends to the fact that, when in animal locomotion one part of 
the body moves, there must be some other part that remains still (698a 16-17), as in the 
case of the forearm moving when the elbow remains still (b 1 ff.). At 698a 16-21, he tells 
us that the joint enables the parts of the body to move in such a way. An important point 
about the joint is that it embraces two points, one being moved and the other at rest (a 21 
if; 702 21-32). The joint is thus where the end-points, or extremities, of two parts meet. 
And, each joint is that in which one motion ends and another begins. Aristotle understands 
that the motion that begins is somehow initiated by the joint and regards the joint as an 
unmoved mover that moves another part, while also remaining at rest (e.g. 698b 8-15; 699a 
27 etc.). After arguing for the necessity of the external unmoved mover, he also claims, in 
ch. 4, that there must be an unmoved mover inside the anima1. 
But in the case of animals, there must be something unmoved not only in this sense, but also, within the 
actual creatures moving from place to place-those, that is, which move themselves-(since they must have 
one part at rest and one in motion), there must be something against which the moved part supports itself 
334 E.g. MA 703a 9-10; 703a 18-19; Somn. 456a 15-23. 
335 "BEt BE 'to }lEA-A-OV lCtVEtV }lit Cx.A-A-otrocr£t 'towt>'tov EiV(ll." For the implication of this passage, see 
below. 
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when it moves, as, for example, if it moves one of its limbs; for one part supports itself against another 
which is, so to speak, at rest. (700a 6-11; cf. a 17-20) 
However, what exactly is the role of the unmoved mover other than that of being the source 
of motion? More explicitly in chs. 2-3, the role of the unmoved mover is described as 
offering resistance. Aristotle says, 
For just as there,must be something unmoved within the animal, if it is going to move, so even more there 
must be something outside the animal which is unmoved, supporting itself against which that which moves 
is moved. For if it gives way all the time, as when tortoises walk in mud or men on sand, the creature will 
not advance, and there will be neither stepping, if the ground should not remain still, nor flying nor 
swimming, if the air or the sea should not offer resistance. (698b 12-18) 
He is here concerned with the unmoved mover (e.g. the surface, the air, or the sea) outside 
the animal that offers resistance. He says that the animal requires not only the external 
resisting force, but also the internal resisting force, and this is what differentiates it from the 
non-living being (698a 11-17). These characterisations of the material unmoved mover are 
relevant to those of pneuma illustrated above. Among them, pneuma as a basis of strength 
suggests that Aristotle's arguments for the unmoving principle in chs. 1-4 of the MA are 
meant to provide a framework for establishing the conception of pneuma in later chapters. 
F or Aristotle, affections are, in general, accompanied by heating and chilling in the 
heart, according to whether the affection is, respectively, pleasant or painful. 336 When the 
animal as a whole, not the soul or the body alone, senses something pleasant, the heart, 
more specifically, the pneuma in the heart (or in an analogous part) gets hot and, as a result, 
the heart expands. Under the opposite circumstances, the pneuma gets cold and the heart 
contracts. The expansion and the contraction of the region of the heart are thus due to the 
336 See 70lb 13 ff.; b 33 ff.; 702b 21- 25; 703a 14 ff. 
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nature of pneuma, as a balloon expands and contracts in accordance with the change of the 
temperature of the air in it. As mentioned, Aristotle claims that all animals derive their 
strength from pneuma. However, what is it to say that pneuma is a source of strength? 
How does the animal get its strength from pneuma? 
In his discussion of Atlas in MA ch. 3 (699a 27 ff.), Aristotle says that both what moves 
and what is moved must have some force. However, if their forces are equal, they will not 
be in any motion and remain at rest. Thus the moving part must have a greater force than 
that of the moved part in order for there to be a motion. At MA 698a 16 ff., Aristotle tells 
us that in the case of an animal the moving part and the moved part are connected by a 
joint. His reason for introducing a joint seems to be to say, as seen, that both parts 
connected by a joint might produce different types of motion. For instance, lifting the 
forearm straight up brings about the hand moving left or right by reason of involving a wrist 
joint (698a 18-21). The role of the joint in this sense is to offer resistance like the surface, 
the sea, the air, etc. Aristotle seems to think that the pneuma contained in the lung or the 
heart offers resistance to the animal in the same way as the joint does (MA 700a 19-25; cf. 
698b 12-15). Some parts of the animal support themselves against the lung or the heart so 
that the animal as a whole can initiate its motion. Thus pneuma is like the joint, e.g. the 
wrist of the hand or the elbow of the arm which is unmoved. Aristotle elsewhere says that 
such an intense force for the animal to move itself is produced by holding its breath, i.e. 
pneuma. 
Since it is impossible to make any movement, or do any action, without strength, and the holding of the 
breath produces strength-breath from outside in the case of animals which inhale, and inherent breath in 
the case of those which do not (which is why winged insects of the class holoptera are observed to buzz 
when they move, through the friction of the breath pulsating against the diaphragm) ... (Somn. 456a 16-23. 
trans. Hett. See also GA 737b 29-738a 1) 
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All males hold their breath before emitting sperm (GA 718a 2-3), whether child-birth is 
easier or not depends on how well the female holds her breath in labour (775b 1-2), and so 
on.
337 If so, the pneuma in the lung or the heart can be said to be an unmoved mover in the 
sense of joints that lie between different parts of the body. It then appears that the purpose 
of the 'joint' account in the earlier chapters (chs. 1-4) of the MA is to establish the necessity 
of the centre as an unmoved mover in the physiological system of the living body. 
However, even if this is one sense of pneuma as an unmoved mover in the animal, it 
does not seem to be a distinguishing criterion of the animal from the puppet. F or it is 
certainly conceivable that the puppet has joints. That is, although the puppet is connected 
by cables and pegs instead of sinews and bones in the animal, it also seems to have joints in 
the sense of unmoved movers that offer resistance. 338 If so, there seems to be no 
fundamental difference between the animal and the puppet and between their motions. 
However, there is no doubt that Aristotle wants to distinguish them in terms of pneuma 
(701b 10 ff.). Thus we need further to examine the role of pneuma in animal locomotion. 
(ii) The One-Way Motion of Pneuma and Its Significance 
Aristotle elsewhere characterises pneuma as something that "KtV£tV J.11l Ct.AAOHO<J£t" 
(MA 703a 24-25). The implication of this phrase is not immediately clear. Nussbaum 
translates it as 'imparting motion without undergoing alteration' .339 But it might also mean 
'imparting motion not by being altered'. The former implies that pneuma itself does not 
undergo any alteration, whereas the latter can mean that it does not impart motion by the 
alteration by which it is affected. If so, the latter does not necessarily mean that pneuma is 
337 For more relevant passages, Clark (1975), pp. 203-204. The references are due to him. 
338 See below for more on this point. 
339 Nussbaum (1978), p. 52. 
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absolutely free from alteration. Before discussing the inalterability of pneuma itself, let us 
first examine the passage where this characterisation under discussion is made. I quote the 
relevant passage at length. 
The movement of animals is like that of automatic puppets, which are set moving when a small motion 
occurs ... Now in the puppets and carts no alteration takes place, since if the inner wheels were to become 
smaller and again larger, the movement would still be circular. But in the animal the same part has the 
capacity to become both larger and smaller and to change its shape, as the parts expand because of heat and 
contract again because of cold, and alter. Alteration is caused by phantasiai and sense-perceptions and 
ideas.34o For sense-perceptions are at once a kind of alteration and phantasia and thinking have the power 
of the actual things. For it turns out that the form conceived of the [warm or cold or] pleasant or fearful is 
like the actual thing itself. That is why we shudder and are frightened just thinking of something. All 
these are affections and alterations; and when bodily parts are altered some become larger, some smaller. ... 
Further, when, under the influence of heat or cold or some other similar affection, an alteration is produced 
in the region of the heart, even if it is only in an imperceptibly small part of it, it produces a considerable 
difference in the body, causing blushing and pallor, as well as shuddering, trembling, and their opposites. 
(70lb 2-32) 
In the GA, Aristotle also uses the 'puppet example' in a comparison with the formation of 
an embryo as a typical example of a chain of motions explained in mechanical terms as in 
the case of A moving B, B moving C, and so on (734a 3-18; 741b 6 if.). On the other 
hand, in the above passage, he explains that the puppet composed of the pegs and the iron 
moves when it is released and slackened by means of a cable. He also thinks that the 
mechanical motion of the puppet is similar to animal locomotion that is produced by means 
of sinews, limbs, etc. (MA 701b 3-10). Also, the two creatures have something else in 
common in that a small change occurring in a central part results in great and numerous 
changes at a distance (cf. 701b 24-28 above). We might illustrate this point with an 
example of a man spinning a long string tied with a stone. In such a case, the string near the 
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man's hand makes a small circle, but the string makes bigger circles with greater distance 
from the hand. 
Nonetheless, there is, Aristotle says in the above passage, a major difference between 
animal locomotion and the motion of the puppet in that the puppet does not undergo any 
alteration (aA,A,oi(O(n~), whereas the animal does. However, it is to be noted that in the 
above passage he does not mean by aAAol(oOt~ the change of colour, temperature, etc., but 
becoming bigger or smaller, expanding, or contracting. He denies such alteration to the 
carts for the reason that their inner wheels do not become smaller and larger, whereas he 
ascribes alteration to the animal in that it has a part that can become both smaller and larger 
in turn. That is, such a part is what enables the animal to be capable of alteration. 
However, why does Aristotle think that this is an important point? What does he want 
to tell us with it? The last paragraph in the passage cited above suggests that he is 
concerned with the question how a small quantitative change in a small part can produce 'a 
considerable difference' all over the body. Aristotle does not explicitly tell us which part he 
means by 'a small part', but it is presumably either some part in the heart or the heart itself. 
He says that an alteration occurs when heat or cold causes expansion or contraction in the 
region of the heart, and the expansion or the contraction again produces such alterations as 
blushing, pallor, shuddering, etc. Aristotle's emphasis on expansion and contraction in the 
region of the heart is based on the two grounds that the governing principle must reside in 
the most important part of the body (MA 702a 32-b 11) and that the heart is this important 
part since it is the first part to be formed in the embryo (GA 735 21-25) and since "a part 
which contains the first principle and the End of the animal's whole nature-which must be 
present in an animal ... must of necessity be formed first of all" (742a 37-b 1). Thus when 
the embryo is so formed, the heart (or an analogous part in some animals) is the first part to 
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be formed (and the last to fail when the animal dies) because it is the first principle of 
growth and movement to the other parts (739 b 32 if· 742a 16 b 37) d lb' . 
. , - an a so ecause It IS 
the source of sensations (743b 25-32) and contains the essential nature of the . al C· T. arum JUV. 
478b 32-34). Aristotle thus regards the heart as the central part of the animal and thinks 
that all the primary living activities start from there. Thus understood, Aristotle's placement 
of pneuma in the heart (or an analogous part) (MA 703a 15-16; cf. 703b 23-29) suggests 
that he wants to attribute to it a certain role which is initiated from the very beginning of 
life. 
Aristotle further says in the MA that in arousing locomotion "there is no need of soul in 
each part" of the animal body (703a 36-37) since the components of the animal body (e.g. 
bones, sinews, marrows, flesh, etc.) are so well arranged as to move appropriate bodily 
parts for locomotion when 'some governing principle' initiates it (703a 30-b 2). By 'some 
governing principle', he means the soul that resides in the heart with the sumphuton 
pneuma. Although, as seen above, pneuma is spread all over the body, Aristotle appears to 
distinguish the pneuma in the heart from the pneuma elsewhere. Thus the pneuma in the 
heart has a close relation to the soul. The pneuma cannot be the governing principle 
without the soul. Without the soul, it will be like a dead body or a severed bodily part 
which Aristotle does not want to call a body or a bodily part at all. Aristotle thinks that 
such a well organised body resembles a city well-governed by the laws. The role of the 
pneuma in the region of heart is to control the organised sinews, limbs, etc., as a man 
controls a well-organised puppet with pegs and irons by a cable at the starting point. 
Pneuma expands and contracts the region of the heart as the air in a balloon expands or 
contracts it when it is heated up or cooled down. However, it should be clear by now that 
pneuma certainly undergoes the alteration of getting hot or cold and, as a result, 
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respectively, expands or contracts the heart which initiates the movement of the sinews and 
the limbs of the animal. Again, pneuma is by definition 'hot air' and it is undeniable that 
Aristotle acknowledges that it might gain or lose some of its heat. However, it is not the 
case that it transmits its own temperature to other parts of the body, but transforms it into 
the expansion and the contractions of the bodily parts. At GC I. 7, 324a 30-b 13 (cf. Ph. 
258a 18-22), Aristotle says that "between the unmoved mover and moved the contact is 
one-way". 341 
Now, in motion, there is nothing to prevent the first mover being unmoved (indeed, as regards some this is 
actually necessary) although the last mover always imparts motion by being itself moved; and, in action, 
there is nothing to prevent the first agent being unaffected, while the last agent only acts by suffering action 
itself. For if things have not the same matter, the agent acts without being affected; thus the art of healing 
produces health without itself being acted upon in any way by that which is being healed. But the food, in 
acting, is itself in some way acted upon: for, in acting, it is simultaneously heated or cooled or otherwise 
affected. Now the art of healing corresponds to an origin, while the food corresponds to the last (i.e. 
contiguous) mover ...... . 
Pneuma has a peculiar characteristic in that it is the agent that undergoes some alteration by 
means of some other agent, but does not transfer the same alteration it receives to another 
patient. That is, it becomes hot or cold by means of some other agent and thus undergoes 
motion in quality, but the motion it transmits to the region of the heart is motion in quantity, 
i.e. expansion and contraction of the area. Once again, pneuma is altered by something 
else but this is not the same sort of alteration the pneuma imparts to the heart. And in this , 
sense, pneuma is said to be an unmoved mover, although it does undergo a certain 
alteration, i. e. becoming hot or cool. 
In the previous section, we saw that, when the treatment of pneuma as an unmoved 
mover in the sense of a joint is understood as such, there is a doubt about its validity as a 
341 Gill (1991), p. 255. 
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distinguishing criterion between animal motion and the motion of the puppet. However, as 
we have seen in the present section, the significance of pneuma in the animal is its nature to 
transmit a different sort of alteration to its patient from the motion it undergoes. 342 
(c) Pneuma as a Differentiating Factor 
Based on the examination of the physiological constituents (in particular, flesh and 
blood) of the animal, Lloyd tries to show that "in the case of living creatures, there is no 
altenative to the matter they happen to possess.343 In this way, he denies the functionalist 
ascription of compositional plasticity to Aristotle's hylomorphic distinction between soul 
and body. He rightly points out that in order to understand the activities of the living being, 
we have to analyse not only the nature of its constituents such as flesh and bones, but also 
the nature of the elements (i.e. the simple bodies) that constitute them. 344 Indeed, Aristotle 
deals with the primary constituents of bodily parts at GC II. 7, 334a 22 ff in terms of the 
primary pairs of opposites, i.e. 'hot and cold' and 'wet and dry'. However, as he claims in 
the subsequent chapter, not only living beings but, in fact, all the beings in the sublunary 
world are composed of the four simple bodies (334a 31-335a 22). 
There is no doubt that Aristotle believes that each of the simple bodies has its own 
characteristics, i.e. fire (hot and dry), air (hot and moist), water (cold and moist), and earth 
(cold and dry) (330b 4-5). If the functionalist interpretation of Aristotle is right, then 
Aristotle must have thought that there can be some sorts of matter other than fire that has 
the characteristics of 'hot and dry'. That is, Aristotle should have thought of more than the 
four elements and called something fire for the reason that 'that something' has the 
342 See also Sec. (d) (ii) below. 
343 Lloyd (1992), p. 39. 
344 Lloyd (1992), pp. 45-46. 
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characteristics of fire. Ho thi l' f 
wever, s me 0 argument does not appear convincing since for 
Aristotle the number of the fundamental constituents that are common to all sublunary 
beings is exactly four. 
As we saw earlier, in accounting for the activities of the living being Aristotle introduces 
the conception of pneuma that is peculiar only to the living being (cf GA 736 29-737a 8). 
Unfortunately, although Lloyd does notice the conception,345 he neglects its significant role 
in relation to the flesh and blood he discusses in his article and to the physiological 
constituents of the living being as a whole. F or that reason, his argument is not strong 
enough against the functionalist position. For, as we shall see, Aristotle admits that not all 
animals have the blood, but some might have some analogous liquid. The functionalist 
notes this point and goes on to argue that they are compositionally plastic. 346 Thus, unless 
Lloyd shows what both types of liquid are primarily composed of, his argument is still 
vulnerable to the functionalist attack. However, the following discussion will show that the 
primary component of both the blood and the analogous liquid has a close relation to the 
amount of pneuma. This will also suggest that Aristotle does not think that there can be 
another element Q that can have the same characteristics as P. For him, if something had 
the characteristics ofP, it would be P, not Q or whatever. 347 
As noted, in the DA Aristotle has distinguished different classes of living beings 
according to their functions or activities in virtue of the different faculties of the soul they 
345 Lloyd (1992), p. 46. 
346 See Nussbaum (1978), p. 82 ff.; Nussbaum and Putnam (1992), n. 17. 
347 Cohen (1992, p. 69) argues that the attempt to characterise the essential connection between soul and 
body in the living being in terms of the four simple bodies is a way 'gone too far' since 'the elements are too 
remote to be the matter of a living hylomorphic compound; they are not even potentially alive'. Ho"oever, 
we have seen that Aristotle has no doubt that the composition of the living being of the four simple bodies 
plus pneuma is a primary mark that distinguishes it from the artefact, e.g. the puppet, that is ~omposed of 
the four bodies only (J\.1A 701b 2 ff.). Moreover, Aristotle thinks that the amount of pneuma IS related to 
different bodily organs, different species of animals and, also, to their lives and dea~s .(see ~lo~). Th~s 
without the examination, in particular, of pneuma, it is not possible to show what the livmg bemg IS, why It 
is alive, why some animals have different bodily organs, and the like. 
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have (see Chs. III and IV). Non-living beings are differentiated from living beings in the 
Ph. for the reason that the latter have souls (255a 6 if) Among li' b' . a1 
. . vmg emgs, arum s are 
different from plants in virtue of their sensitive faculty of the soul, whereas locomotive 
animals are different from non-locomotive animals in virtue of their locomotive faculty. 
Thus if he wants to say that the soul-faculties are essentially embodied, then it is to be 
expected that he will also try to establish the different sorts of matter they are realised in.348 
In effect, this is exactly what Aristotle is doing by characterising pneuma and blood as 
differentiating factors in different classes of animals,349 in different sexes,350 and in different 
parts of the animal. 351 Different bodily parts and different animals are generated in 
accordance with the purity, the temperature, or (and) the amount of pneuma and blood (or 
the analogous stuff) (cf esp. 732b 26 if; HA 521a 4 if). His account of different animals in 
terms of blood in PAIl. 2 is one such example. 
Further, variations are found among different specimens of these uniform parts, and this is to subserve a 
good purpose. Blood is an excellent illustration. Blood can be thin or thick, clear or muddy, cold or warm; 
and it can be different in different parts of the same animal: instances are known of animals in which the 
blood in the upper parts differs from that in the lower parts in respect of the characteristics just enumerated. 
And of course the blood of one animal differs from that of another. (647b 29-36) 
This passage tells us how Aristotle explains the reason for different species of animals being 
different and, also, for different capabilities of the same species of animals. The 
differentiating factor introduced here is blood which includes 'heat in its definition' (PA 
649b 25-26). For Aristotle "the blood is the material of which the whole body is made" 
348 Cf. Lloyd (1992), pp. 44-45. 
349 GA 732b 15 if.; cf. Resp. 475b 6 if.; HA 521a 4-6. 
350 GA 765b 7 if.; cf. HA 521a 23-32; PA 648a 28 if. Cf. Rist (1989), p. 131 & pp. 246-249. 
351 GA 741b 37 if.; PA 647b 31-648a 28. As may well be clear by now, the degrees or levels of pneuma 
Aristotle is here concerned with are different from those levels Balme has in mind (Sec. 1 (a) above). 
Aristotle's are of connate pneuma, whereas Balme's are of inhaled air. 
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(6S1a 14) and thus its condition is a criterion of the distinction between individuals and 
species. In this way, he ascribes to blood "a whole range of other functions of the soul" as 
, 
Lloyd points out. 352 
Aristotle explains different parts of the animal in terms of the temperature of blood in 
P A II. 2 and different classes of the animal in terms of their different amounts of blood in 
GA II. 1. However, he closely relates its temperature to its amount and so different animals 
are so divided on both counts (see GA 732b 32 if). It thus seems that the differentiating 
factor of animals and their parts is blood rather than pneuma. However, they are indeed 
correlate concepts. In effect, the thinness or thickness of the blood (or blood-like liquid) 
has a lot to do with the amount of pneuma in it (735b 8-37). Aristotle maintains that the 
hotter blood is thinner and clearer and so "the more perfect are those which are hotter in 
their nature and have more moisture". 353 As noted, the concoction is the action of the heat 
on moisture which, as a result, evaporates. The blood (in sanguineous animals) or the 
analogous stuff (in bloodless animals) is the liquid that evaporates by the heat that acts on it 
(P A 648a 20-22). That is, the liquid is concocted by the heat and turned into pneuma. 
Furthermore, the pneumatised blood not only supplies the nutrition necessary for 
maintaining the life and the growth of the animal, but also contributes to the formation of its 
various bodily parts. 354 We need to recall our earlier discussion of the pneuma that 
performs a cooling effect. It seems that the more pneuma an animal has, the cooler its body 
is and also the thicker its blood becomes. Presumably, if an animal does not have enough , , 
heat necessary for its living, it will not live long. However, a small amount of pneuma in an 
animal does not necessarily mean that the animal will live long and its blood will be hot. 
352 Lloyd (1992), p. 44. 
353 GA 732b 31-32; cf. HA 521a 4-6; a 23-32. 
354 Peck (1953), p. 115. 
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What is important is that the necessary amount of pneuma is related to the necessary heat or 
temperature that the being in question requires in order to stay alive. If there is too much or 
too little heat, it will not survive (Resp. 474b 10 ff.). Thus when Aristotle says above that 
the more perfect being is hotter than others, he means that the degree of the heat it naturally 
requires is higher than that of others. For instance, intelligent beings require more pneuma 
than others in controlling their temperature (cf PA 647b 29 ff.). Thus the appropriate 
amount of pneuma is related also to the lives and deaths of living beings. 
Although Aristotle often talks about an analogous part to the heart or analogous stuff to 
the blood and so on, he never conceives any analogous substance to pneuma. That is, when 
the blood is concocted, it is 'charged with pneuma' or, as is sometimes described, 
'pneumatised'; i. e. the pneuma resides in the blood. 355 Thus the amount of pneuma and 
that of blood are correlative. According to our discussion so far, it appears that the 
correlation between the amount of pneuma and that of blood is a key factor in determining 
what kinds of animals they are and what kinds of capacities they are supposed to have. 
However, we have to say that the common factor of differentiating living beings is pneuma 
rather than the blood since only some of the animals have blood, whereas pneuma is 
common to all the living beings. As seen, there is no doubt that Aristotle thinks of pneuma 
as a fundamental component of bodily parts. The point is that he does not think of any 
material substance other than pneuma as playing the same role as it does. If he thought that 
pneuma can be replaced with another substance that plays the same role it does, he should 
have mentioned even once that there is an analogous substance to it, as he often talks of 
analogous bodily parts to other bodily organs. However, he never speaks in that way. Thus 
we may now conclude that Aristotle does not accept compositional plasticity at the 
355 For the argument for this point, see Freudenthal (1995), pp. 121-124. 
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fundamental level. The question we are concerned with here is not whether it is really 
possible that a psychological capacity that is realised in P can be realised in Q for the reason 
that Q is in the same functional state as P, but whether Aristotle would acknowledge such a 
possibility. Our examination of pneuma in this section shows that Aristotle would deny the 
possibility that pneuma can be replaced with any other sort of matter. 356 
We might call the psychological activities 'functions'. However, they are not 'the 
functional states of matter' which allows for compositional plasticity.357 For Aristotle 
pneuma is not the air in the environment, though he sometimes calls it with the same name, 
but the connate pneuma that belongs to an animal in a living (en souled) being. Likewise, 
the functions of the soul are not to be performed apart from the appropriate matter which 
undergoes such and such processes. Aristotle thinks not only that psychological processes 
must accompany corresponding physiological processes, but also that the matter that 
undergoes the processes must be specific matter, i.e. pneuma, that exhibits its peculiar 
characteristics. The latter point signifies that if we replace the pneuma in the heart with any 
of the simple bodies or any other compound of them, none of them will act as the pneuma 
and so the animal will not be able to be alive, not to speak of functioning in an appropriate 
way. Thus, when Aristotle says that "the soul is in a body, not any body, but 'a body of 
such a sort' (DA 414a 19-20)" or that "the soul can be realised in what is already in the 
potentiality of that thing, i.e. in the appropriate matter ... (a 25_28)",358 he means that there 
356 See below for more on this point. 
357 Nussbaum (1978), p. 146. , , ~ , , 
358 The relevant Greek text reads "O'&}lcx. }lEV yap OUK ,EO''tt~ O'cO}lcx.'t~~ OE,... 'tt, K,cx.t, Otcx. r 'tou'to, E~' 0'0l:,~ 
una. Et Kcx.1. E.V O'cO}lcx.'tt 'tOtOU'tOl Kcx.1. OUX roO'nEp Ot npo'tEpoV El~ 0'0l}lcx. £V11P}lO..,O~ cx.U'tTtV, 0 "E\ npo~gtoPtSOV'tE~ E.v 'ttVt Kcx.1. notq;: Kcx.tnEp ouoE q>cx.tvO}lEvO'U 'tot> 't'UX6V'to~ oEXE0'8cx.t 'to, 'tU~O\'. :" o't,~ 
}lEV o-ov E.v'tEAEXEta. 'tt~ E.0''tt Kcx.1. A6yo~ 'tot> ouvcx.}ltv EXOV'tO~ dvcx.t 'totou'to'U, q>cx.VEpOV EK 'to'U't0l\'. 
(DA 414a 21-28) 
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must be a particular bodily substance without which the I . . 
sou -capaCItIes cannot be 
actualised. Thus the functionalist ascription of compositional plasticity to Aristotle fails. 359 
(d) Pneuma and Orexis 
Aristotle's explicit account of the role of pneuma in animal locomotion can be found 
only in MA ch. 10. He opens the chapter by saying, 
According to the account that gives the reason for motion, desire is the middle, which imparts movement 
being moved. But in living bodies there must be some body of this kind (AM 703a 4-6) 
The passage suggests two points: (1) Aristotle regards orexis and pneuma as moved-
movers and (2) his arrival at the conception of pneuma is based on the discovery of orexis, 
but not the other way around. Let us examine the implication of these points in tum. 
(i) Pneuma and Orexis as Moved-Movers 
We have taken it for granted from our earlier discussion of the SF in Chapter I that, 
since orexis is a soul-capacity, it is not subject to motion on its own without being 
embodied or enmattered. We also saw Aristotle's attempt to establish pneuma as an 
unmoved mover. Thus one might be alarmed by Aristotle's claim in the above passage that 
both orexis and pneuma are moved-movers, i.e. those that KtVOUOt KtVOU~£va.. How can 
the two conflicting characterisations be reconciled? Is it reasonable to say that they are 
unmoved movers as well as moved-movers? In dealing with these questions, let us first ask 
what orexis is said to be moved by. One might think that orexis is in the middle (~toov) in 
relation to locomotion because it comes between the activity or actualisation of sense-
359 E.g. Nussbaum (1978), p. 148. 
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perception (or seeing an object), for instance, and the arousal of locomotion However 
. , 
even if this is true, it does not necessarily follow that pneuma should also come in the 
middle. For Aristotle, in the.MA, maintains that not only orexis, but also sense-perception, 
phantasia, and thought (which are necessary for the arousal of orexis), are actualised in 
pneuma. Thus the order of the actualisation of psychological capacities in arousing 
locomotion does not thereby make pneuma a moved-mover. 
What is of importance at this stage is to note that whatever is said to move orexis it is 
, 
not any internal bodily parts or other psychological processes, but the external object (see 
e.g. 700b 23-25; 703a 7-8). However, the relation between the external object and orexis 
is, of course, not a causal one as in the case of a man pushing a chair. There are two 
primary reasons for this claim: Aristotle thinks, first, that there is no time gap between 
perceiving an object and the actual initiation of locomotion (MA 702a 15-17; a 20-21; cf. b 
26 ff) and, second, that the soul cannot cause change in anything that has a magnitude 
without being embodied (703a 1-3). For, although Aristotle often introduces the object of 
orexis as the origin of animal locomotion, it is clear that it does not move the animal or 
cause it to move as a man pushes or drags a chair by force. 36o Thus we have to think of 
orexis as an embodied capacity. But embodied in what? As seen, Aristotle clearly indicates 
that it is embodied in pneuma. In other words, as he envisages sense-organs as the 
actualising bodily parts of the capacity for sense-perception, he also regards pneuma as the 
bodily element in which orexis is actualised. Thus Aristotle's suggestion seems to be that 
the activities of orexis and the activities of pneuma being moved-movers can be established 
in so far as we treat them as the activities of one and the same thing. That is, orexis is not 
moved in its own right, but by being embodied in pneuma. However, it is, of course, odd to 
360 E.g. DA 433b 5 fl.; MA 700b 23 fl.; 701b 33 fl. 
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say that pneuma desires something. Strictly speaking, it is the animal that desires something 
in virtue of the appetitive faculty of the soul embodied in pneuma. Given this caution, we 
shall now freely talk of the object of orexis or pneuma. 
According to the passage at A1A 702a 17_19/61 the arousal of locomotion involves the 
following processes: (i) perceiving an object as pleasant or painful (heating and chilling),362 
(ii) the desire to pursue or avoid (expansion or contraction), (iii) the preparation for pursuit 
or avoidance (the arrangement of the bodily parts), and (iv) the actual arousal of 
locomotion. As noted, the process from (i) to (iii) involves pneuma which resides not only 
in the heart (703a 14-16), but also throughout the whole body (a 18-19). Pneuma is so well 
disposed as to organise the whole living body and so its bodily parts are in appropriate 
places to actualise the capacities of animals (703a 28 if.). Thus when the pneuma in the 
heart gets hot or cool, it expands or contracts the heart so as to put the whole body in 
actual motion. Aristotle's characterisation of orexis embodied in pneuma as a moved 
mover in the account of locomotion appears to presuppose the external object as the input 
and locomotion as the output, as the functionalist would describe (see Ch. II. 1 (c)). 
However, he thinks that the process from (i) to (iii) is simultaneous and they are all 
actualised in the physiological substance, pneuma. Indeed, Aristotle's treatment of orexis 
as a moved mover in relation to the external object suggests that he thinks of it not as a 
single capacity that is separated from other psychological capacities, but as a faculty that 
comprehends them. 363 Thus for Aristotle the psychological activities involved in the arousal 
of locomotion do not have a causal relationship in our sense of 'causal'. That is, he also 
361 Cited in Ch. IV. 1 (a). See also e.g. MA 701b 16 if.; b 33 if. 
362 Whether animals perceive an object as an object of a certain sort in a somewhat loose sense, or 
specifically as an object of pleasure or pain has been discussed in Ch. IV. esp. Sec. 1 (b) & (c). 
363 See Ch. III. Sec. 1 (a). 
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differs from the functionalist in that he does not acknowledge causal relations between the 
psychological activities. 364 
It is undeniable that an animal requires a triggering or igniting force for its locomotion. 
Considering that the process from (i) to (iii) via (ii) leads to locomotion, it now appears that 
the animal requires something to heat or cool the pneuma. We need to note two points 
here: (a) the feeling of pleasure or pain results from the presentation of an object through 
sense-perception, phantasia, or thought365 and (b) the psychological activity of pleasure or 
pain is identified with the physiological activity of heating or chilling. If so, the object in (a) 
seems to be a triggering force, i.e. the source of motion. It is, however, still obscure how 
the object is said to move the perceiver or in what sense it is a source or cause of motion. 
Fudey thinks that an individual's orexis rather than the object as such is a cause. 366 It is 
certainly true that the object does not push or drag the perceiver in action. It can become 
the object of orexis when and only when the animal desires it. However, we need to clarify 
this statement, according to our earlier discussion (Ch. III. Sec. 3 (a)). Firstly, only when 
an object is perceived or recognised by the animal as what is pleasant or painful, does it 
become the object of pursuit or avoidance (8U.tlK'tOV Kat <pEUK'tOV). Moreover, even if 
there are intentional objects of orexis, the individual will have orexis only when it feels 
hungry. Thus it is not the object as such, but the object interpreted as pleasant or painful by 
a desiring animal, that is the source of motion. 
However, we need to pause to ask again whether this is Aristotle's understanding of the 
object as the source of motion. We know that the soul is not an efficient cause in the 
. '1 b t 367 d 
modern sense in that for Aristotle causation IS not necessan y etween two even s an, 
364 See Ch. II. Sec. 1 (c). 
365 See esp. Ch. IV. Sec 2 (c). 
366 Furley (1996), p. 64; see also, Smith and Jones (1986), esp. pp. 238-239. 
367 Lear (1988), pp. 30-3l. 
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also, causes are not necessarily prior to effects. 368 However, it is undeniable that Aristotle 
regards the soul as an efficient cause in that it brings about some effects in the living body. 
The question is then what brings about effects in it. This question arises since saying that 
the individual's orexis is the source of motion is no more than saying that its soul is the 
source. If so, it seems that Aristotle does not have to mention any external object as a 
source at all since orexis as such is the orexis for something. However, this is certainly 
wrong. At DA III. 10, 433b 5 ff., Aristotle describes the object as an unmoved mover. It is 
an unmoved mover because it brings about motion in the animal by being desired. In other 
words, it does not bring about motion in the animal by force or qua itself, but by being 
'apprehended in thought or phantasia'. 369 It thus appears that animal soul is the efficient 
cause in the sense that the animal would not be able to arouse its locomotion without it. 
Moreover, the animal is capable of desiring an object for the sake of some specific end in 
virtue of its soul. 
It seems that Aristotle's concern with the object of orexis is derived from a conviction 
that "if there were no external objects in the first instance, then the animal would not be able 
to satisfy its orexis for survival". Thus considering that the ultimate aim of the living being 
is to live, the existence of the external object seems to be as important as its orexis. It is 
now clear that unless the object of desire is perceived by the perceiver as pleasant or 
painful, it cannot be a final aition of the perceiver. 370 At first glance, the influence of the 
object seems to be its presence in phantasia or thought, i.e. merely an imagined or 
368 Allan (1965), p. 1. 
369 DA 433b 11-13; cf. Met. 1072a 26-27; MA 700b 35-701a 1. .., 
370 Aristotle's description of the external object, rather than orexis, as the fir~t mover .lmplIes that he ~as m 
mind animal locomotion that proceeds towards a specific end rather than an mdetermmate end. That IS, he 
is thinking about the procedure (i) "I am hungry. 1 want a sandwich." rather than (ii) "~ am hungry. I want 
some food (any kind of food)." (i) leads to a determinate action and (ii) to an.indet~fIDlnate one. Although 
we might think that (i) would not be possible in the case of irrationallocomouve arumals other than hum~ 
beings, Aristotle does not appear to agree with us. His statement at MA 701a 16-25 suggests that he IS 
indifferent to such a distinction. 
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articulated object. However, Aristotle's emphasis that an object must be that which is 
realisable
371 
suggests that the object in question must generally exist in reality. 
The necessity of the external object is thus in harmony with the survival of the 
individual. In other words, the object can be the final aition in so far as it satisfies the end 
of the individual. Aristotle at times says that the soul is the final aition of the living being 
(e.g. 415b 15-22). Now it appears to mean that the animal has the capacity for maintaining 
its own life. However, this capacity must be differentiated from its capacity for orexis. Of 
course, the animal has the capacity for desiring something for its survival. Our earlier 
claims in III. 2 (c) that the lower ends are for the ultimate end and in IV. 1 (a) that the 
higher faculty of the soul comprehends the lower ones have shown that all the faculties of 
the soul are for the survival of the individual: it is not one or more than one faculty that is 
necessary for the survival of an individual. It might be disappointing to find out that 
Aristotle's conception of soul does not tell us much about how the animal has such a 
capacity: it only tell us that it is so and so. Nonetheless, we have learned from Aristotle's 
discussion that the mere presence of the external object on its own does not affect the 
animal, unless the animal has such a capacity to present it to itself as desirable. In this 
sense, to say that the soul is the formal aition is to say that the animal has such a capacity to 
move around for food which is necessary for its end, i.e. its survival. 372 
The animal's possession of the capacity for orexis is traced back by Aristotle from his 
observation of its locomotion. He takes a considerable leap of deductive reasoning from the 
. h . 373 H . 
conviction that what is true in a small world must be true m t e uruverse. owever, III 
inferring an animal's capacity for orexis Aristotle would not require such a leap. What he 
371 MA 700b 24-25; cf. 701a 23-25; DA 433b 15. . . . . 
372 Cf. Ch. II. 3 on Aristotle's attempt to establish the hierarchy III different senses of mtw (PA 639b 11-
16). 
373 Ph. 252b 25-29; cf. 252a 29-30; MA 698a 8-14; b 8-15; 699a 22-27. 
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needs is to witness different reactions of the animal to the same conditions or the same 
reactions to different conditions. Some animals sometimes move for the food over there 
, 
whereas they sometimes do not, though seeing the food. The observation of those animals' 
different reactions to the same conditions is enough for one to conclude that the food is not 
the very force that triggers animal locomotion; that is, animals must also have some inner 
conditions such a state as feeling hungry and the orexis to pursue or avoid the food. 
Nonetheless, we cannot think of the actual satisfaction of the animal's state of hunger 
without reference to the existence of food in the environment. An easy way of interpreting 
orexis as an unmoved mover might be suggested in relation to Aristotle's statement that "if 
we exclude the motion of the universe, living creatures are responsible for the motion of 
everything else ... " (701b 11 ff.). In this way, he might be saying that "if we exclude the 
affection of the environment," then orexis embodied in pneuma can be said to be an 
unmoved mover. Orexis is orexis for something and it can be actualised or satisfied only in 
relation to the external object. In other words, the object does not exist in the environment 
because the animal has orexis for it. In this sense, orexis embodied in pneuma374 cannot be 
the unmoved mover when it is considered in relation to the objecs of orexis in the 
environment. Thus he can legitimately claim that the animal is a moved-mover in relation to 
the environment, but it is, nonetheless, a self-mover since it has the proximate reason for 
locomotion, which is orexis (cf 701a 33-35). On the other hand, Aristotle's attempt to 
characterise orexis and pneuma as moved movers and to derive the existence of pneuma 
from the animal's capacity for orexis may well be mirrored as implying that he is thinking of 
an essential connection between the two. 
374 I think that Aristotle has the embodied orexis in mind when he talks about its movability. For he finnly 
maintains that all the soul-faculties as such are exempt from any kind of motion. 
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(ii) Aristotle's Top-Down Explanation 
Let us now turn to the implication of the second point of the A1A passage at 703a 4-6 
cited earlier. In that passage, Aristotle undoubtedly shows his conviction that since in 
locomotion there is a psychological process that involves orexis, there must (OEt) be a 
corresponding material substance which soon turns out to be the sumphuton pneuma (703a 
4-6). However, does he also hold that the presence of pneuma is sufficient for explaining 
the capacity for orexis? 
Considering the point that pneuma belongs to all living beings, it might not be 
immediately clear why in the account of animal locomotion Aristotle needs the conception. 
However, MA 701 b 2 ff. suggests that he initially postulates it as a criterion for 
distinguishing animal locomotion from the motion of the puppet (701b 2 ff.). In the first 
instance, the criterion seems to be based on their material or physiological differences. 
However, Aristotle's intention in emphasising the physiological difference is eventually to 
bring out the psychological capacities that only the living being has (cf 703a 4 if). In 
stating the reason for the physiological differences of alteration, he says that it is relevant to 
the capacities for 'phantasia, sense-perceptions and ideas' (701b 16-17). That is, he is 
saying that since alteration is due to psychological capacities, what is capable of it has such 
a physiological characteristic. In this way, he suggests that it is not the case that every 
automaton-like organism can have psychological capacities. Thus, if something does not 
have such a physiological characteristic, it does not have psychological capacities, either. 
Indeed, this line of interpretation is on a par with Aristotle's idea developed in the DA that 
it is not reasonable to say that the soul pities, fears, desires, etc., but the living being as a 
whole does so with the soul (e.g. 408b 1-17). 
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As shown above, pneuma is involved in various animal activities such as the digestion of 
food (pneuma in the stomach), the transportation of the perceived data (pneuma in the 
poroi), the transmission of the soul to the offspring (pneuma in the semen), the arrangement 
of the bodily parts for locomotion (pneuma in the heart), and so forth. Also, its amount is a 
significant factor in distinguishing sexes, parts of the animal, species of animals, and so on. 
Furthermore, since there is no doubt that Aristotle closely relates it to orexis, if there is 
anything that accounts for the animal's capacity for orexis in physiological terms, then it is 
the material substance 'pneuma'. It thus appears reasonable to think that, as Nussbaum and 
Rist point out,375 he wants to relate the goal-directedness of locomotion to pneuma. 
However, considering that not only locomotive animals, but all living beings, have the 
connate pneuma, we must not assume that its goal-directedness is related to its role in 
locomotion only. There are, as I have said earlier, other forms of pursuit than the goal-
directed locomotion. But how can Aristotle explain why some animals are capable of 
locomotion for an end and others are not, despite the fact that all of them have pneuma? As 
he accounts for different species of animals in terms of different faculties of the soul, he can 
presumably explain the different species in physiological terms, i. e. in terms of the 
temperature and amount of pneuma. For instance, the indeterminate locomotion of some 
animals can be explained in terms of their insufficient amount of pneuma for the capacity for 
locomotion in their blood, whereas locomotive animals can be explained in terms of the 
sufficient amount of pneuma for it. If so, it appears that the goal-directedness of animal 
locomotion can be also explained in terms of pneuma. 
However, the initial question we raised earlier is whether Aristotle thinks that such and 
such an animal is capable of locomotion because it has a certain amount of pneuma, i. e. the 
375 Nussbaum (1978), p. 146 & p. 160 if.; Rist (1989), p. 131 if. 
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amount necessary for it to have such a capacity. As noted, the problem with the materialist 
account of the living being is, if it is described simply in terms of purely material 
components, how we can explain such a distinct activity that involves intention. Despite 
this problem, the denial of any independent non-corporeal substance as a component of the 
living being inevitably drives us to account for its activities in terms of material components. 
One might think that the attempt to account for living activities in that way seems to contain 
some form of hylozoism, viz. 'the view that matter is endowed with a kind of life' .376 
Indeed, the Stoics' conception of pneuma might well be understood in this fashion. The 
Stoics also ascribe a central role to pneuma: (i) they think that it is connate 'warm air' with 
which living beings are born and (ii) they also account for various living activities in terms 
of pneuma and the hierarchy, or scale, of the beings in terms of its different degrees of 
tension. 377 (iii) They also explain that the feeling of pleasure and pain brings about 
expansion and contraction. Such emotions as pleasure and pain are described as irrational 
movements of the soul or weaknesses in it. 378 The Stoics think that the soul itself is that 
which expands or contracts. However, the pneuma identified with soul is not any pneuma, 
'but a specific level of pneuma, with the degree of tension required for it to function as 
pneuma psuchikon, the pneuma of the soul' .379 In this way, the Stoics explain different 
classes of animals only in material or physiological terms. Thus they appear to believe that 
psychological activities can be also explained in terms of material constituents and 
380 
structures. 
376 Verdenius (1983), p. 101; cf. Rist (1989), p. 131. 
377 For the Stoic conception of pneuma, see e.g. Long and S.edl~y .(1987),. esp. 47 A-T; Annas (1992), pp. 
37-70. Extensive references to the Stoics can be found in then blbhographies. 
378 Cf. Annas (1992), pp. 103-113; Long and Sedley (1987), e.g. 65 A. 
379 Annas (1987), p. 53. See e.g. Long and Sedley (1987),47 N. 
380 See Long and Sedley (1987), 45 A-H and their commentaries on the fragments. 
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Looking at Aristotle's account of the relationship between orexis and pneuma from the 
Stoic point of view, it seems that we might be able to identify their states since we can 
explain that an animal is in the state of pleasure if we can observe the heating and chilling of 
the pneuma in the heart. Similarly, the expansion and contraction of the heart area by 
pneuma is identifiable with the subject's state of orexis. This, however, is not the case for 
Aristotle. Aristotle tells us that looking only at a material or physiological side of a living 
being is not sufficient to account for what it is, but it is also necessary to look at its 
psychological side which differs in kind from the former. He would say that if material 
constituents and structures were all there are to constitute a living being, then we could 
construct a living being out of matter. If they were, Aristotle would acknowledge the 
resurrection of a living body out of a lump of matter. One immediate piece of evidence 
against this view is his homonymy principle that distinguishes a dead body from a living 
body and that emphasises the significance of the form (see Ch. II). In effect, at DA e.g. 
408b 1 ff. Aristotle has made it clear that the change of a living being cannot be explained in 
terms either of the soul or the body alone without involving each other. Moreover, his 
statement at MA 703a 4-6 cited earlier immediately suggests that he is trying to find a 
corresponding bodily substance whose activity can be placed on the same level as that of the 
psychological activity. For Aristotle, pneuma itself is not the soul, though he wants to 
relate it closely to the capacity for orexis. However, he derives the animal's possession of 
pneuma from its possession of the capacity for orexis, but not the other way around. 381 
When Aristotle is concerned with living beings, he does not ask why plants should have 
only the capacity for nutrition and reproduction. But he rather asks what kinds of bodily 
parts are necessary for them to perform their activities. Moreover, for him the activities of 
381 See e.g. Burnyeat (1992), esp. pp. 22-23; M. Frede (1992), p. 97 ff. 
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the animal are not any activities, but activities for the sake of an end,382 which is the survival 
of the individual and, also, the preservation of its species. All the same, the question about 
why locomotive animals move towards a specific end is not to ask why they should have the 
capacity for locomotion, but what the capacity is for and what kinds of physiological parts 
and structures are necessary for the capacity (e.g. PA 662a 33-b 14). As noted, Aristotle 
ascribes the locomotive faculty to those living beings that are capable of determinate 
locomotion; that is, he employs the faculty to explain why such locomotion is peculiar to 
some animals. Given that there is such a psychological capacity that accounts for 
locomotion, Aristotle embarks on searching for a physiological substance that is necessary 
for completing the overall picture of them. For a psychological capacity to be actualised it 
must be embodied (e.g. DA 414a 19 ff.). Indeed, locomotion is of the animal, not of the 
soul apart from the body. The conception of pneuma emerges at this stage in the need for 
explaining in what kind of a physiological substance orexis should be actualised. 
Although this line of top down explanation is granted for Aristotle, one might still 
remain unconvinced. For it is one thing to claim that a living being cannot be explained only 
in terms of its material constituents, quite another to explain away the impression that it, 
nonetheless, seems possible to identify it with, or explain it in terms of, the state of matter. 
That is, according to our earlier discussion, it does appear that if we could examine the 
exact amount or temperature of the pneuma in the heart, we could identify the state of 
feeling pleasant with, explain it in terms of, the state of the pneuma. For the feeling of 
pleasure or pain always involves the heating or chilling of pneuma. 
However we have to note that the point of the identity theory is that, if A can be , 
identified with B, B must be identified with A. Thus it seems that, if Aristotle maintains that 
382 See Furley (1996), pp. 74-76. Cf. Sorabji's argument that a function of animal bodily parts is not only 
for survival, but also for other goods (1964, p. 293 if.). 
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the feeling of pleasure and pain is due to only phantasia, for instance, then he has to 
acknowledge that the type of the state of pneuma in the heart will be identified with the 
state of phantasia and commit himself to the type-type identity theory. However, we saw 
in Ch. IV that the feeling of pleasure or pain might also be aroused by sense-perception or 
thought. 383 In effect, we saw that Aristotle appears to maintain that there are four possible 
types of the locomotive faculty or the source of locomotion; that is, in arousing locomotion, 
there might be a combination of (i) sense-perception and orexis, (ii) sense-perception, 
phantasia, and orexis, (iii) phantasia and orexis, or (iv) thought and orexis .. Thus, even if 
we could examine the state of pneuma, we cannot tell whether the feeling that arouses 
orexis is due to sense-perception, phantasia, or thought. For the same reason, the 
expansion or contraction of pneuma cannot be identified with orexis. For there is no way to 
tell which of the psychological capacities are involved in the arousal of it. All the same, 
when we observe an animal's locomotion, we cannot tell what kind of locomotive faculty is 
involved. 
In consequence, although, at first glance, Aristotle's claim that the actualisation of a 
particular type of a psychological capacity necessitates a particular change of the material 
substance 'pneuma' appears to suggest his commitment to the type-type identity theory, this 
is not the case since he does not acknowledge the reverse. We can explain Aristotle's anti-
reductionism in a similar way. The four types of locomotive faculty suggest that Aristotle's 
ground for resisting the reduction of the psychological to the material relies on the belief 
that the talk of the state of pneuma does not explain what kind of locomotive faculty it 
refers to. That is, since the psychological cannot be explained wholly in terms of the 
mateterial, Aristotle evades any commitment to reductionism. 
383 See Ch. IV, esp. Sec. 2 (b) and (c). 
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Summary 
Aristotle believes that what it is to be an animal organ that fu t" , 
nc Ions m a certam way 
(though the organ might be structured differently in a different species of the animal) and, 
more generally, what it is to be an animal of a certain species have a close relation to the 
involvement of the fundamental material substance pneuma in the animal. As noted, for him 
the structure of the bodily organs of the animal is related to its capacity for performing the 
activities that are necessary, in the end, for its survival. And the animal has such a capacity 
in virtue of its soul. 
The question we have raised in the present chapter is whether Aristotle would 
acknowledge that such a capacity can be actualised in anything other than the physiological 
substance, pneuma, There is no doubt that his introduction of pneuma is to explain the 
activities of the living being. For instance, Aristotle appears to think that for an animal to 
arouse locomotion, it must have pneuma that plays the role of changing heat or coolness to 
expansion or contraction. His ascription of such characteristics to pneuma appears 
conceptual rather than empirical since he derives the necessity of that sort of substance from 
the necessity to explain living beings' activities. That is, he discovers the substance from 
the observation of animal activities rather than the direct observation of pneuma. For 
instance, from the observation of an animal's movement in place he infers that it must have 
the capacity to perceive an object at a distance, the capacity to desire what appears to be 
pleasant, and the capacity to move. From this inference, he again infers what kind of 
material substance the animal requires in order to be capable of its capacities. He could 
have named pneuma differently. However, this does not mean that Aristotle allows that 
there might be some other substance in which the soul-capacities can be actualised. That is, 
he does not consider the possibility of the existence of any other substance that might have 
243 
the same characteristics as pneuma does. Aristotle does admit that different animals might 
have differently structured sense organs for the same function. However, when it goes 
down to their ultimate constituents, he does not think that there are any other elements than 
the simple bodies and pneuma. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis initially raised the questions whether Aristotle acknowledges the existence of 
the self-mover and in what way he accounts for its motion. In dealing with those questions, 
we have examined Aristotle's resolutions to the following theses: 
(i) Everything that moves is moved by something else. 
(ii) The living being initiates its motion without being moved by anything else 
other than itself. 
(iii) The living being has two parts, the unmoved moving part (the soul) and the 
moved part (the body). 
(iv) The soul is not moved by anything else, though it might be accidentally moved 
by virtue of being embodied. 
(v) The soul is a mover (in the Ph.) or an aition (in the DA) of the body. 
(vi) The body of the living being must be en souled 
(vii) A dead body is not a body at all. 
The 'something' in (i) is an external mover since it is based on Aristotle's conviction that 
everything is ultimately moved by the first mover of the universe. Thus, anyone who 
believes, or wishes to argue, that Aristotle acknowledges the existence of the self-mover, 
i.e. (ii), first of all has to find a way to explain (i), since (i) denies any such existence from 
the outset. The difficulty arises when one thinks of (i) and (ii) as incompatible with each 
other and tries to accept one and dismiss another. F or there is no doubt that Aristotle 
consistently endorses both theses. (iii) might well be taken to imply the approval of (ii) 
because it suggests that the living being as a whole does not necessarily require any external 
mover. 
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However, the suggestion that Aristotle denies (i) on the ground of (iii) is rejected by the 
passages at Ph. VIII. 2, 253a 11-20 and 6, 259b 6-17 where he relates the motion of the 
living being to the environment, which is ultimately related to the first mover In contrast 
. , 
those passages cannot be taken as conclusive evidence for the denial of (ii) because, also, of 
the implication of (iii). I thus argued that Aristotle adopts a compromising view between (i) 
and (ii), namely, he is searching for a special status for the motion of the living being while, 
at the same time, maintaining the claim that it requires external movers. 
In effect, (i) conflicts not only with (ii), but also with the conception of nature defined as 
the source of motion that belongs to all natural beings including non-living beings. The 
point is that Aristotle's introduction of (iii) is to distinguish the motion of the living being 
(i.e. self-motion) from the motion of the non-living being (i.e. natural motion), not to claim 
that self-motion is exempt absolutely from the thesis (i); that is, Aristotle thinks that (iii) 
satisfies (ii), but not (i). He, in effect, conceives (iii) as a characteristic mark of self-motion 
of which the living being is capable. Theses (iv)-(vii) articulate the characteristics of the 
internal parts and their relationships with one another. The question about the implications 
of (iv)-(vii) is eventually narrowed down to the question of how to understand Aristotle's 
hylomorphic distinction between soul and body. 
It is clear that Aristotle's hylomorphism is applicable to the animal as well as the 
artefact, both of which have the simple bodies as their constituents. This promptly suggests 
that Aristotle might have maintained that the soul-body relationship is contingent because 
the form-matter relationship in the case of the artefact (that is also composed of the simple 
bodies) is no doubt contingent. However, this is only an attempt to understand the soul-
body relationship of the living being from the form-matter relationship of the artefact, but 
never to understand the latter from the former. We saw in Chapter I that Aristotle contrasts 
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living beings' capacity to produce two-way motion with non-living beings' one-way motion. 
However, non-living beings here are not artefacts, but the simple bodies. This might well be 
taken to suggest that Aristotle thinks that the soul-body relationship of living beings must 
be understood as the form-matter relationship of the simple bodies, not as that of artefacts. 
On the other hand, if all sublunary beings are composed only of the simple bodies, then 
the difference between living beings and artefacts is the difference in proportions of the four 
simple bodies constituting them. And the distinction between them appears merely 
conceptual. However, in distinguishing the locomotion of the animal and the locomotion of 
the puppet (which is no doubt an example of the artefact) in the MA, Aristotle introduces 
pneuma, which is a physiological substance that belongs only to the animal. Thus the 
animal is distinguished from the puppet on the ontological level. Also, Aristotle's remarks 
on the conception in the biological writings are sufficient to show that he thinks of it as an 
indispensable physiological substance the presence of which distinguishes the animal from 
the puppet. 
Nonetheless, Aristotle does not say that if something involves certain materials as its 
constituents, it necessarily has certain capacities, but, in fact, the other way around; that is, 
the animal is constituted of such and such elements, because it has those capacities. This is, 
I think, his primary reason for giving priority to the soul in the DA and in Met. VII. 
However, we can often witness that Aristotle is, nevertheless, anxious for the reader not to 
be misled by his statements. He thus at times tells us that the physiological aspect must not 
be forgotten or ignored. This tendency is more explicitly shown in Ph. VIII where he 
discusses the problem of self-motion in general and in the MA where he focuses on self-
locomotion. In both treatises, Aristotle treats the soul and the body in terms of the 
unmoved moving part and the moved part in Ph. VIII and in terms of the psychological 
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process and the physiological process in the MA. It has been clear that there cannot be the 
soul without the body or the body without the soul and, also, that the soul itself is not the 
body. The living being has the essential body without which the soul cannot be actualised at 
all. 
In the present thesis, I have focused on analysing Aristotle's remarks on the involvement 
of the psychological and the physiological activities in the arousal of locomotion. We saw 
in Chapter III that Aristotle's emphasis on animal locomotion is to claim that the capacity 
for sense-perception is not for its own sake, but for the sake of bringing about orexis and 
locomotion (which is ultimately necessary for maintaining life). That is, granting that the 
locomotive animal has the capacity for nutrition and the contact senses, it also requires the 
capacity for either sense-perception (the distance senses) or phantasia or thought each of 
which brings about orexis and, eventually, locomotion. However, to say that the animal has 
such soul-capacities that bring about its locomotion is not to say that the animal is capable 
of locomotion without reference to the presence of the external object, but to say that its 
presence is not a sufficient condition for bringing about locomotion without the capacities in 
the animal. 
However, this explanation does not show any significant difference between natural 
motion and self-motion. For, as seen, the simple bodies also have some capacity of their 
own without which they are not capable of exercising their one-way natural motion. In 
other words, whether it is one-way motion or two-way motion, Aristotle undoubtedly 
acknowledges that the agent must have a certain capacity within itself in order to arouse its 
own motion. However, the characterisation of the two-way motion of the living being is 
not only to say that the living being has a nature to move itself when nothing hinders or, in 
other words, when sufficient external conditions are provided, but also to say that it has a 
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nature not to move even in such a case, depending on its internal condition. That is, the 
simple bodies tend to actualise their natures to move themselves whenever sufficient 
external conditions are provided, whereas, in the case of animal locomotion the animal 
, 
might or might not move around even if delicious food is always nearby. That is, animal 
locomotion depends on the animal's inner state of hunger, whereas the motion of the simple 
bodies largely depends on external conditions. However, it is to be noted that the 
expression that 'the motion of the simple bodies depends on external conditions' must be 
distinguished from the expression that 'their motion is explicable by referring only to 
external conditions'. F or their motion is explicable in terms of external conditions given 
that they have within themselves the sources to actualise their natures. 
Furley states that "1 am not sure that it would be worth struggling [for Aristotle] to 
retain the concept of the animal soul as unmoved mover. 384 The point is that external 
objects are not in themselves sufficient causes for the voluntary movements of animals. But 
they do have some effect on the soul, and it would be obstinate of Aristotle to deny that the 
effect can be called a movement." 1 think that Furley's uncertainty is due to his neglect of 
the fact that Aristotle's reason for discussing self-motion is not only to consider it in 
relation to the first mover of the universe, but also to distinguish it from the motion of non-
living beings. As shown, external conditions are sufficient neither for the arousal of self-
motion nor for the arousal of natural motion. Thus the phrase that 'external objects are not 
in themselves sufficient causes' cannot explain the distinct motion of the animal from that of 
the simple bodies. The point is rather that, granting that animals have their natures to move 
themselves and that there are sufficient external conditions, they, nonetheless, might not 
384 Furley (1978), p. 65. 
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move around. This capacity for not moving around is also described as their nature which , 
is a good reason to describe animal soul as an unmoved mover. 
Aristotle's theory of self-motion appears plausible when, and only when, we accept that 
the self-mover is also under the influence of the ultimate first mover which is responsible for 
the motions of all natural beings. In contrast, when the two conceptions are considered as 
incompatible, we face a serious difficulty from the outset. We have seen that Aristotle does 
not think of self-motion in an unqualified sense. On the basis of our earlier claims that both 
the simple bodies and the living being are moved movers when they are considered with 
reference to the first mover of the universe and that Aristotle's hylomorphism is applicable 
to all natural beings, we can now conclude that although there is such a clear difference 
between the two types of motion, we can explain both of them in terms of nature in the 
sense of the soul (or the psychological capacity) or in the sense of the form alone in so far 
as the essential physiological (or material) substance is presupposed or taken for granted.385 
There is no doubt that, since Aristotle ascribes a special role to pneuma that exists only 
in the living being, it deserves a scrutiny in giving an account of the living being. I have 
chosen locomotion as an example because it clearly shows not only the role of pneuma, but 
also the involvement of other psychological activities. However, focusing on animal 
locomotion gives one resolution to one disputed question and leaves at least two further 
questions unanswered. Firstly, since the arousal of locomotion involves other psychological 
activities, the analysis of the relation between locomotion and pneuma shows that not only 
locomotion itself, but other activities involved in arousing it, must involve a physiological 
change (which undermines the claim that there is no physiological change in the activities of 
385 See Lloyd (1992), pp. 52-53. 
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sense-perception, thought,386 etc.).387 On the other hand, it is not quite clear how our 
analysis of animal locomotion concerning the relationship between soul and body can be 
applied to plants, though it was partially dealt with. F or instance, there is a question 
whether Aristotle can evade reductionism in the case of nutrition and reproduction of the 
plant in the same way as he did in the case of animal locomotion. Also, there arises a 
question about human actions involving moral responsibility. That is, if the capacity for 
self-motion is ascribed to all living beings (so non-human living beings are also responsible 
for their own motions), why should human beings alone be said to be responsible for their 
actions? 
My interpretation of pneuma as an essential substance without which soul-capacities 
cannot be actualised is, of course, based on Aristotle's actual remarks on the conception of 
pneuma. Nonetheless, the authenticity of my interpretation is still subject to dispute since it 
is not possible to know what Aristotle really had in mind or whether he really gave as much 
weight to the conception as I do. However, this kind of uncertainty is indeed the main 
reason why the correct interpretation of Aristotle's hylomorphic distinction between soul 
and body has been unceasingly disputed over the last two millennia. Since such an 
uncertainty is inevitable, what we can do is to collect as much evidence as possible and try 
to make the best sense of it. 
386 It is to be noted that my claim is that, in so far as the rational faculty is .involved in. the arousal of 
locomotion, it must involve a physiological change. Thus I am not concerned WIth the Special status of the 
active nous. 11' ) h ' d th ht 
387 To recapitulate: I have discussed in Ch. IV that sense-percepti~n (e.g. sme Ing, P antasla, an, oug 
play the role of recognising an object as pleasant or painful and, In Ch. V, that, whenever the arumal ~eels 
pleasant or painful, the pneuma in the heart becomes hot or cold. On the other hand, wh~n\'er the arumal 
h 'th el'ther expands or contracts Thus I have concluded that there IS undoubtedly a as oreXIS, e pneuma '. . . ., f 
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